Commentary

Volume Sixty-eight, Number Four, October 1979

Black Anti-Semitism on the Rise

Murray Friedman

The Socialists and the PLO

Carl Gershman

The Lawyers' War Against Democracy

Franklin Hunt

A New Soviet Strategy

Francis Fukuyama

Women as Conservative Rabbis?

Ruth R. Wisse

FICTION:
Elizabeth Hardwick and Mary McCarthy
Pearl K. Bell

MOVIES:
Coppola's Folly
Richard Grenier

BOOKS:
James A. Nuechterlein
David Biale
Joseph W. Bishop, Jr.
Milton Klonsky
Richard Pipes

PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE / $2.50

ARCHIVE OF JEWISH LIFE
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

We Plus Ultra.

The Ultra People have discovered
The Ultra Scotch.
Its name, "Ne Plus Ultra," simply means
that there's nothing better.
Ultra smooth. Ultra mellow.
(It should be after 12 years of aging.)
A quality difficult to put words to.
But try it yourself.
Our special taste is hard to convey in an ad.
But easy to convey in a glass.

12

Ne Plus Ultra

The Ultra Scotch.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Some energy tasks are too big for small tools.

It will take an estimated $250 billion to develop the domestic energy the nation will need during the next five years.

Small companies can play a role in providing this energy, but many projects require the funds and technology that only large companies can furnish.

For example, in the Gulf of Mexico, Conoco and several other firms—large and small—are developing a petroleum field in over 1,000 feet of water, the deepest water in which petroleum has ever been produced.

Total cost of this project will be some $800 million—the bulk of which will come from the larger companies, providing an opportunity for the small firms to join a venture they could not handle on their own.

This year, Conoco expects to spend almost $1.5 billion—two thirds of it in the United States—to develop energy and related petrochemicals. We also plan to put the additional income from decontrol of crude oil prices into developing more U.S. energy.

At a time when some people would limit the size of energy companies, we think it is worth noting the vital contribution that large companies are making.

conoco

Doing more with energy.

Conoco Inc., Stamford, CT 06904. © 1979

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Commentary

VOLUME 68 NUMBER 4 *OCTOBER 1979*

Articles	31	Black Anti-Semitism on the Rise *Murray Friedman*
	36	The Socialists and the PLO *Carl Gershman*
	45	The Lawyers' War Against Democracy *Franklin Hunt*
	52	A New Soviet Strategy *Francis Fukuyama*
	59	Women as Conservative Rabbis? *Ruth R. Wisse*
Fiction	65	Elizabeth Hardwick and Mary McCarthy *Pearl K. Bell*
Movies	67	Coppola's Folly *Richard Grenier*
Letters	6	from *Berl Falbaum, Ralph S. Pollock, Martin F. Herz, Walter A. Sheldon, Michael M. Kaplan, Howard R. Olson, Jr., Ella Wolfe, Frances Stewart, Paul P. Streeten, P.T. Bauer, Milton Birnbaum, Hyam Maccoby, Maxwell Ross, Denes Agay, Samuel Lipman, Edward N. Luttwak, Ilya Levin, Sol W. Sanders, Charles A. Krohn, Charles Horner,* and others
Books in Review	74	The Neoconservatives, by Peter Steinfels *James A. Nuechterlein*
	79	Surviving and Other Essays, by Bruno Bettelheim *David Biale*
	82	Senator, by Elizabeth Drew *Joseph W. Bishop, Jr.*
	84	William Blake, by Jack Lindsay *Milton Klonsky*
	86	How the Soviet Union Is Governed, by Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod *Richard Pipes*

Editor: Norman Podhoretz
Executive Editor: Neal Kozodoy
Managing Editor: Marion Magid
Associate Editor: Brenda Brown
Contributing Editors: Robert Alter, Milton Himmelfarb, Walter Laqueur
Comptroller: Philip Shamis
Production Manager: Bruce Lodi
Circulation Manager: Helene Hansen
Cover: The Drawing Board, Inc.

COMMENTARY is published monthly by the American Jewish Committee—Single copy is $2.50, $24 a year; 3 years $64; 5 years $96—Add $4.00 per year for all foreign, including Canada and Latin America—Second class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices.

Copyright © 1979 by the American Jewish Committee; all rights reserved under International and Pan American Copyright Conventions—Indexed in *Readers' Guide, Book Review Digest, Public Affairs Information Service, Index to Jewish Periodicals, ABC Pol Sci, Historical Abstracts,* and *America: History and Life*—Unsolicited manuscripts must be accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed return envelope.

Publication Number ISSN 0010-2601
EDITORIAL & BUSINESS OFFICES: 165 E. 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Which do you prefer you?

CHIVAS REGAL • 1.75 LITER BOTTLE • 12 YEARS OLD • BLENDED SCOTCH WHISKY • 86 PROOF • GENERAL WINE & SPIRITS CO., N.Y., N.Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Why this one-of-a-kind invention didn't end up as the only one of its kind.

Every new invention needs another new invention—the one that can mass-produce it at an affordable cost.

For example, Bell Labs invented a process for making the glass rods from which hair-thin fibers used in lightwave communications can be drawn. The fibers have far greater capacity than conventional copper wires, so they'll help keep costs down. In fact, they've been carrying voice, data, and video signals under city streets for about two years in a Bell System demonstration.

But standard lightwave systems will require *miles* of the fiber, produced at low cost and to specifications nothing short of microscopic.

That's where Western Electric's Engineering Research Center comes in.

A Unique Center

The Center is devoted exclusively to manufacturing research.

Here, a highly trained team of scientists and engineers probe fundamental questions about materials and processes. They provide Western Electric factories with pre-tested, proven ways to manufacture products based on the latest technology coming out of the laboratory.



For example, while Bell Labs scientists were inventing new glass fibers, Western Electric engineers and scientists were tackling the manufacturing problems involved.

The fibers had to be drawn from molten glass at high speeds, with less than a 1% deviation in diameter.

But how do you control a "thread" of glass being spun at rates up to 15 feet per second?

Scientists and engineers at the Center discovered that laser light beamed onto the fiber cast a characteristic pattern. By correlating the pattern to the fiber's diameter, they were able to build a monitoring system into the fiber drawing machinery. It measures the fiber 1000 times per second, automatically adjusting production to keep the diameter constant.

The system works so well that in all the miles of fiber produced by Western Electric, the diameter varies by no more than 30-millionths of an inch.

The Key to the Future

In the Bell System, technology is the key to keeping costs down. It is the key to constantly improving your phone service.

And Western Electric's Engineering Research Center is an essential link between the ideas of the laboratory and the realities of the factory.

So your Bell Telephone Company can make the best one-of-a-kind inventions a part of your phone service.

Keeping your communications system the best in the world.

Western Electric

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Statement of Aims

In sponsoring COMMENTARY, the American Jewish Committee aims to meet the need for a journal of significant thought and opinion on Jewish affairs and contemporary issues. Its pages will be hospitable to diverse points of view and belief, and it hopes to encourage original creative endeavor in the various fields of culture. The opinions and views expressed by COMMENTARY's contributors and editors are their own, and do not necessarily express the Committee's viewpoint or position. The sponsorship of COMMENTARY by the Committee is in line with its general program to enlighten and clarify public opinion on problems of Jewish concern, to fight bigotry and protect human rights, and to promote Jewish cultural interest and creative achievement in America.

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Richard Maass, *President*

The Commentary Publication Committee

Frederick P. Rose, *Chairman*

Norman E. Alexander
Donald M. Blinken
Charles D. Breitel
Naomi W. Cohen
Theodore Ellenoff
Edward E. Elson
Richard C. Ernst
Edith U. Fierst
Maurice Glinert
Robert H. Haines
Lewis J. Laventhol
Bess Myerson
Ned Pines
David Sher
John Slawson
Alan M. Stroock*
Laurence A. Tisch
Ben Touster
Gerard Weinstock

**Honorary Member*

Letters from Readers

Watergate

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Congratulations to James A. Nuechterlein for giving some perspective to a tragic event in American political history ["Watergate: Toward a Revisionist View," August]. Mr. Nuechterlein should also be commended for calling attention to Judge John J. Sirica's sometimes questionable judicial conduct. Although I am not a defender of Watergate, I was appalled, from the beginning, by Judge Sirica's apparent violation of judicial standards. His book, and also his comments in interviews, only support the view that he does not have a full understanding of judicial demeanor. . . . It is about time someone raised the points Mr. Nuechterlein does.

BERL FALBAUM

Oak Park, Michigan

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

James A. Nuechterlein's article is one of the most regrettable pieces I have seen on the subject. The self-serving books and statements published by some of the convicted participants are more comprehensible than the author's "revisionist" views.

The most unforgivable aspect of the article is Mr. Nuechterlein's obvious ignorance of much of the factual record. To place reliance on the assertions and views of a Maurice H. Stans, whose credibility throughout left much to be desired, and at the same time to express such unwarranted and niggardly criticism of Judge Sirica, who contributed so much to the resolution of the break-in and cover-up conspiracies, raises a not-so-slight question of perspective, if not judgment.

Perhaps the revisionists are excessively eager to get on with it—with or without facts—because Richard Nixon, the biggest revisionist of them all, has beaten them to the punch.

RALPH S. POLLOCK

Potomac, Maryland

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In his attempt to get Watergate in perspective, James A. Nuechterlein says much that is plausible and that needs to be said, but then ruins it all by saying . . . that no government jobs, "especially ambassadorships, were sold to the highest bidders." He quotes Maurice H. Stans, with an apparent complete suspension of disbelief, as having said to a potential contributor that "Luxembourg was not for sale."

The line of reasoning in the article does not stand or fall by the accuracy of what Stans says about ambassadorships, so it is possible that all the rest of what Stans is quoted as saying, and that Mr. Nuechterlein seems to accept, is correct; but what the former finance chairman of the Committee to Reelect the President says about ambassadorships is certainly untrue. As a matter of fact, Luxembourg did go to the highest bidder, or at least to a contributor to the CRP who ponied up $300,000. Nobody has ever been able to advance any other explanation for Mrs. Ruth B. Farkas's appointment as Ambassador to Luxembourg than the fact that she made that contribution.

Mr. Nuechterlein (or Mr. Stans) might say that this doesn't *prove* that Mrs. Farkas became an American ambassador on the strength of her financial contribution, any more than it could be proved that any of the other large financial contributors to President Nixon's election campaign were appointed as a result of their contributions, and, after all, the Watergate special prosecutor was unable to prove the charge.

I happen to know a good deal about this because I was myself an American ambassador (to Bulgaria), though a non-political career officer, and I was approached for campaign contributions, along with all the others in the ambassadorial category; and I have it from eyewitnesses that Stans solicited money for the 1972 campaign from potential contributors by *holding out the prospect* of ambassadorial appointments to them.

This was not done by way of "auctioning" ambassadorships. Nor was it done by offering an explicit *quid-pro-quo*, which would have been a criminal offense. As the New York *Times* reported on March 17, 1974, from a source involved in the Watergate investigation, the dealings among Stans, Herbert Kalmbach (President Nixon's lawyer), and the would-be ambassadors would go this way: "What you were paying for was to have your name in the hopper. People were told they would only get it [the nomination] if they

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

We asked Americans:

'Will Industry Develop Energy-Efficient Technologies?'

Because Union Carbide's business depends on energy, our future growth depends in part on national policies that encourage new energy technologies. Since public attitudes help shape public policies, we commissioned a survey which included this question on industry's role in achieving greater energy efficiency:

"Is it your feeling that American industry will play a major role in developing methods to reduce the amount of energy it takes to produce the average product or do you feel that (it) will play only a minor role in this?"

Major role	65%
Minor role only	27%
Don't know	8%

Source: Survey conducted for Union Carbide by Roger Seasonwein Associates, Inc. May 1979 national probability sample, by telephone, of 1,000 adults.

Two-thirds say industry will play major role.

As the nation seeks ways to conserve energy by using it more efficiently, 2 out of 3 Americans feel U.S. industry will make a major contribution to the effort. Indeed, industry's energy conservation record to date is good, a fact acknowledged by the Department of Energy (DOE). Yet, in a separate question in the same survey, fewer than half the American public believe industry will do the job on its own.

Industry has made real progress.

Increasing energy prices since the early 1970's have given industry strong incentives to save energy—and to develop ways to use it more efficiently. And these incentives have produced results.

- U.S. industry now produces a unit of output with 18% less energy than in 1973.
- Petrochemical companies like Union Carbide have developed plastics and carbon fibers for auto parts to replace heavier materials previously used—making possible lighter-weight cars that use less gas. In 1978, the average new car contained 165 pounds of plastics—produced from less than 1% of overall U.S. petroleum usage. And that amount is expected to reach 350 pounds per car by 1985.
- Union Carbide has developed new energy-efficient technologies: Our new "H-process" produces low-density polyethylene with just one-fourth the energy of previous methods. And our new process for hardening metal parts can save enough natural gas each year to heat all the homes in a town the size of South Bend.
- Under a contract with DOE, Union Carbide has developed a low-cost silicon material for use in photovoltaic cells which convert sunlight into electricity.

Getting on with the job.

With higher costs and potential energy shortages, it is in Union Carbide's interest to continue to create new energy-efficient technologies. The job can be done better and faster by all of us if we answer the President's call to "join together in a great national effort to use American technology to give us energy security"—and if public policies provide positive support for this effort.

An important first step is to allow U.S. energy prices to reach world levels so that America no longer encourages inefficient use of energy resources. Realistic pricing fosters energy conservation and encourages development of both conventional and alternative energy resources.

Union Carbide already produces a pound of product with almost 20 percent less energy than we required in 1972, and by 1985 we are committed to achieving a 30 percent reduction over the 1972 base year. But even with conservation and more efficient energy utilization, our energy bill will still be more than $2 billion in 1979. The phased decontrol of crude oil prices now underway will clearly increase that amount. While we, like other consumers, don't welcome higher energy bills, we do see realistic energy pricing as a necessary step toward solving the nation's long-term energy problems.

This advertisement is part of a continuing series on public opinions and national concerns.
For more information, write for a complimentary copy of the national survey, "Public Attitudes on Energy." Address: Energy, Union Carbide Corporation, Box G-17, 270 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10017.

UNION CARBIDE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

KNOWING HO
COULD DOUBLE
OF AMERICA
DID YOU HE

Business today is held together by its communication system.

And listening is undoubtedly its weakest link.

Most of us spend about half our business hours listening. Listening poorly. Research studies show that on the average we listen at a 25% level of efficiency.

A statistic that is not only surprisingly low, but terribly costly.

With more than 100 million workers in America, a simple ten dollar listening mistake by each of them would cost a billion dollars.

Letters have to be retyped; appointments rescheduled; shipments reshipped.

And when people in large corporations fail to listen to one another, the results are even costlier.

TELL THE CHAIRMAN WE'VE AGREED TO A MERGER WITH SMATHERS & FLATHERS OVER LUNCH.
TELL THE CHAIRMAN WE'VE AGREED TO DISCUSS A MERGER WITH SMATHERS & FLATHERS OVER LUNCH.
TELL THE CHAIRMAN WE'VE AGREED TO HAVE LUNCH WITH SMATHERS & FLATHERS.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED.

W TO LISTEN THE EFFICIENCY N BUSINESS. AR THAT?

Ideas get distorted by as much as 80% as they travel through the unwieldy chain of command.

Employees feel more and more distant, and ultimately alienated from top management.

Well, as one of the world's largest corporations—with 87,000 employees and five divisions—we at Sperry simply can't afford to pay the price of poor listening.

So we've set up extensive listening programs that Sperry personnel throughout the world can take part in. From sales representatives to computer engineers to the Chairman of the Board.

These programs are making us a lot better at listening to each other. And when you do business with Sperry Univac, or any of our other divisions, you'll discover that they're making us a lot better at listening to you.

SPERRY

We understand how important it is to listen.

Sperry is Sperry Univac computers, Sperry New Holland farm equipment, Sperry Vickers fluid power systems, and guidance and control equipment from Sperry division and Sperry Flight Systems.

How efficient a listener are you?
Write to Sperry, Dept. 4C, 1290 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York 10019, for a listening quiz that's both fun and a little surprising.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED.

were 'qualified,' but they would only send the name over if he contributed."

As a matter of fact, Kalmbach—after having been promised immunity from prosecution—pleaded guilty to a charge that he had promised a prestigious diplomatic post to J. Fyfe Symington in return for $100,000 in political contributions to Republican senatorial candidates in 1970 and to Nixon in 1972. Is it at all likely that Stans, who was in charge of the financial aspects of the Nixon campaign, was unaware of that proven and admitted arrangement?

Former Secretary of State William Rogers had the decency (or perhaps just the prudence) to inform the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1973 that the government "could learn some lessons from Watergate" in the area of campaign funding, and he said, without naming any names, that he and President Nixon had agreed that something should be done about the tradition by which wealthy campaign contributors could "buy" assignments as ambassadors (New York *Times*, March 17, 1974).

Now, whom are we to believe—the President's lawyer (who was promised immunity), a former Secretary of State (who was not involved in Watergate but had knowledge about the purchase of ambassadorships), or Stans, who, when the transactions could not be proved in a court of law, was spared a criminal indictment—and then proceeded to claim that none of this ever happened? Mr. Nuechterlein should read the newspapers more carefully. They have carried news about the "purchase" of ambassadorships for years.

Nor, I must hasten to add, did the practice cease when Jimmy Carter came into office, despite his campaign promises that he would make ambassadorial appointments "strictly on the basis of merit, not reward for political favors." Although other cases could be cited, an egregious one was that of Marvin Warner, an Ohio real-estate developer who had made major campaign contributions to various Democratic candidates and was nominated to be Ambassador to Switzerland. The American Foreign Service Association testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "an examination of Mr. Warner's background suggests that the appointment was a reward for political support and for substantial financial contributions" and that there was "little evidence" that Warner had better qualifications than the career officer with thirty years of diplomatic experience whom he was to replace.

It should be stated that the practice of buying ambassadorships, which has been rampant under both Democrats and Republicans, is actually a case in point for Mr. Nuechterlein's argument that Nixon was charged with offenses that had been committed also by his predecessors and successors. So it is quite unnecessary for the "revisionist" point of his article to claim, or to believe a claim, that Stans was not a party to such transactions. Nor should the complicity of our Congress be overlooked. In every case the Senate, when it approved unqualified nominees, had information showing that they were unqualified and that they owed their nominations to campaign contributions or other political services.

MARTIN F. HERZ
Washington, D.C.

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

James A. Nuechterlein writes that "[T]he only path of historical rehabilitation for Richard Nixon will be the recognition that there was more to his administration than Watergate." But such "historical rehabilitation," if ever undertaken, would be incomplete should it fail to consider Nixon's pre-presidential political career. It might then end up proving that the Watergate cover-up was one of the minor crimes of a political life which from its very start was governed by the un-American concept of the end justifying the means.

WALTER A. SHELDON
Lido Beach, New York

JAMES A. NUECHTERLEIN writes:

I cannot quarrel with Ralph S. Pollock's right to find my article "regrettable," but I do object to his failure in any way to document his charge concerning my "obvious ignorance of much of the factual record." If I got things wrong, he should point out where and how; if he has no specific evidence, he should avoid irresponsible accusations. That holds as well for his disparaging reference to Maurice H. Stans's "credibility." It is precisely that sort of unsubstantiated charge which Stans legitimately complains of in his book. As for my "unwarranted and niggardly" criticism of Judge Sirica, it would again be helpful if Mr. Pollock would deal substantively with the issues I discussed. It is worth noting that my views on those issues are hardly unique: Mr. Pollock will in fact find more severe judgments on Sirica's behavior expressed in the reviews of *To Set the Record Straight* by both Joseph Rauh, Jr. in the *New Republic*—which I cited in my article—and Nicholas von Hoffman in the *New York Review of Books*.

Martin F. Herz raises the question of Maurice H. Stans's credibility in the specific context of the "sale" of ambassadorships. He suggests that what Stans has said about the matter is "certainly untrue," and that I was naive and careless to believe him. Mr. Herz's letter, however, does not make the case he thinks it does. His argument fails because he neglects to make crucial distinctions. Neither Stans nor I have claimed that President Nixon's 1972 fund-raising campaign ended the universal practice by which major contributors to any successful presidential campaign received special consideration for certain ambassadorial posts. That, as Mr. Herz concedes, has been standard operating procedure in all presidential campaigns since time out of mind (and known even to those who do not read their newspapers carefully). What Stans did claim—and what, on the basis of the record, I found plausible—was that no jobs were promised in exchange for contributions. The difference, put simply, is between traditional political practice and criminal offense. Mr. Herz in fact appears implicitly to recognize and acknowledge that distinction in the course of his argument, but he then promptly muddies it up and forgets about it.

That the distinction is no mere quibble can be established by a careful comparison of Mr. Herz's letter with Stans's explanation in *The Terrors of Justice* of how he handled contributors who indicated a desire for a government job:

> No one was "sold" an ambassadorship or any position in the government. I instructed the finance organization a number of times on the record that such deals could not be made. The general policy, specifically worked out in an early meeting with [H.R.] Haldeman, was that if a prospect indicated an interest in serving the government, he was to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



LOVE CAN BE DANGEROUS TO YOUR HEALTH

NIAGARA FALLS, New York—Almost three years ago, the Niagara Gazette, a Gannett newspaper, broke the story of Love Canal.

An environmental time bomb had been ticking in that Upper New York State community, and nobody was doing anything about it—until a reporter for the Niagara Gazette received a very alarming telephone tip.

The caller told of dangerous chemicals being dumped years before in a site where homes and a school were now standing. The caller was worried about the people living there.

The Gazette investigated and found strange things all along Love Canal.

Pungent odors in the school. Murky substances oozing into cellar basements. Flowers not blooming. Pregnant women afraid for their unborn children.

A major environmental disaster that was seriously threatening the health of hundreds of families had been uncovered.

That was in 1976. Now, almost three years and hundreds of Niagara Gazette stories later, the time bomb is being defused.

The federal government and the state have acted to help the people of Love Canal.

Over 300 families have been evacuated. The canal is being cleaned up. And new legislation gives property tax relief to families living nearby.

The Niagara Gazette and its professionals uncovered the story long before it became national news, and stayed with it long after national attention started to fade, because it was and still is a vital community issue.

Throughout, Gannett has supported and encouraged the Gazette's efforts in every way.

They symbolize the things Gannett is most proud of: professional excellence in news coverage and a total commitment to strong, independent service to the community.

At Gannett, we have a commitment to freedom in every business we're in, whether it's newspaper, TV, radio, outdoor advertising or public opinion research.

And so from Wilmington to Denver, from Cincinnati to San Bernardino, every Gannett newspaper, every TV and radio station is free to express its own opinions, free to serve the best interests of its own community in its own way.

Gannett

A World Of Different Voices Where Freedom Speaks

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be told that his desires would be conveyed to the White House after the election, *regardless of the amount he contributed and regardless of whether he made a contribution at all.* He was also to be informed that such appointments would be made only by the President on the basis of qualifications, with the concurrence of the State Department, and after full investigation by the FBI. A record was kept by me of all such persons, and the White House was given a list of them in December 1972. It contained the names of fifty-six individuals interested in foreign-service posts and seven offering to serve in Washington; *more than a third of them had made no contributions or had given minor amounts.* There were no commitments to any of them [emphasis added].

Note that the only significant difference between this account and that of the anonymous source in the New York *Times* cited by Mr. Herz concerns whether or not aspiring ambassadors had to contribute to the campaign in order to be placed on Stans's White House list. Stans says no, and he says the list exists to prove it. Among the names on that list, Stans says further, is that of the man who asked, "How much for Luxembourg?" He was told that no promises could be made, and he thereupon left Stans's office without making a contribution, but his request for office was nonetheless forwarded to the White House. Stans tells of a similar case in which he turned down a $100,000 contribution from a woman who offered it in exchange for assurances that she would be named Ambassador to Haiti. There were, according to Stans's account, many other such offers and many other refusals.

The point at issue becomes even more clear in comparison with the case of Herbert Kalmbach. In the instance that Mr. Herz cites—and which, incidentally, Stans refers to in his book—Kalmbach pleaded guilty to accepting, on behalf of the White House, a contribution of $100,000 from J. Fyfe Symington in exchange for a promise of an ambassadorial position. In that action, which occurred in 1970 when Stans was still Secretary of Commerce and was not involved in campaign fundraising—Kalmbach stepped over the line that Stans insists that he always maintained. And Kalmbach, who testified freely concerning his knowledge of criminal actions connected with Watergate, never implicated Stans in criminal knowledge or wrongdoing in this or other matters. We do not have to choose, then, between the word of Kalmbach and that of Stans: they do not contradict each other. As for the testimony of William Rogers, it seems clearly to have referred to the general practice by which large contributors receive special consideration for office, and not to the specific sale of specific positions. Thus Stans was "spared" a criminal indictment with respect to selling ambassadorships because, after admittedly exhaustive investigation by the Watergate special prosecutor and others, no evidence of criminal behavior could be found.

Mrs. Farkas may not have been particularly qualified for her position and she may have in effect purchased consideration by the White House for it. But that problem—and I agree with Mr. Herz that it is one worthy of attention and correction—is one quite separate from the problem of Watergate and quite separate as well from Maurice H. Stans's credibility as a Watergate witness. Mr. Herz has presented no good evidence that, on this matter at least, Stans has not told us the truth.

Walter A. Sheldon may well be right that a thorough investigation of Richard Nixon's public career will disclose a consistent pattern of improper behavior, but one hopes that the investigation, when it comes, will not be conducted with the presumption of guilt that Mr. Sheldon appears to harbor.

My thanks for the kind comments of Berl Falbaum.

Singer & American Jewry

To the Editor of Commentary:

In his letter in the July issue commenting on "Singer's Paradoxical Progress" by Ruth R. Wisse [February], Rabbi Samuel H. Dresner . . . criticizes the American Jewish community for failing to protest against Isaac Bashevis Singer's Nobel Prize. This is taken as a clear symptom of the depravity of modern American Jewry. I fear, however, that Rabbi Dresner's outrage is based on faulty perceptions. He has a distorted idea of the Polish *shtetl*, he misreads Singer, and he misunderstands the reasons for the present crisis in American Jewish life.

In *The Earth Is the Lord's*, which Rabbi Dresner cites, Abraham Heschel gave us an account of the spiritual ideals of the Polish Jew, specifically of the Polish Hasidim; but ideals are not realities. . . . *Shtetl* culture had many beautiful qualities; it also had many ugly ones. For Rabbi Dresner to suggest that the *shtetl* even came close to embodying the Torah ethic is to confuse ideals with reality. . . . Let Rabbi Dresner read Mendele's stories about the oppression of the Jewish poor, or Peretz's stories about the oppression of Jewish women; these are as much a part of *shtetl* life as hasidic ecstasy.

Rabbi Dresner's second point is that Singer is a neo-pagan who departs from true Jewish teaching. . . . Singer describes what happens when the defenses of our humanity are undermined. But does this imply that Singer rejects Jewish values? Singer's awareness of the power of the demonic leads to the realization that our defenses against it must be strengthened.

Singer has a gift for describing—perhaps better than any other modern author—the human significance of that disintegration of moral order which characterizes the 20th century. It is clear to anyone who really listens to Singer's message that his answer is to reaffirm classical Jewish values. . . .

But I have a feeling that Singer may be only a side-issue for Rabbi Dresner, a convenient take-off point for an attack on the Jewish community. Like Amos of Tekoa, Dresner of Deerfield courageously hurls God's wrath at the modern calf-worshippers. Rabbi Dresner seems to be among those who view the *shtetl* as the supreme expression of "authentic Judaism." This attitude is widespread among committed Jews and is itself one of the main factors preventing the emergence of a creative Jewish community in America. Our people have lived in many different ways in their long history and there is no one "Jewish way of life." We must learn to develop our own expression of Judaism and we cannot do that until we are liberated from the psychological prison of *shtetl* nostalgia.

Rabbi Dresner accuses us of having betrayed the Jewish heritage. "Betrayed" is an inappropriate term, however. Modern American Jews are incapable of betraying the Jewish heritage because we do not know what it is. Our rabbis and educators have failed to transmit the tradition to us. All we

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



With fuel short and more costly, inflation biting, and recession threatening, it's no wonder Americans are apprehensive about the future. But fortunately, we're a country with a built-in way out of our troubles.

Talk.

That's right, talk. Rousing debate of national problems and the new ideas people have for finding bold solutions.

As a company, we believe strongly in America's tradition of constructive national dialogue—sorting through the issues, giving everyone a chance to have his or her say. It's the greatest guarantee our country has for making the right moves. On energy. On anything.

Which is why you'll see us fighting in the press against legislation we think could sap the energy industry's vitality. Why we champion opening up television to more viewpoints. And why we put defense of the First Amendment right of free speech high on our list of priorities. And will keep on doing so.

Mobil®

Speaking out for tomorrow...today

©1979 Mobil Corporation

ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have of our ethics is a vague sense that we should be liberals "because Jews are for the underdog." As for our history, the impression of it that most of us have gotten from rabbis, teachers, and community leaders is that Jewish history consists of two things: the Holocaust and the rebirth of Israel. We were not taught how to observe the *mitzvot;* even more importantly, we were not taught *why* we should observe them.

The only real teachers of Torah and Jewish ethics we can turn to today are our novelists. Saul Bellow affirms the humanism of Jewish tradition against the purveyors of fashionable despair. Bernard Malamud teaches us the value of charity and mercy. Elie Wiesel has shown us how to protest evil when God is silent. And Isaac Bashevis Singer reminds us of the importance of *menschlichkeit*. . . .

If Rabbi Dresner wishes to do something constructive, let him teach Jewish values to our spiritually starved generation, a generation which needs compassionate guidance from the rabbis, not abuse. Let him help us express Torah in modern life, and show us how to respond Jewishly to the problems we face today. However, that would be difficult. It is so much easier to indulge in sterile *shtetl* nostalgia, or play at being the Jeremiah of Surburbia.

MICHAEL M. KAPLAN
Chicago, Illinois

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

With regard to Rabbi Dresner's letter, . . . I too could never understand how Isaac Bashevis Singer even came to be considered for the Nobel Prize. His tales are boring, but more important is the manner in which he depicts the Jewish people. . . . Haven't we been degraded and lowered in the eyes of the world often enough? Why must one of our own seek out lunatics, prostitutes, beggars, and all manner of riff-raff to write about? . . . Singer has done the Jews of the world a great disservice.

PAULINE T. BELLOW
Stamford, Connecticut

Sociobiology

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . As an aspiring sociobiologist who rejects all forms of psychological determinism (whether of the environmental, genetic, or economic variety), I found Charles Frankel's article, "Sociobiology & Its Critics" [July], positively inspiring. . . . Mr. Frankel's firm rejection of Edward O. Wilson's arrogation of philosophy, ethics, and epistemology to his own purposes, was particularly deserving of attention. . . . While sociobiology can offer no panacea for social ills, it could provide frameworks for a wide variety of non-authoritarian social experiments. Perhaps Mr. Frankel's insightful analysis will help to reform a discipline which may some day ameliorate the social milieu which led to his tragic murder.

HOWARD R. OLSON, JR.
Concord, California

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

The late Charles Frankel thought he was quoting a French witticism: "*L'éléphant est un animal féroce; quand on l'attaque, il se défend.*" In fact, he was paraphrasing a doggerel original: "*Cet animal est très méchant;/Quand on l'attaque, il se défend.*" In English this might be: "This animal is bad indeed,/Defending itself in case of need."

ASINUS PORTANS LIBROS
New York City

Liberation Theology

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

We are all enormously in debt to Michael Novak for his article, "Liberation Theology and the Pope" [June]. Splendid and convincing!

ELLA WOLFE
Stanford, California

Foreign Aid, Cont.

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

We do not wish to reply in detail to the comments of P.T. Bauer and John O'Sullivan on our comments on the role of international aid to poor countries [Letters from Readers, July, referring to "Foreign Aid for What?" by Messrs. Bauer and O'Sullivan, December 1978]. Again we find much to agree with; more to disagree with. Again we find that their non sequiturs and distortions overwhelm their insights and truths. (One example: Messrs. Bauer and O'Sullivan rather go to town over our remarks on the Stevenson scheme, giving not so much a *curriculum vitae* of one of us, as a request for an *apologia pro vita sua.* Yet those who are interested in the facts will find in Charles R. Whittlesey's authoritative *Government Control of Crude Rubber* [1931], pp. 105-109, a confirmation of what we said.) But we feel it would be tedious for your readers to enter into a blow-by-blow debate. We should, however, like to highlight our major disagreement.

Messrs. Bauer and O'Sullivan agree with us that there are many very poor people in the world—people who are starving and unhealthy, illiterate and homeless. We believe that this fact imposes a strong obligation on rich societies to transfer resources on concessional terms to poor countries. If past transfers of this kind have sometimes gone astray—as is undoubtedly the case—*we believe this is an argument for* reforming aid, not for rejecting it.

Messrs. Bauer and O'Sullivan appear to believe that aid is unreformable, as shown by their statements that "any presumption about the effects of aid must be that they are adverse" and "any positive contribution of aid to development must be negligible." These claims are serious ones which, if established, would undermine the basis of aid. Are these claims justified in the *general* case, as against particular instances? Consider the cases of Taiwan, of South Korea, and of India. The authors cite Taiwan and South Korea approvingly on a number of occasions (referring to Taiwan, they rightly speak of the "massive economic advance"). India is regarded as the epitome of what happens to a country following aid: not only has economic progress been markedly less impressive, but "Indira Gandhi's manipulation of economic controls for political purposes" is cited as one of the indirect consequences of aid. They say nothing of South Korea's repressive regime and the only reference they make to Taiwan's tough and interventionist government is to describe the Taiwanese as "lightly governed" (in comparison with China). Yet the facts on aid, development, and politics in these three countries are in stark contrast to the conclusions the authors draw: both Taiwan and South Korea have been *major* recipients of aid. Between 1961 and 1972, South Korea received nearly five times as much aid per head of the population as India; Taiwan nearly twice as much. It is probably incorrect to attribute any large element in the spectacular progress of either South Korea or Taiwan to the flow of aid: their success is mainly due to a combination of land reform, trade and pricing policies, and strong government which

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



The Hollis Hedberg. Gulf's own floating computer center.

"This computer center happens to be on the *Hollis Hedberg*," says Gulf Research Geophysicist John McDonald. "It's the only research vessel in the industry that has complete data processing right on board. And that makes all the difference.

"The typical oil exploration ship is equipped only to record raw data from whatever equipment it has on board to detect oil deposits under the ocean floor. Usually they

"On-board computers help you learn a lot more, a lot faster."

have seismic sounding gear, occasionally magnetometers and gravity meters. The raw data gets sent to an onshore computer center for analysis, and by the time analysis is complete, the ship could be a thousand miles away.

"By contrast, the *Hedberg* has a full complement of recording equipment, including hydrocarbon 'sniffers,' and with computers right on board, we can make a preliminary analysis immediately. If it looks good, we go back for a second look at that location.

"It could take five or six years between the time you find an oil deposit and the time you actually start drilling for oil, so any time we save in exploration puts the country that much closer to a new supply of petroleum.

"It's a real challenge, trying to find that invisible spot under the seabed that's likely to produce oil. But the *Hedberg* is one of the best ways there is of finding it."

Gulf

Gulf people: meeting the challenge.

Gulf Oil Corporation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

supported economic development and suppressed vested interests which might have thwarted such progress. But the aid facilitated the transformation of policies and of the economy which led to the rapid economic growth. There is certainly no evidence here that aid acted as any sort of drag on, or obstacle to, economic progress.

In contrast, India, with a substantially lower income level, has received an unduly low proportion of the total flow of aid. India's room for maneuver—in particular the possibility of moving toward more outward-looking, trade-oriented policies—would have been much greater had it received levels of aid comparable to Taiwan and South Korea.

The argument that aid retards growth was put forward as much as twenty years ago—by Mr. Bauer, among others. Since then, not only have the outstanding success stories of countries like South Korea and Taiwan provided a conclusive counter to this conclusion, but it has been subject to much systematic statistical investigation. The most authoritative study of the relationship between aid flows and economic growth among developing countries during the past three decades—by Professor Papenek in the *Economic Journal*, 1972—demonstrates that aid has contributed positively and strongly to economic growth, among developing countries as a group.

While we would not base the case *for* aid on its effects on economic growth—we believe the fundamental case is the moral imperative arising from extremes of poverty in the midst of plenty—your readers will be subject to self-deception if they believe that they can avoid this moral obligation, which falls on those whose incomes are average or above average in rich societies, by false claims that aid impedes economic progress in poor countries.

FRANCES STEWART
PAUL P. STREETEN
The World Bank
Washington, D.C.

P.T. BAUER writes:

I should have thought it obvious that John O'Sullivan (who has now left England) and I listed some of Paul P. Streeten's posts solely in order to convey to readers his outstanding prominence as a development economist and aid administrator and for no darker purpose. As to the other points:

1. *Poverty:* Official aid goes to Third World governments not to the poor. Many spend lavishly on purposes which have nothing to do with the poor—witness the construction at vast cost of brand new capitals such as Brasilia, Islamabad, and Dodoma in Tanzania. Many prestige projects or programs have to be supported by local taxes, including those on the very poor. In particular, *official* aid does not go to the skeletal figures, or to the families of those children with distended bellies so prominent in aid propaganda. Indeed, their horrifying situation is often aggravated or even caused by the aid recipients. Aid has gone to many Asian and African governments who have for political and racial reasons persecuted, expelled, or even killed very many people, often their most productive subjects. Such policies have been commonplace in Asia and Africa, alphabetically all the way from Afghanistan to Zambia, and geographically from North Africa to the Far East. The new Vietnam is only a recent and conspicuous example of a list which includes at least Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Burma, Burundi, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia. When productive groups such as Asians in Africa or Indians in Burma are persecuted, or even if private trading is suppressed, the local people are deprived of skills and consumer goods and also of markets for their produce, which causes shortages and even famines. The poorest groups, especially in the rural areas, are among the worst hit. Aid facilitates these policies by enabling governments to conceal from their population, at least temporarily, some of their worst effects. Aid to rulers on the basis of the poverty of their *subjects* tends to encourage policies of impoverishment.

2. *Development:* We made it quite clear in our reply to Mrs. Stewart and Mr. Streeten why aid cannot contribute significantly to development. The *maximum* possible contribution, we showed, "cannot exceed the difference between the cost of commercially available capital and that of aid, applied to the percentage of national income represented by aid." The pertinent magnitudes, namely, aid as a percentage of the national income of the recipients; the avoided cost of borrowing by governments who can use capital productively; and the maximum return on investible funds, insure that the contribution of aid to development must be insignificant, in all but the most exceptional cases. Moreover, investible funds are not the main determinants of development. Any marginal contribution to development by the avoided cost through receiving subsidized funds is easily offset by such adverse repercussions of official aid as support for overvalued exchange rates and the further politicization of life. The inefficacy of aid is suggested, among other evidence, by the problems many aid recipients have in servicing even very soft loans.

Once it is recognized that the contribution of aid to development normally must be at best minimal, the whole basis of official aid is undermined, as indeed Mrs. Stewart and Mr. Streeten would seem to accept.

The progress of some aid recipients listed by Mrs. Stewart and Mr. Streeten does not affect the issue. It shows at most that government or business in these countries can use capital productively. (At most, because material progress reflects the operation of numerous past and current influences operating with different time lags, and investible funds are not the main determinant of progress, much less the only one.) These countries can therefore borrow abroad, as noted above. The progress of South Korea and Taiwan reflects the attitudes and motivations of the population and of firm but relatively limited governments, which are also behind the spectacular progress of Hong Kong and Singapore, not mentioned by Mrs. Stewart and Mr. Streeten. On the other hand, land reform, foreign aid, and strong government (emphasized by our critics) as prime agents of progress reflect the principal political thrusts of global egalitarianism.

For reasons already indicated, even a very high correlation between aid and economic development (and the statistics are in fact conflicting) would tell absolutely nothing about the contribution of aid to development. In New York City, there are many rich people living on Fifth Avenue, but this does not mean that living on Fifth Avenue makes you rich.

3. *Commodity schemes:* Charles R. Whittlesey's book is on several grounds irrelevant to Mrs. Stewart's and Mr. Streeten's views on com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

24 COLOR SLIDES of the Great Impressionist Masterpieces for only $1

(comparable value $18 to $24)

Includes this Deluxe Album and 48-page Gallery Lecture Guide—at no extra cost

GAZE in astonishment as Renoir's lovely "Seated Bather" (shown above) appears on your wall aglow with all the vibrant reds, blues and greens of the Impressionist palette. Or, thrill to Rembrandt's famed "Aristotle Contemplating the Bust of Homer"—one of the world's costliest works of art. Or, marvel as you view Titian's allegorical masterpiece "Sacred and Profane Love" just as it appears in Rome's Borghese Gallery.

Until today, unless you had the means to travel among the world's great museums and private collections, you simply could not know these paintings so *intimately*. Now, as a member of the *McGraw-Hill Color Slide Program of Art Enjoyment,* they are but a few of the magnificent art works you will enjoy and more richly understand as you view them in dramatic *full-size* and glowing *original colors!*

Accept this $1 demonstration offer

If you mail the attached card, you will receive a unique Album containing 24 color slides of priceless works by Renoir, Monet, Degas and other important Impressionist painters. These exquisite slides are produced to exacting specifications in Florence on 35mm. Kodak film. They come in individual 2″ x 2″ mounts and can be used in any home slide projector. (*If you do not own a projector, see special offer below.*)

The color slides, however, are only one part of this elaborate Album. Bound into the center is an illustrated 48-page book by Albert Chatelet, Director of France's renowned Lille Museum—with a guide to each of the slide pictures and the complete story of the Impressionist era.

If this demonstration pleases you, you will be offered a new slide-and-commentary Album approximately every six weeks. Among the Albums in this series are *Italian Renaissance Painting*, the *Origins of Modern Art—Romanticism* and *Realism*—and other Albums covering every major art period.

The cost is surprisingly low

The least you might expect to pay for 24 color slides of comparable quality—if the subjects were available from museums and private collections—is $18-$24. Yet, as a subscriber to this new Program, you pay only $9.95 for each complete Album—including slides and illustrated guide book. You may take as few or as many as you like, and may stop whenever you wish.

Your Introductory Album only $1
No obligation to continue

Send no money now. We will ship your introductory Color Slide Album of Impressionist Paintings and enroll you as a trial subscriber. If you are thrilled with the demonstration, send only $1, plus a few cents for tax and shipping. Thereafter, you will be offered a new Album approximately every six weeks at the subscribers' low price of only $9.95. If not delighted, however, you may return the Introductory Album within 15 days, and owe nothing. Mail the attached card today.

Here's what you get for only $1

Luncheon on the Grass—Edouard Manet
Women in the Garden—Claude Monet
The Green Parasol—Berthe Morisot
Nude in the Sun—Auguste Renoir
The Seated Bather—Auguste Renoir
The Pedicure—Edgar Degas
The Saint-Lazare Railroad Station—Claude Monet
The House of Pere Lacroix—Paul Cezanne
The Saint-Martin Canal—Alfred Sisley
At the Races—Edgar Degas
The Red Roofs—Camille Pissarro
The Loge—Mary Cassatt
. . . plus 12 other Impressionist classics!



The Color Slide Program of Art Enjoyment

If you do not have a projector: here's an unusual opportunity. We can offer you the sensational Kodak Carousel BC 604 Projector supplied with a 500-watt lamp, and 4-inch f/2.8 Ektanar lens. This top-rated projector shows all regular 2″ x 2″ 35mm. slides up to 1/16-inch thick. It has dependable gravity feed and you have instant access to any one of its 140-slide capacity at any time. List price $122.50—subscribers' price only $85.95, plus tax. Remittance must accompany trial subscription form. If you are not completely delighted with the projector, you may return it in 15 days for a full refund.

If Reply Card has been removed, write McGraw-Hill Color Slide Program of the Great Masters, Dept. CY-114, 1221 Ave. of the Americas, N.Y., N.Y. 10020.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENCED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT. DOES IT THREATEN THE WORK ETHIC?

The American work ethic has always assumed that if you worked hard, your efforts would be rewarded.

We wouldn't argue with that. But we would like to amend it a little.

The way we see it, working hard isn't nearly as important as working well.

Information Management isn't a way of sidestepping hard work. It's a way of making it more productive.

For example, there's no virtue in having to spend hours typing, retyping and re-retyping documents. So we make electronic typing systems that let you type, revise and retrieve information in a lot less time. Which gives you a lot more time to create and perfect it.

To make information easier to work with, we make a full range of copiers, duplicators and computer printers. Ones that not only reproduce, but can reduce, collate or even print in color.

To make information more accessible, we have Telecopier transceivers and communicating typewriters that transmit information crosstown or cross-country in minutes.

We even offer computer services that let you manage information without having to manage a computer.

So you see, Xerox information management systems are actually the epitome of the work ethic.

They work harder. So you can work better.

XEROX

XEROX® and Telecopier® are trademarks of XEROX CORPORATION.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ELINOR ROSS
"One of the most thrilling soprano voices you will hear in your lifetime . . ."
Cincinnati Enquirer

CONGREGATION SHAARE EMETH
of
St. Louis, Missouri
presents a
gala musical evening
with
Metropolitan Opera Star
ELINOR ROSS
in concert

the great arias of opera
the best melodies of Broadway
the nostalgic songs of the Yiddish Theater
Israeli hits and Cantorial gems

October 26, 1979
at the Temple
11645 Ladue Road
St. Louis, Missouri

modity agreements. For instance, that book, published in 1931, has no bearing at all on the International Rubber Regulation Scheme which started in 1934. In 1948, the British Colonial Office published my officially commissioned report on the rubber growing small holdings of Malaysia, which argued that quotas under that scheme discriminated against the small holders and, more important, that its operation jeopardized the entire economic future of the small holders. According to the official Colonial Office foreword to that report: ". . . Mr. Bauer's main conclusion that under the pre-war restriction agreements a disproportionate burden was carried by small holders was accepted by the Colonial Office and the Government of the Federation of Malaya. . . ." All this is quite apart from the exclusion of potential producers necessitated by the operation of that scheme, for many of whom rubber would have been much the most suitable cash crop or even the only one available. As Mr. O'Sullivan and I repeatedly noted, this is a usual feature of effective commodity agreements.

4. *Morality:* The donors of aid are the taxpayers who have to contribute whether they like it or not and often do not even know that they contribute. What is the morality in forcing them to contribute resources for the maintenance of aid agencies and to governments which have often pursued inhuman and barbarous policies, not to speak of merely wasteful ones, policies often facilitated or even made possible by aid? Virtue is not obviously reflected or enhanced by enforced removal of money from Western taxpayers, or from Western and Third World buyers of necessities controlled by commodity schemes.

5. *Reform of aid:* I do not think that the major defects and limitations of official aid are remediable. But aid could be much improved, especially in its methods of allocation. I have already argued this in easily accessible publications, and hope to do so again in a forthcoming book. But I would not be surprised if my ideas for reform should differ substantially from those which Mrs. Stewart and Mr. Streeten would favor.

The Song of Songs

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

"Sex According to the Song of Songs" by Hyam Maccoby [June] is a fascinating guide through the labyrinthine mazes of the origins and meanings of this endlessly puzzling book of the Hebrew Bible. It proves once again, however, the parlous nature of the academic parlor game of hunting down sources and parallels.

In noting how the description of the female in the Song of Songs is similar to that of the queen of Egypt, Hatshepsut, the author comments in a footnote: "An interesting example in Western literature of a queen compared to a goddess is Enobarbus's description of Cleopatra in Shakespeare's play." The speech which Shakespeare assigns to Enobarbus is, of course, taken almost verbatim from the Thomas North translation of Plutarch's *Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans Compared Together.*

The search for ultimate roots is an endless digging.

MILTON BIRNBAUM
American International College
Springfield, Massachusetts

HYAM MACCOBY writes:

I do not quite grasp Milton Birnbaum's point. "Ultimate roots" is not the issue here. Surely the magnificently sensual Shakespearean passage is more relevant to the poetry of the Song of Songs than the prose passage of North's Plutarch of which it is a (by no means "verbatim") reworking.

Music

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Samuel Lipman's interesting article, "The State of the Art" [Music, May], touches on the complete absence of worthwhile new music, but does not probe the reasons. Why are there no more Mozarts or Schuberts? Have human genes changed? Or are worthy candidates confronting a world even more unappreciative than Mozart and Schubert did?

In today's music world, unknown composers are not backed, nor do they "prosper." Moreover, retrenchment in the arts has closed off academic posts for composition teachers. New composers are not "widely performed" either, only new music by recognized names or by those with an "in" or a bankroll. Established performers do not have the time, interest, or judgment to undertake the effort and risk of selecting, learning, and interpreting the works of unknowns. And

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

YOUR CAR AND TOMORROW'S FUELS

AS THE SUPPLY OF OIL DROPS, SYNTHETICS BECOME MORE ATTRACTIVE.

General Motors is not in the fuel business. But since the cars we build depend on fuel, we have to be on top of the energy situation. Here's the way it looks to us.

All the cars we build are powered by internal combustion engines. These engines work by burning petroleum-derived gasoline or diesel fuel under high pressure. So far, petroleum has been the safest, least expensive source of these hydrocarbon fuels, which pack a lot of energy per gallon. But automotive fuels can also be obtained from many other sources, ranging from oil shale to coal and even corn stalks. The problem is to turn these solid materials into safe, convenient, environmentally sound, cost-efficient liquid fuels.

At GM, we have evaluated a variety of domestic resources and alternative fuels.

Fuels made from shale oil are the best current alternatives. Shale oil is produced by heat-treating oil shale, an abundant American resource. Gasoline and diesel fuel could be refined from shale oil. What is needed, however, are the plants to convert the shale rock into the shale oil. As petroleum becomes more expensive, it will be cost-efficient to build these plants. The mining of shale, though, still presents serious environmental problems that must be solved.

Coal is the next best option. Coal can also be turned into gasoline and diesel fuel, but the process is more expensive and complex than that for oil shale. As with oil shale, coal mining also poses environmental problems.

Biomass (vegetation and organic wastes) is another possibility. The main advantage of biomass is that it is a renewable resource. However, biomass is difficult and expensive to collect and process.

The only automotive fuel currently being made that uses biomass is gasohol. Gasohol is a blend of 10% ethyl alcohol and gasoline. The use of gasohol in present-day cars can save gasoline and causes no insurmountable difficulties.

Hydrogen has often been discussed. Although engines can be run on hydrogen, its production potential appears limited, and the practical problems of safe and efficient distribution and storage haven't yet been solved.

Although electricity isn't a fuel, it can be generated from non-petroleum resources. Some electrically-powered cars are already on the road. The problem is that with current lead-acid batteries they're only capable of traveling relatively short distances between battery charges. We're continuing to do extensive research on advanced zinc-nickel oxide storage batteries.

Nothing is more important than ensuring the supply of fuels needed to keep our country strong. At GM we are confident that if government and industry cooperate and work together to explore alternative energy sources, the problem of providing sufficient fuels for the future, at the lowest possible cost, can and will be solved.

This advertisement is part of our continuing effort to give customers useful information about their cars and trucks and the company that builds them.

General Motors

People building transportation to serve people

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

even if the will existed, the producer/agent would probably squelch it, since advancing the art does not make money.

There are well-intentioned people who try to alleviate the situation by establishing contests. On reflection, is it not an absurdity to try to determine the greatness and permanence of a new work by contest? Look at a list of past winners and weep. And how is the judgment made? Why, of course, by hiring another composer to decide. Of all necessarily imperfect solutions, this is probably the worst. Even assuming competence, honesty, and interest, one still confronts a bundle of biases. And each contest has its list of arbitrary restrictions. (Dear Mr. Brahms: Responding to your request for information about our contest, if you are between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-six and have a composition for 13 kazoos which was composed and publicly performed for the first time this year, then you may submit a recording to our Mr. Tchaikowsky.)

I am not a musician, but I believe that music will not be resurrected until these stultifying conditions are rectified. But first they must be exposed.

MAXWELL ROSS
Barrington, Rhode Island

Take a great airline to a great country.

Take Lufthansa to Israel.

Of course you can fly Lufthansa to Tel Aviv. Because Lufthansa is much more than the airline to Germany. We serve 117 cities in 73 countries.

Wherever you go, take advantage of Lufthansa's famous service and efficiency. And if you wish fine kosher food en route; simply tell us when you make your reservation.

Ask your travel agent about us.

Lufthansa

680 Fifth Avenue, One World Trade Center (Lobby),
New York, N.Y. Tel. (212) 357-8400

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Samuel Lipman's excellent article contains a statement which should not go unchallenged. He attributes the rather limited scope of 18th-century musical culture in America to, among other things, "the musical incapacities of the Founding Fathers." I do not believe that historical facts support such a contention. The leaders of the new nation were, on the whole, a remarkably erudite, well-rounded breed whose capabilities and interests were not entirely restricted to statecraft, warfare, and politics, but included a lifelong attraction to music.

George Washington seldom missed an opportunity to attend a concert or theater performance. Thomas Jefferson, who described music as "this favorite passion of my soul," was quite a competent violinist who enjoyed evenings of chamber music and playing duets with Patrick Henry. He envied the European royalty and aristocracy for their court orchestras and bemoaned the fact that "the bounds of an American fortune will not admit the indulgence of a domestic band." Benjamin Franklin played the harp and guitar, invented the glass harmonica (for which Mozart composed a set of pieces), and was also an astute critic. One of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, Francis Hopkinson—lawyer, poet, and musician—composed a *Set of Eight Songs*, dedicated to Washington.

Clearly, the lack of flourishing musical culture in 18th-century America may have been due to a combination of social, geographic, and economic factors, but not to a lack of interest on the part of the Founding Fathers.

DENES AGAY
Norton, Virginia

SAMUEL LIPMAN writes:

Like Maxwell Ross, I am no admirer of contests. They are indeed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"All we have of freedom—all we use or know—
This our fathers bought for us, long and long ago."
—Rudyard Kipling

This collage by New York artist Fred Otnes was especially commissioned by Brown & Williamson for its permanent collection of fine art works.

The freedom to choose our livelihood was provided to us long ago. And it was typified by the struggle of immigrants to America in the early 1800's. People like Adam Gimbel, a humble Jewish peddler from Germany, who later founded the country's first department store. And individuals who became industrial giants, like Andrew Carnegie from Scotland, who built one of the largest steel producing businesses in the United States. America had given both of them the freedom. The freedom to choose.

A free individual does not live without choice. A free society does not prosper without it. Consider, if you will, the personal choices we make every day without intervention from others. Now consider how many we take for granted.

The right to choose is the basis of all freedom—political, social, artistic, economic, religious—for all people. But this right must be protected from those who would chip away at it...either deliberately for personal gain, or innocently for the "betterment" of humanity. It must be protected from those who would make *their* choice, *your* choice. These personal freedoms are our legacy as well as our responsibility...to protect and to pass on to those who follow.

Freedom. It's a matter of choice.

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company–USA

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

inaccurate judges of talent and predictors of success, even in terms of their own professed criteria; still more important than this failure is the replacement in contests of musical standards by falsely perceived competitive exigencies. And perhaps most disturbing is the plain evidence that contests are today increasingly being established in order to benefit the personal egos and public images of sponsors rather than the futures of the contestants or the good of music as an art.

But all this quite properly having been said, it still seems a mistake to treat contests, as Mr. Ross does, as so important a cause of our present musical disabilities rather than as a striking symptom. To find in contests the reason for the lack of viable new music is, I am afraid, to succumb to a kind of conspiracy theory which places responsibility for the state of music on everyone but musicians. It is not that others do not have some share in causing the current crisis; it is, rather, that musicians must be encouraged to take responsibility for what they do rather than blame society or its various constituents. For the conclusion seems unavoidable that contests are now flourishing because new performers are not sufficiently commanding to win audiences through concerts alone, and because new music seems undistinguished and its composers interchangeable. The resultant vacuum caused by public apathy is thus filled by contests as an apparently beguiling means of selection. Whatever the exact nature of the remedy for this state of affairs may be, there can be little doubt that the initial impetus for reform must come from music and musicians rather than from administrators and institutions—faulty and handicapping though these latter now are.

As for Denes Agay's ringing defense of the musical abilities and interests of our most famous early Americans, such effort might have seemed to him less needed had he not incorrectly capitalized the words "founding fathers" he quoted from my article. They were not so capitalized therein, because they were meant to describe those people I had mentioned just before:

> The history of this country is in its origins a story of early settlement by ethnic groups which were not to bulk large in the development of 18th- and 19-century music. . . .

It is these groups who constituted in the largest sense our founding fathers, and their musical incapacities did without doubt mark American musical culture for a long time.

Politics & the Novel

To the Editors of Commentary:

Having seen how fully Pearl K. Bell misconstrues my letter in the July issue on her review of Dan Jacobson's *The Confessions of Josef Baisz* [Fiction, "Imaginings of Africa," April], I now understand her failure to review Jacobson's book properly.

I drew attention to the phenomenon that Jacobson explains because Mrs. Bell had failed to do so; I certainly did not imply thereby that Jacobson's brilliant success in explaining the motivations of the

The turkey turkey
Empire
POULTRY
No fats added. No oils added. No margarine added. Natural juices, natural flavor. Nothing added except the Empire Kosher touch — extra care in the selection, processing, inspection and packaging to assure the finest quality, plump and tender all-turkey turkey you can eat. Baby, Hen and Tom Turkeys. Turkey Breasts, Legs, Wings, Drumsticks, Thighs. Country-fresh and flavor-sealed fresh-frozen. Good for you. Kosher good. (And the same goes for our chicken, duck and many other fine poultry products.) When we talk turkey, we mean it.
KOSHER
Empire
POULTRY
The Most Trusted Name in Kosher Poultry and Foods
Accepted and Preferred Worldwide

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

No More Free Ride... For Union Officials.

Thanks to Harry Beck, American workers no longer have to support unwanted candidates or undesired political causes to keep their jobs.

Harry, who was born and grew up in LaPlata, Maryland, has worked for the telephone company for 19 years. He once belonged to the Communications Workers of America union, but resigned "because the CWA was totally impersonal to anyone except those at the top."

However, "those at the top" in the union then negotiated a contract with the telephone company which required all non-union employees, like Harry, to pay CWA an "agency fee" equal to union dues to stay employed.

Harry Beck had to pay up or be fired. But then he learned that the CWA, one of the country's most politically active unions, was using the "agency fees" for partisan politics—and that made him mad. "They backed people," explains Harry, "I just wouldn't have backed."

With the help of the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, suit was brought against the CWA union by Harry and 19 other telephone company workers. And on March 16, 1979, in an historic decision, a Federal court ruled that a union's collecting or spending of compulsory fees for any purpose other than collective bargaining violates the Constitutional rights of employees who object.

It was the first time that a Federal court had declared that union political spending from mandatory "agency fees" is an infringement upon the rights to free speech and association enjoyed by private sector workers.



Similar protection was established for public employees in 1978 in the U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Abood v. Detroit Board of Education* —another case supported by the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation.

The potential impact of the two decisions is enormous. Union officials spend an estimated $100 million in direct and "in-kind" support on political campaigns in a single election year—most of it raised through compulsory dues or "agency fees." The workers forced to pay for this political support have rarely any voice in the selection of the union favored candidates or causes.

But the Beck decision reaffirms the basic principle that no worker in a free country should ever have to support anyone else's politics in order to retain his right to work.

The National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, established in 1968, provides free legal aid to workers whose rights have been violated as a result of compulsory unionism. It is presently supporting more than 100 court cases involving the rights of employees across the nation.

If you'd like to help workers like Harry Beck, we'd like to hear from you.

National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation
Suite 600
8316 Arlington Blvd.
Fairfax, Virginia 22038

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

servants of dictatorship fully defines his achievement. *The Confessions of Josef Baisz* is indeed a novel and not a textbook, but as Conrad, for one, did before him, Jacobson combines artistic construction with analytical explanation, the latter of course imperceptibly combined in the former. The result is in the first place a gripping novel, and Jacobson is not to be faulted for having explained a political phenomenon while telling his story.

Your reviewer's willful misunderstanding of my letter is evident in her attempt to show that I confuse "imaginative" with "imaginary" ("If he finds cause for rebuke in my reading of Dan Jacobson's novel as 'an exercise in imaginative construction,' then he does not know what a novel is. . . ."). Obviously the stress was on the word exercise. Perhaps I should have written, ". . . Mrs. Bell has not served COMMENTARY readers well by dismissing the work as a *writer's* exercise in imaginative construction." For that was and is, my objection: the review was dominated by Mrs. Bell's failure to understand the meaning and purpose of the novel, and by her resulting speculations on Jacobson's motives in writing the novel at all. Hence her approving quotation of an unspecified British reviewer whose inane suggestion was that Jacobson had written simply to keep himself busy.

EDWARD N. LUTTWAK
Bethesda, Maryland

PEARL K. BELL writes:

Edward N. Luttwak has the tenacity of a bulldog, but this second round of indignation about my review of Dan Jacobson's novel is more of a credit to his teeth than to his intelligence or to his understanding of what I originally wrote.

To take his last sentence first: I made it unambiguously clear that I thought the British reviewer's "interpretation" was ludicrous, and I referred to it only to show how the baffling obscurity of Jacobson's meaning and purpose could inspire a desperate stretch of ingenuity. Even so, Mr. Luttwak in this instance not only misinterprets *my* intention, but completely misreads that hapless reviewer, who suggested that *The Confessions of Josef Baisz* is about the plight of writers forced to teach in "autocratic" institutions of higher learning. What has this to do with writing to keep busy?

It is all very well for Mr. Luttwak now to tell us which word he meant to stress in remarking that I had dismissed the novel "as a writer's exercise in imaginative construction." This still does not acquit him of failing to grasp the distinction between imaginative and imaginary. The fundamental trouble lies in Mr. Luttwak's erroneous belief that a strenuously repeated *assertion* is the same as demonstrated proof. He asserts that Jacobson has succeeded brilliantly in combining "artistic construction with analytical explanation." He asserts that the novel is gripping. He asserts that I have failed to understand Jacobson's aims and achievement, and that I faulted the novelist for explaining a political phenomenon. I can only reply that Mr. Luttwak views *The Confessions of Josef Baisz* too narrowly, because he wants to see it as a political novel which has demonstrated the nature of ambition and acquiesence in a dictatorial society. I thought, and I tried to show, that the ambiguity of the depiction undermined that effort. But that did not underestimate Dan Jacobson as much as Edward N. Luttwak has done in ignoring the enigmatic reach of the book, even if that reach exceeded its grasp.

Soviet Writing

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In his review of Anatoly Rybakov's novel, *Heavy Sands* [Books in Review, June], Walter Laqueur asserts that it is "the first [novel] published in the Soviet Union since 1948" that presents a "detailed description . . . of the last days of many Russian Jews." But in fact Rybakov's novel is not the only one dealing with the subject of ghettos and the Final Solution in German-occupied Russia. During the 60's there were others; especially remarkable, in my view, are the works of the Jewish-Lithuanian writer Itskhokas Meras, author of *What the World Stands On (Na chem derzhitsya mir)*, which originally appeared in the literary journal *Yunost*. What makes an otherwise mediocre novel by Rybakov truly remarkable is the time and place of its publication: not only have there been no works in the Soviet Union dealing with the subject in recent years, but the journal *Oktyabr*, which serialized *Heavy Sands*, would have seemed the least likely place for it to appear, since it is known for its notoriously ultra-conservative literary and political stance. It is this fact that makes *Heavy Sands* a literary event of sorts rather than Rybakov's alleged pioneering approach to the theme.

ILYA LEVIN
Department of Slavic Languages
University of Texas
Austin, Texas

Cambodia & Vietnam

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In his review of William Shawcross's *Sideshow* [Books in Review, August], . . . Charles Horner does not discuss the real problem of the book: namely, its failure to consider Cambodia's role in the overall history of the Indochina conflict.

Under French colonial rule, Cambodia and Cochin China (later South Vietnam) were treated almost as one territorial unit. For example, Cambodian rice surpluses regularly made up an important part of the southern Vietnam exports shipped out of Saigon. There were extensive contacts between the two areas (Saigon was only three hours by car from Phnom Penh). . . .

The war against the French, 1948-54, by the so-called Vietminh . . . was waged in the south mostly from Cambodia. . . . And this did not change during the later struggle between the government of President Ngo Diem Dinh and the Communists. When I sought a visa to go to North Vietnam in 1959, I applied at the headquarters of Hanoi operations in Phnom Penh.

During the American war in Vietnam, that is after 1964, Cambodia continued to play a paramount role in the war in the southern reaches of the Republic of Vietnam. The 1968 Tet offensive would not have been possible without the use of Cambodian territory. Also, vast amounts of arms, materiél, and food passed through Cambodia to North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces. . . . It is important to note that U.S. officials throughout this period were eager, for the most part, to deny such activity, so that any record—such as Shawcross's—which relies on U.S. government documents, would not reveal the extent of Cambodia's involvement. A young U.S. diplomat . . . told me in 1964: "One day we may have to go into Cambodia (in order to fight the war effectively), and because we are not admitting what is actually going on there, there

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Woodcut – Amsterdam 1707.

שנה טובה

New Year's greetings from Israel's first and largest bank – Bank Leumi le Israel B.M.

Banking with us enables you to contribute towards Israel's economic strength while benefiting from the experience and service of a large international banking network: 395 subsidiaries and branches including 39 offices outside Israel.

REGIONAL MANAGEMENT - WESTERN HEMISPHERE
562 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10036, U.S.A., Tel. (212) 832-4940, Telex ITT 428451 blrgmgt

BANK LEUMI TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK
579 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017, Tel. (212) 832-5000 (12 other Branches)

BANK LEUMI LE-ISRAEL B.M.
Chicago: 100 North LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois 60602, Tel. (312)781-1800
Philadelphia: 1511 Walnut St., Pa. 19102 Tel. (215) 299-4400
Los Angeles: 9731 Wilshire Blvd., Beverly Hills, Cal. 90212, Tel. (213)278-7001/2
Miami: 407 Lincoln Road Mall, Miami Beach, Florida 33139, Tel. (305)531-3378/9

Other Subsidiaries, Branches and Representative Offices in:
Toronto, Cayman Islands (2), London (4), Frankfurt a/M., Paris (2), Zurich, Geneva, Brussels, Antwerp, Milan, Caracas, Buenos Aires, Sao Paulo, Johannesburg, Hong Kong.

bank leumi בנק לאומי

TAL-AROYO

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

will be no rationale for it." How prophetic he was!

Sihanouk's role has always been much more complicated and opportunistic than his Western admirers would admit. Suffice it to say that it was Son Ngoc Than and not Sihanouk . . . who was the chief spokesman for Cambodian nationalism against the French, when he was puppet prime minister during the Japanese occupation. Son Ngoc Than was an ally of Sirik Matak, a descendant of the main line of the royal family which had been displaced by the French in favor of Sihanouk's grandfather. Matak, then a general of the Lon Nol forces, refused asylum when the end came; he was finally expelled from the French embassy, and apparently killed by the Pol Pot Communists. His note to the U.S. ambassador which accused the U.S. of abandoning his country after making promises of support for so many years is a classic document—and one that makes some of us who have read it ashamed of our policy for reasons quite different from those of Shawcross. (Son Ngoc Than is reported fighting in the mountains against the present Vietnamese-supported Phnom Penh regime.)

There is something obscene in the writings of Shawcross and others who blame the excesses of the Communist regimes in Vietnam and Cambodia on the U.S. attempt to keep them from power. It reminds one of the argument of the 1930's that Hitler was only the product of the unfairness of the Versailles treaty. The New York *Times* today prints accusations that those who are now being forced to die at sea because of their persecution in Vietnam are, after all, black marketeers and not willing to conform to the new policies of Hanoi. How cruelly reminiscent of the accusations against the Jews in Germany.

The Shawcrosses of this world are wrong because they simply do not understand the nature of Communist regimes. And they have used the incompetence and the twists and turns of American policy—all fully and officially documented—to try to convince a gullible and inexperienced American public.

I am afraid that Mr. Horner's elaborate but overly sophisticated response to *Sideshow* simply plays into that tragic but total failure to understand the nature of our enemy.

SOL W. SANDERS

New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

As a soldier anointed in the blood of his profession, I would like to commend Charles Horner for his insight into the way many Vietnam veterans view their wartime service. If the dead could talk to us from the grave, I believe that they too would thank Mr. Horner for speaking for them, perhaps to them. . . .

Neither I nor my professional associates have any remorse about serving in Vietnam, except to deplore the tragic—and avoidable—outcome. Nor will we express our grief to outsiders. But what is still not often understood is the anguish we felt over the final solution as it affected our Vietnamese friends of high and low station. Their sad fate, of course, was immediately foreseeable when South Vietnam was "liberated."

These friends did not fit the media stereotype: they were fine human beings with a profound sense of compassion, nationalism, and purpose. Their principal failing was that their world view was influenced by the assurances of people like me.

[Lt. Col.] CHARLES A. KROHN

Savannah, Georgia

CHARLES HORNER writes:

Sol W. Sanders is quite correct in observing that *Sideshow* is flawed by "its failure to consider Cambodia's role in the overall history of the Indochina conflict." This, of course, is a predictable defect in the work in that Shawcross, given his desire to defame American Indochina policies generally, would scarcely adduce any justification for the American effort in that region. However, the last sentence of Mr. Sanders's letter seems not to follow from the rest of his discussion. I do not see how my review plays into a "total failure to understand the nature of our enemy." I think, rather, that the review makes quite explicit my differences with Shawcross on these questions.

Charles A. Krohn expresses, I think, the sentiment of many Vietnam veterans, but the country as a whole must come ultimately to share this view if we are to recover a correct understanding of the American role in world affairs. The collapse of American-supported resistance to Soviet- and Chinese-supported North Vietnamese aggression has had horrible human consequences throughout Indochina. It is one thing to attribute that collapse to American and South Vietnamese inadequacies of thought and execution, another to go beyond this and mendaciously attribute the subsequent horrors to those who worked so hard to prevent them. We may have failed in Vietnam, but we did not deserve to fail. That makes all the difference.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UN MOMENT DE MARTELL

80 PROOF IMPORTED BY THE JOS GARNEAU Co., NEW YORK, N.Y.

DINNER IS OVER, BUT THE NIGHT IS STILL YOUNG.

WHAT BETTER TIME TO EXPERIENCE THE WORLD'S FINEST COGNAC—MARTELL.

AFTER ALL, MARTELL COGNAC HAS HELPED MAKE EVENINGS MEMORABLE SINCE 1715.

MARTELL V.S.P., V.S.O.P., AND CORDON BLEU.

MARTELL COGNAC

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

We're savin'!

Car-pooling not only saves gasoline, but makes trips less expensive.

I'm savin'!

Avoiding high-speed driving can improve fuel economy.

I'm savin'!

Replacing fouled sparkplugs can increase gas mileage up to 9%.

I'm savin'!

Making sure the engine timing is right can help improve mileage.

SAVAGALLONAGASAWEEK

AMOCO®

Amoco Oil Company

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Black Anti-Semitism on the Rise

Murray Friedman

THE resignation of Andrew Young as Ambassador to the United Nations might have seemed to raise the issue of the proper conduct of American foreign policy, and the proper role of an ambassador in carrying out that policy. But even while the episode was still unfolding, it had already begun to take on another definition entirely, as charges were made that Young's resignation was more on the order of a toppling, and that the forces responsible for his alleged ouster were not the State Department or the administration but American Jews.

The fact that only one major Jewish organization had called for Young's departure seemed to make no difference to those black leaders who saw in the event clear evidence that "the Jews" had in this instance combined their self-assigned right to dictate American policy in the Middle East with their hostility to Andrew Young as a black man. Suddenly the air was filled with statements about "the Jews" that bordered on and even crossed over the edge of racial defamation. It was said that in the past, Jews had aligned themselves with blacks because it was in their interest to do so but that now, in their opposition to quotas, they were attempting to restrain black economic progress. It was said that in their support of Israel, Jews were forcing America to adopt a policy that could only result in a threat to the country's oil supplies and its economic health, and hence to black well-being. It was even said, in a revival of an old right-wing anti-Semitic charge, that American Jews owed their first loyalty not to the United States but to Israel—in contrast to black Americans, whose "loyalties have never been questioned."

The virulence and intensity of the anti-Jewish attitudes expressed by black leaders like Jesse Jackson and Reverend Joseph Lowery of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference came as something of a shock to many people who had long taken for granted the idea of a natural alliance between blacks and Jews in this country. In fact, however, the Young affair has only served to bring into the open, if in a particularly ugly way, a growing phenomenon in the black community over the last ten years or so.

MURRAY FRIEDMAN teaches courses on minority problems and urban sociology at LaSalle College in Philadelphia, and writes frequently on intergroup relations.

SINCE World War II almost all indices of anti-Semitism in this country have declined. Americans have increasingly described themselves as holding fewer negative stereotypes of Jews and as willing to welcome them as neighbors and to vote for them for political office, including the Presidency.

Until the mid-60's, surveys showed that blacks shared generally in this trend. As late as 1967, Gary Marx in his study, *Protest and Prejudice,* which reported on interviews with over 1,000 blacks in metropolitan areas across the country, found black anti-Semitism either nonexistent, or, where it existed, explainable as a result of low education or of certain negative experiences. Then in the late 60's and early 70's a series of confrontations took place between blacks and Jews which caused a rise in tensions. By 1974, and again in 1978, Harris surveys showed a sharp increase in black anti-Semitism. A 1978 survey on attitudes toward racial and religious minorities and women commissioned by the National Conference of Christians and Jews found that while a range of from 17 to 32 per cent of whites agreed with a series of negative stereotypes of Jews, blacks agreed in a range of 37 to 56 per cent.

As significant as the overall change in black attitudes toward Jews is the profile of the sort of black person who has been found to express anti-Jewish feelings. Whereas, according to the 1974 Harris survey, blacks over fifty did not differ in their anti-Jewish feelings from whites, younger blacks were more anti-Semitic than whites their own age. This and other surveys taken recently also reported that younger blacks were the most unsympathetic to Israel and the most firmly opposed to providing military aid to it. Most unexpected of all was the response to certain stereotypes on the part of black leaders, as measured by the 1978 Harris survey. Some 81 per cent of the 53 national black leaders interviewed agreed that Jews choose money over people; 50 per cent that Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the United States; and 67 per cent that Jews constitute the largest number of slumlords.

The figures reporting a rise in anti-Jewish feelings among the best-educated and best-informed members of the black community came as a surprise to social scientists and community-relations experts who had long held that a higher degree

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of education was closely correlated with a lessening of anti-Semitic prejudice. In fact, the overall decline in anti-Semitism in this country in recent years is probably related to the rise in education among Americans generally. Yet the precise contrary appears to be the case among the most highly educated blacks—as well as among those blacks who have benefited the most from civil-rights and other gains of recent years to which Jews have contributed significantly.

The appearance of this survey information has coincided with a series of recent incidents that underline the increase in black hostility to Jews. Last year alone saw a number of highly publicized neighborhood collisions in New York between blacks and Hasidim, and an open conflict containing strong anti-Jewish overtones between black leaders in New York City and Mayor Edward Koch.* At Harvard Law School, a "Third World Human Rights" conference convened by blacks and others this past February featured an official of the Libyan mission to the United Nations as "guest of honor" and provided a forum for virulent anti-Jewish and anti-Israel remarks.† Earlier, at the University of Maryland, the Black Student Union sponsored a seminar on Zionism, billed in a flyer as an effort to show that "Zionism Supports the Murder of Black People."

In short, as William Schneider, professor of government at Harvard, concluded earlier this year, black anti-Semitism has not only been on the increase but has taken on a new form. "This is not the anti-Semitism of ignorance or religious bigotry," he wrote, "it is the anti-Semitism of political conflict and confrontation." How does one account for it?

WHILE anti-Semitism has existed among blacks, as it has among other Americans, for a long time, it was, until recently, a fairly minor current, submerged by the identification of blacks with Jews as fellow sufferers of oppression and by strong bonds of friendship going back to the early part of this century. As is well known, Jews and blacks, together with church, labor, and other groups, were joined together in the liberal coalition which helped to bring about a great deal of liberal legislation and was responsible for important gains in civil rights. Then in the late 1960's, rifts began to develop between the two groups as the civil-rights movement turned into the "black revolution," and new organizations like the Black Panthers sprang up, and as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) was transformed by the black-power movement into a vehicle of "Third World" politics. It was at this time, too, that a new group of black leaders and intellectuals came upon the scene to challenge traditional civil-rights figures like Roy Wilkins of the NAACP, Whitney Young of the Urban League, and even Martin Luther King, Jr. This new group included such figures as Stokely Carmichael, H. "Rap" Brown, Malcolm X, Eldridge Cleaver, Harold Cruse, Imamu Baraka/LeRoi Jones, Claude Brown, and Julius Lester.

The emergence of these organizations and individuals coincided with a significant expansion of the black middle class, in large part as a consequence of the social changes brought about by the civil-rights movement. Currently, 1.6 million blacks hold higher-income professional and managerial jobs, which is twice the number held in 1969. Many are in the public sector, including federal, state, and local government and social-service organizations. In the last fifteen years, the number of blacks going to college has more than tripled. It was this new young black elite, especially, who hung on the speeches, pamphlets, and books of the revolutionary heroes and intellectuals of the day.

Many of these new spokesmen, in addition to attacking the large institutions in American life that had held blacks in thralldom, and in addition to attempting to inspire a greater sense of black pride, simultaneously directed a significant portion of their animus against Jews. Thus, Harold Cruse's 1967 book, *The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual*, which is basically a critique of black intellectuals for failing to assert their identity in left-wing politics, also attacks Jewish "striving for dominance and prestige" and Jewish "political and ideological power over Negroes." Cruse repeats the anti-Jewish utterances of such men as Marx, Dostoevsky, and even Ulysses S. Grant and charges—in a manner once reserved for discussions of Catholics and the Pope—that Jews "function in America as an organic part of a distant nation-state." Although it is not much discussed today, Cruse's book was widely reviewed and commented upon at the time.

Still widely read today, in fact something of a classic, is *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*, a moving, personal account of what it means to be poor and black in America. Yet this book too is filled with derogatory caricatures of Jews as exploiters of blacks. Here is an example of what Malcolm X claims he learned about American Jews:

> [A]ll I held against Jews was that so many Jews actually were hypocrites in their claim to be friends of the American black man. . . . [A]t the same time I knew that the Jews played these roles for a very careful strategic reason: the more prejudice in America could be focused upon the Negro, then the more the white Gentiles' prejudice would keep . . . off the Jew. . . .

For almost a generation now, the rising black middle class has been fed on misleading and distorted information about, and just plain hatred of, Jews, both here and in Israel. Julius Lester denied

* See Dorothy Rabinowitz, "Blacks, Jews, and New York Politics," COMMENTARY, November 1978.

† Daniel Benson, "'Human Rights' at Harvard Law School," COMMENTARY, September 1979.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the Jews or Israel deserved any sympathy "because of the six million murdered in the gas chambers."* LeRoi Jones spoke of "atheist Jews" as "doublecrossers" who "stole our secrets." Stokely Carmichael proclaimed that black militants were ready "to take up arms and die if necessary to help the Arabs free Palestine." Claude Brown, the mildest of all, in his autobiographical best-seller, *Manchild in the Promised Land,* cited those who said, "We got to take Harlem out of Goldberg's pocket." The sacrifices made by Jews in behalf of the black struggle—such as the Mississippi murder of Andrew Goodman and Michael H. Schwerner along with the black, James E. Chaney—were derogated; Harold Cruse declared that Chaney had been beaten into an unrecognizable state while the two Jews were treated "less harshly."

Despite the deep anti-Jewish feelings manifested by many black intellectuals and new extremist spokesmen, much of their work was supported by liberal whites, including Jews. Enthusiastic introductions were written by Jews to Malcolm X's *Autobiography* and Eldridge Cleaver's *Soul on Ice.* Not a single reviewer of Cruse's book saw fit to discuss his blatant anti-Semitism. Thomas Lask, in the New York *Times,* called it "angry" and "full of extreme statements," but nevertheless "so vigorously written, so fiercely and honestly argued—[that] it provides a mind-plowing experience of the first order." Christopher Lasch, in the *New York Review of Books,* wrote that Cruse's book would survive as a "monument of historical analysis—a notable contribution to the understanding of the American past. . . ." It was left to the black writer, James Baldwin, to resign in protest from the black nationalist publication, *Liberator,* over this issue. "I think it is distinctly unhelpful, and I think it is immoral, to blame Harlem on the Jew," Baldwin declared. "Why when we should be storming capitals, do you suggest to the people you hope to serve that they take refuge in the most ancient and barbaric of European myths?"

Baldwin's eloquent plea notwithstanding, many white intellectuals simply abdicated the normal standards of criticism when it came to dealing with black militants and their excesses. During the mid-60's, in the midst of widespread looting and destruction of businesses in slum areas, when H. "Rap" Brown proclaimed that he was "neither morally nor legally bound to obey laws made by a body in which I have no representation," his stand was applauded by Staughton Lynd, then an assistant professor of history on leave from Yale, in a New York *Times* article, "A Radical Speaks in Defense of SNCC." Similarly, in "White Standards and Negro Writing," which appeared in the *New Republic* in 1968, the critic Richard Gilman called for a moratorium on literary judgments of black writers, since "in the present phase of interracial existence in America moral and intellectual 'truths' have not the same reality for Negroes and whites. . . ."

Out of this same impulse, many found it possible to overlook an entire body of black anti-Semitic thought. Is it any wonder that many well-educated and politically conscious blacks came to accept the "moral and intellectual 'truths'" told them about Jews?

TO POINT to the false and malicious ideas about Jews that began to gain currency in educated black circles in the late 60's and early 70's is not to suggest that such ideas were the only element involved in the rise of black hostility to Jews. What has developed in recent years is in some part a plain conflict of interest: the increase in black education and the expansion of the black middle class have brought blacks into greater competition with Jews. Blacks seeking to gain entrance to and advancement in the professions, business, and government, have been coming up not simply against whites but often against Jews who happen to be a step or two above them on the social and economic ladder. As Nathan Glazer observed in the mid-60's, "The Negro no longer confronts the Jew only as tenant, servant, customer, worker. . . . Now the Negro teacher works under a Jewish principal, the Negro social worker under a Jewish supervisor."

This conflict of interest has given rise to what might be called an "objective" anti-Semitism, a resentment of and a desire to displace those Jews who seem to be "in the way" of upwardly mobile blacks. But the conflict has also at times been invested with elements of "subjective" anti-Semitism.† William Schneider has pointed out recently that elements of the rising black middle class "have gone beyond actual conflicts with Jews and revived the image of the abstract, alien, powerful Jew who keeps blacks down and manipulates them for profit." Perhaps the most salient instance of this whole mixed phenomenon was the traumatic school strike in New York in 1968.

The ostensible issue in the strike was the involvement of neighborhood people in the administration of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville demonstration school district; decentralization, it was claimed, would be a means of improving the education of disadvantaged youngsters. Yet what was involved too was an effort by upwardly aspiring blacks to gain access to teaching and administrative positions within the school system. The proportion of blacks and Puerto Ricans among New York City's teachers at the time, according to Martin Mayer in *The Teachers' Strike,* was under 10 per cent, and school administrators were "almost invisible except at the lowest rank. . . ." The

* To judge by an extraordinary piece protesting against the "new expression of anti-Semitism" among blacks after the Young resignation (*Village Voice,* September 10, 1979), Lester's attitudes have changed markedly in the past few years.

† The terms are drawn from Eva G. Reichmann's book, *Hostages of Civilization: The Social Sources of National Socialist Anti-Semitism* (Greenwood, 1951).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proportion of Jews was much higher. Yet the United Federation of Teachers—acting as a labor union and not as an ethnic group—feared that decentralization, if applied to the entire school system, would destroy the union's bargaining power, and its position was supported by the patriarch of the civil-rights movement, A. Philip Randolph.

What began as a labor dispute, with elements of a legitimate conflict of interest, was quickly transformed by a number of black militants into an issue of "the Jews." Negro parents denounced the striking teachers as "Jew pigs." A black schoolteacher read a poem over a radio station dedicated to Albert Shanker, the president of the teachers' union, which began, "Hey, Jew boy, with that *yarmulka* on your head/You pale-faced Jew boy—I wish you were dead." Jewish organizations, of course, condemned these and similar incidents, but for the most part, civic leaders and many intellectuals found it expedient to let them go unchallenged. Yet as Earl Raab wrote at the time in an analysis of the black revolution and its attitude toward Jews:*

> This is not the folk anti-Semitism which the black population shares with the white population. It is, rather, the abstract and symbolic anti-Semitism which Jews instinctively find more chilling. . . . "This is not anti-Semitism" (some blacks say). "The hostility is toward the whites. When they say Jew, they mean white." But that is an exact and acute description of political anti-Semitism: "The enemy" becomes the Jew. . . . "Don't be disturbed," the Jews are told, "this is just poetic excess." But the ideology of political anti-Semitism has precisely always been poetic excess, which has not prevented it from becoming murderous.

In the years after the 1968 school strike, blacks and Jews found themselves increasingly on opposite sides of the whole complex of issues surrounding the government's affirmative-action programs. One of the worst collisions occurred over the *Bakke* case. By the time it came before the Supreme Court, the case found community-relations organizations like the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith lined up in the courts and on the public hustings against traditional allies like the Urban League, the NAACP, and other black groups. For taking a position against preferential treatment—a position shared, according to a 1977 Gallup poll, with an astonishing 83 per cent of the American people and 64 per cent of non-whites—Jewish organizations were condemned by some blacks in acrimonious terms. Thus, writing in the *Amsterdam News*, Louis Clayton Jones declared that the Jews were already, through the state of Israel, "the greatest beneficiaries of preferential treatment in the history of mankind," and were now trying to prevent others from benefiting from the same process.

Still another occasion for the open expression of black hostility to Jews has arisen with budgetary constraints in a time of inflation. Thus in New York City last year, the efforts of black political leaders to protect their political "turf"—the city's anti-poverty programs—led them into outright anti-Semitic attacks on Mayor Koch, whose administration has been forced by economic exigency into making cutbacks in city services. At a meeting in Harlem attended by Koch, he was called a "dirty Jew bastard" by a black in the audience, to which several others yelled, "Right on!" Koch was finally hustled out of the building by dozens of security guards and police officers amid cries of "Get that Jew-boy!"

IT HAS been said that while black anti-Semitism may be growing, there has been a corresponding increase in anti-black feeling among Jews. The Harris data gathered for the NCCJ study, for example, reported that Jews were less willing than whites generally to send their children to schools with blacks or to have blacks move into their neighborhoods.

Now, there is little doubt that prejudice exists among Jews or that they (along with middle-class blacks and others) are often personally unwilling to take on the problems of the black poor in their schools or neighborhoods. The fact is, however, that Jews remain the closest social and political allies blacks have. They are still more liberal than any other white group and they are still strongly and consistently opposed to racism. Even those black leaders interviewed in the 1978 Harris survey who expressed negative sentiments toward Jews conceded that Jews have a greater commitment to civil rights than Americans generally. And at about the same time Harris pollsters were doing their interviewing, a New York *Times*-CBS survey of voters found Jews to be the most liberal group on a whole range of issues affecting the black community.

Moreover, there is some reason to doubt the conclusion of Harris that "Jewish attitudes toward blacks have . . . tended to harden." William Schneider reports that no other survey shows Jews to be more anti-black than other whites. He has questioned, also, the method used in gathering the Harris materials on Jewish attitudes. In the effort to find a cluster of Jews for sampling purposes, he suggests, Harris pollsters over-selected poorer, more Orthodox, and less educated Jews who tend not to be representative of the total Jewish population. (To be sure, in shocked response to what has been revealed by the Young affair, political sentiment within the Jewish community may indeed now begin to undergo significant changes.)

The fact that the rising black middle class is colliding at a number of points with Jews may ex-

* "The Black Revolution and the Jewish Question," COMMENTARY, January 1969.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

plain but can hardly justify the growing incidence of anti-Semitism. Stirring up animosities against Jews in order to advance the interests of any particular group is simply indefensible. Jewish and Roman Catholic leaders have clashed for many years over such issues as aid to parochial schools and abortions, but while tensions have grown, there is no evidence that relations between Jews and Catholics have been marked by any significant increase in anti-Semitism.

WHAT has been especially disquieting has been, first, the silence of establishment black leaders in the face of black anti-Semitism and now, in the wake of the Young affair, their acquiescence in and even encouragement of anti-Jewish and anti-Israel sentiments. When black anti-Semitism began to appear publicly in the mid-60's, Roy Wilkins of the NAACP, James Farmer of CORE, and others were quick to denounce it. In the March 5, 1966 issue of *Afro-American*, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., struck out at a particular outrageous statement by a local black leader in Mount Vernon, New York:

> One of the leaders of a fine and militant civil-rights group has made an anti-Semitic remark. . . . I do not view this horrible outburst as anti-Jewish. I see it as anti-man and anti-God. It would be a statement to condemn harshly, coming from anyone. It is singularly despicable, coming from the lips of a black man. For black people who have been torturously burned in the crucible of hatred for centuries, should have become so purified of hate in those scorching flames as to be instinctively intolerant of intolerance.

No such forthright condemnation has been heard from the black leaders of today. With the notable and courageous exception of Bayard Rustin, Bernard Gifford, Tony Brown, and one or two others, black leaders have endorsed, rationalized, or actually promoted the expression of openly anti-Jewish attitudes as well as the effort to blame "the Jews" for black dissatisfactions. Writing ten years ago about the scapegoating of Jews as a primary element in the transformation of the civil-rights movement into the "black revolution," Earl Raab noted that that revolution had "already succeeded in reintroducing political anti-Semitism as a fashionable item in the American public arena—with what consequences no one can yet tell."

Even as recently as a few months ago, most black members of Congress voted for the $5-billion aid package in support of the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement, and only last November, Jews joined with blacks in preventing Frank L. Rizzo, who had been resorting to harsh racial rhetoric in a charter-change campaign, from running for a third term as mayor of Philadelphia.* Such cooperative efforts will become impossible in the future unless the spread of anti-Semitism into influential segments of the black community can be halted and reversed.

* Whereas most of the white ethnic groups supported Rizzo by heavy margins, 96 per cent of the blacks voted against him and 69 per cent of the Jews.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Socialists and the PLO

Carl Gershman

THE meeting in Vienna last July of former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky with Yasir Arafat, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, will be remembered primarily as the PLO leader's first visit to a Western democracy. The meeting, as Arafat claimed, was a "major breakthrough" in the PLO's campaign to enhance its international standing. It was also a breakthrough for Brandt and Kreisky, but in a very different and much more far-reaching sense. For the meeting with Arafat marked a decisive turn in their effort, undertaken in cooperation with other European Socialist leaders, to refashion democratic socialism into an international movement aligned with anti-Western revolutionary movements in the Third World.

In meeting with Arafat, Brandt and Kreisky acted in their capacity as officials of the Socialist International, a worldwide association of democratic-socialist and labor parties, the most influential of which are in Western Europe. Brandt is president of the Socialist International and Kreisky is a vice president and chairman of the organization's Study Group on the Middle East; and they head, respectively, two of the largest parties in the International, the German Social Democratic party and the Austrian Socialist party.*

The Socialist International has been in existence in its present form since 1951, when it was reestablished in Frankfurt. From the first, the new International unequivocally aligned itself with the West in the struggle against Communism, which it called a "new imperialism" that had "destroyed freedom or the chance of gaining freedom" wherever it had achieved power. It opposed any cooperation with Communist parties and excluded from its ranks Socialist parties which did maintain alliances with them. In a statement of basic principles adopted in Oslo in 1962, it said that the cold war "has largely been imposed upon an unwilling world by Communist leaders" whose advocacy of peaceful coexistence is "only a change of tactics" while "they strive to extend all over the world" their totalitarian system and doctrine. While favoring complete disarmament, the International rejected "the idea that democracies should disarm unilaterally," and it called NATO a "powerful bulwark of peace." It also denied that Communism had anything constructive to offer the emerging nations. On the contrary, despite its anti-colonialist rhetoric, Communism had "enslaved scores of millions of people." It was the developed countries of the West, particularly the Socialist elements in these countries, which were the natural partners of the newly independent countries in their historic effort to overcome poverty.

This world view disintegrated within the European Socialist movement under the impact of the rise of the New Left in the late 1960's. The New Left's intense opposition to America as well as to anti-Communism and Western military defense, and its equally passionate espousal of the cause of revolution in the Third World, swept the youth sections of all the Socialist parties. In time these views, refined and sanitized, were absorbed by the parties themselves, a process that was facilitated by the atmosphere of détente that prevailed during the early 1970's. The Union of the Left in France between the Socialists and the Communists, the sharp turn to the Left in the British Labor party and trade unions, the rise of the Jusos (or Young Socialists) as an important force in the German Social Democratic party, and the outspoken anti-Americanism of the Swedish Social Democrats under Olof Palme, were all signs that a fundamental shift had taken place in the European Socialist movement.

This shift did not have immediate consequences for the Socialist International, if only because the SI was not looked upon by the member parties as a significant political organization. Meetings of the International's executive body, the Bureau, were sparsely attended, generally by only the party

CARL GERSHMAN, executive director of Social Democrats USA, has represented his organization at meetings of the Socialist International, of which SDUSA is a member.

* Among the other parties in the Socialist International are the French Socialist party led by François Mitterrand, the British Labor party led by former Prime Minister James Callaghan, the Israel Labor party led by Shimon Peres, the Portuguese Socialist party led by former Prime Minister Mario Soares, the Spanish Socialist Workers party led by Felipe Gonzalez, and the Swedish Social Democratic party led by former Prime Minister Olof Palme.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

functionaries assigned to international affairs, and they were taken up almost entirely with administrative matters. The most important events were party leaders' conferences where top officials would gather for private talks. Such meetings offered a useful, if not indispensable, means of communication. But they were held outside the formal structure of the International and did not generate a coherent program of organizational activity.

Nevertheless, on those occasions when political controversies erupted in the International, the transformation of the organization's political orientation became clearly evident. One such case involved charges of human-rights violations brought in 1975 by the Dutch Labor party against the International's member party in Singapore, the ruling People's Action Party (PAP), which prompted the Bureau to call for an inquiry into the political situation in Singapore. The PAP accused "crypto-Communists" in the Dutch party and the International of aiding and abetting the Malayan Communists, pointing out that Singapore's detention laws were a necessary means of dealing with Communist terrorism and had been part of the PAP's election program at the time it was invited to join the International many years earlier. It was not the PAP that had changed, it said, but the Socialist International which, "from being an alternative to Communism, has now become its instrument." When the charges against the PAP were not withdrawn, the party resigned from the International.*

It was during the period of this controversy, 1975-76, that the decision was taken to reorganize the Socialist International and to give it an important role in world politics. Several factors contributed to the Socialist leaders' optimism about the political prospects of a revived International. First, the Socialist parties were at the height of their influence, providing heads of government during 1975 in nine European countries (sixteen countries worldwide), including West Germany which had emerged as the leader of Europe. Moreover, the French Socialists had overtaken the Communists in voting power and seemed on the verge of becoming the senior partner in a leftist coalition government. And in Spain and Portugal, the Socialist parties, long suppressed by right-wing dictatorships, were emerging as major political forces.

In addition to the strength of the individual parties, the changing world situation seemed to offer new opportunities for Socialists to increase their global influence. It was felt that détente, precarious as it might sometimes appear, had made it possible for Socialists to develop political relations with elements that otherwise would be drawn into the Soviet or American camp. In particular, the growing nonaligned movement, consisting primarily of countries ruled by parties that were nominally Socialist though admittedly undemocratic, was looked upon as a promising arena for expanding Socialist contacts. With American influence in decline, the time seemed ripe for an independent European initiative.

STILL ANOTHER reason for optimism was that Willy Brandt had agreed to assume the presidency of the rejuvenated organization. Although he had resigned as Chancellor of West Germany in 1974 under embarrassing circumstances (involving the arrest of one of his key personal aides who was discovered to be an East German spy), Brandt remained a leader of world stature who brought great prestige to the Socialist International. He also brought an ambitious political perspective. In his address to the 1976 Geneva congress at which he was elected president, he proposed that the organization undertake three bold "offensives." The first was an offensive for a secure peace which would help put an end to the arms race, described by Brandt as a "marathon of irrationalism." The second was an offensive for "new relations between North and South," involving a new willingness on the part of the rich nations to make sacrifices in "the struggle against worldwide misery." Finally, he called for a worldwide offensive for human rights.

The mere fact that such challenging "offensives" had been proposed was an indication that the Socialist International had moved into a new organizational phase. And the manner in which they were carried out during the first two-year term of Brandt's administration showed that the body had completely revised its policies concerning the basic issues of Communism, peace, and political liberty.

The Socialist International adopted a policy of neutrality on matters of East-West relations and disarmament. Whereas in an earlier period the International had affirmed the principle of the collective security of the West as the basis for peace, it now presented itself as an impartial observer, urging, in the words of Brandt, a "*political* partnership" between the U.S. and the Soviet Union based on the acceptance by each side of the "legitimate security interests of the opposing side." Moreover, whereas the International had once approached disarmament as a desirable goal made possible only by a system of collective security, it now raised disarmament to the level of a categorical imperative, the precondition not only for peace between East and West but also for the economic development of the world's poor nations, which required the resources now being "wasted" on armaments. Not surprisingly, therefore, the idea of unilateral disarmament by the democracies was no longer rejected. While the International did not endorse the concept explicitly, it did so implicitly on many occasions, as when its speakers

* The PAP's defense of its record as a ruling Socialist party since 1959, and its charges against the Socialist International, are contained in *Socialism That Works—The Singapore Way*, edited by C.V. Devan Nair, Federal Publications, Singapore, 1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would repeatedly decry the dangers of the neutron bomb while never objecting to any Soviet weapon, or when appeals were made, in Olof Palme's words, to "mobilize public opinion" against armaments, an effort that could only occur in free societies.

In keeping with this new approach, the Socialist International organized a conference on disarmament in Helsinki where, in addition to the member parties of the International, the U.S. and Soviet governments were both invited to send representatives. Yet far from being a forum used by the Socialists to foster a new "partnership" between the two superpowers (an approach wholeheartedly endorsed by the American representative, UN aide James F. Leonard), the conference became instead a platform used by the Russians to promote a new partnership between Socialists and Communists.

The Soviet delegation, the largest to attend the conference, was headed by Boris N. Ponomarev, the chairman of the international department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party, the direct descendant of Stalin's Comintern, on whose executive committee he once served. In an hour-long speech, Ponomarev placed the entire blame for the arms race on the United States, the European members of NATO, China, South Africa, and Israel, while maintaining that only the Soviet armed forces were "designated exclusively for defense needs" and that only the Soviet people were engaged in "peaceful, creative work." Observing that "of late, Communists and Social Democrats have formulated very similar standpoints concerning the struggle for disarmament," he called for unity of all "peace forces" opposed to "imperialist reactionary circles" bent on nuclear war. He concluded by inviting a delegation of the Socialist International to visit Moscow for "summit level" discussions on disarmament, and by proposing the establishment of permanent machinery for "joint actions" by Communist and Socialist parties which would include conferences of journalists and experts and the creation of joint research groups.

The response of the Socialist International was not to question the premises of its neutralist approach to disarmament, including the possibility of getting the Soviet Union to appreciate the "legitimate security interests" of the West, but rather to give serious consideration to Ponomarev's proposals for Socialist-Communist cooperation. The report on the Helsinki conference that appeared in *Socialist Affairs,* the International's official publication, observed that the Soviet spokesman had "opened up an important perspective which the Socialist International member organizations cannot avoid." A study group on disarmament was established which was "especially charged with studying proposals" that Ponomarev had made, and in his report to the congress held last November in Vancouver, the International's general secretary, Bernt Carlsson, announced that "the time is past when such proposals could be treated just by silence." As if to prepare the organization for what might lie ahead, *Socialist Affairs* published what it called a "timely look" at relations between the Socialist and Communist Internationals between 1919 and 1939, the last time efforts were made to reconcile the two movements.

If Brandt's first "offensive" led to a new Socialist attitude toward Western security and Communism, his second "offensive" for a new North-South relationship was intended to link the organization to the nonaligned movement in the Third World. Toward that end, the 1976 Geneva congress revised the International's statutes, adding to the organization's purposes the goal of establishing relations with "Socialist-oriented parties not in membership which desire cooperation." The International also revised its policies so as to remove any ideological barriers between it and the parties in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere in the Third World with which it sought to establish new political relationships.

It dutifully called for "a new world economic order" in which the developing nations would have "permanently guaranteed" markets for their manufactured and semi-manufactured products and would receive "an increased transfer of scarce resources, particularly capital and managerial skills," from the developing countries. The International also went to great lengths to demonstrate its unqualified support for various "progressive" forces in the Third World. It gave special attention to Chile, organizing a three-day conference which was attended by all six parties that made up Salvador Allende's ruling coalition, the Unidad Popular. (It was announced that this was the first time since 1922 that representatives of a Communist party had taken part in a meeting of the Socialist International.) Among other things, it called upon member parties to give political solidarity, humanitarian aid, and "material support for peaceful purposes" to the armed "liberation" movements of Southern Africa. Representatives of two of these movements, the African National Congress of South Africa and the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe Rhodesia, addressed the Vancouver congress and received a warm reception, as did representatives of the Sandinista National Liberation Front of Nicaragua and the Polisario Front of the Western Sahara.

This new orientation to the Third World inevitably affected the conduct of Brandt's third proposed "offensive," on human rights, since the International was hardly about to raise objections to violations of human rights by "Socialist-oriented" parties with which it sought a new relationship. Indeed, among the parties invited to send representatives to the Vancouver congress were the ruling parties in Algeria, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Somalia, and Tanzania—all one-party dictatorships where individual liberty is not respected. The International, Brandt

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

observed at the Vancouver congress by way of justifying the new attitude toward "Socialist-oriented" one-party dictatorships,should not apply "standards which are too much of a European or North American stamp" in countries where satisfying "social human rights" takes precedence over respect for individual rights. "He whose life is exposed to sheer misery," he added, "can take only a minor interest in other civil rights." Evidently, though, this principle of relative standards has not been applied to Latin America, where the International has criticized the denial of political and civil rights by many right-wing dictatorships (though not by the Communist dictatorship in Cuba, a regime that has been warmly praised by the chairman of the International's Committee on Latin America, Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley). Nor has it been applied to South Africa, with regard to which Brandt told the Vancouver congress that "nobody who is devoted to our common values can stand idly by while human rights are disregarded openly and in a systematic manner."

Brandt's human-rights "offensive" fell victim to East-West political considerations, as well as to those of a North-South nature. Under his leadership, the International has firmly opposed any initiative or statement on human rights that might appear to harm détente in any way. At Vancouver, Brandt observed that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) had required of all signatory states the "renunciation of intervention in the internal affairs of other nations." The only effect of "unprofitable provocation" and "largely pointless polemics"—that is, criticism of Communist policies on human rights—would be to "fling us back into the period of dangerous confrontations." The International, Brandt said, would "continue to speak out when people are being tortured—particularly where this is happening under the misused name of socialism." But it would not, he added, "be misled into degrading the debate about human rights into a drum which can be beaten for quite different purposes." Presumably, however, any protest against Communist "torture" would amount to drum-beating, even protest against the slaughter in Cambodia or against the oppressive policies of the regime in Hanoi which have caused hundreds of thousands of people to flee Vietnam at great risk to their lives. On these questions, as on all others regarding brutality by Communist regimes, the Socialist International has remained silent.

The political transformation of the Socialist International has met with only minimal resistance within the organization. The only important leader to criticize the political direction which the International has taken under Brandt has been Leopold Senghor, the President of Senegal. As the leader of the only African party that is a member of the International, Senghor has restricted his criticism to African issues, accusing the International of supporting "those who claim kinship with Marxism-Leninism." In a debate on the Western Sahara, he stated that he was "resolutely opposed" to a policy which favored the pro-Soviet forces in Africa. But his opposition has been unsuccessful, since he was not able to prevent the International from recognizing the Polisario Front of the Western Sahara or from inviting the MPLA of Angola to the Vancouver congress.

THE only issue where the International has been blocked from taking its new radical course has been over the question of recognizing the Palestine Liberation Organization. Or at least this was the case until Brandt and Kreisky met with Arafat in Vienna. Since this is a question of the utmost importance to the Socialist International, and since its handling is illustrative of the way some of the International's leaders have approached many other issues, it is worth examining in some detail.

Until the Yom Kippur War, the position of the Israel Labor party on the Middle East conflict had broad support within the Socialist International. But the war strained the relationship between Israeli and European Socialists. At a party leader's conference immediately after the war, Golda Meir rebuked her long-time comrades for capitulating to Arab pressures in refusing to allow U.S. planes with emergency supplies for Israel to refuel on their territory. Nevertheless, the Israel Labor party retained a decisive influence over the International's Middle East policy for some years after the war, in keeping with the organization's traditional practice of not opposing a party on an issue which specifically affects its country and political interests. (No Arab party belongs to the International since none is committed to multiparty democracy, which remains a requirement for membership.) But even during this period, an effort was initiated to change the International's approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

At the very meeting at which Golda Meir berated the Socialist leaders for abandoning Israel in the war, it was decided that a fact-finding mission under Kreisky's leadership should be sent to Israel and the Arab countries. The mission's report, which was issued in 1977, called upon the Socialist International to adopt a "less emotional posture" toward the Middle East conflict and specifically recommended that the organization recognize the PLO and develop a new "partnership" with the Arab world. It proposed the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, maintaining confidently that "Israel would be totally unchallenged in its existence" if only it would agree to the creation of such a state and "adjust its future political aspirations" to developments in the Arab world.

The report made many outlandish claims that could not have stood up under close examination. The proposition, for example, that a speech de-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

livered at the UN in 1947 by Andrei Gromyko was evidence of the Soviet commitment to Arab-Israeli peace, or that Arafat's speech to the UN in 1974 showed that the PLO accepted Israel's existence was not very convincing, to say the least. But the report never became official policy of the Socialist International, nor was it ever debated by the Bureau. Kreisky merely issued it and then proposed that a round-table discussion on the Middle East conflict be held outside the framework of the Bureau, to which all member parties would be invited to send representatives.

Such a meeting was held in Vienna in February 1978 and revealed the extent to which many of the parties represented there (notably those from Sweden, Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Austria) differed fundamentally with the Israel Labor party's view of the conflict. These parties favored recognition of the PLO and the establishment of a Palestinian state, proposals which Shimon Peres, who represented the Labor party at the meeting, rejected out of hand. Peres did not identify himself with the position of the Begin government, for he called the decision to increase the number of West Bank settlements during negotiations with Egypt "unwise" and advocated a territorial compromise on the West Bank. But the thrust of his remarks was against those who favored recognizing the PLO, an organization which Peres said was committed to Israel's destruction and whose "bread and butter" was violence. "Why should we help crown such an undemocratic group?" he asked. It murders moderate Palestinians, it will endanger Jordan, and it "will bring the Russians to the gates of Jerusalem." As to the view that the PLO was no longer an extremist group or would become moderate if it were recognized by Israel, Peres said that "we will not hang our future on an imagined proposition that holds no water."

The Vienna round-table discussion offered no proposals and adopted no statement. There was little the International could contribute at that point anyway, in the context of Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem and the negotiations which were under way between Israel and Egypt. But when the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations became deadlocked, Kreisky invited Sadat and Peres to Vienna in July for talks with himself and Brandt. These talks produced the so-called Vienna document, a commendable four-point policy statement issued by Brandt and Kreisky which they were subsequently to repudiate. The statement called for "sincere and sustained" negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, as well as for the establishment of "normal and friendly relations" between them; Israeli withdrawal to "secure boundaries" to be agreed upon in negotiations, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338; and the resolution of the Palestinian problem involving "recognition of the right of the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future through negotiations in which their elected representatives would take part." While the obvious intent of the Vienna talks was to pressure the Begin government to be more forthcoming in its negotiations with Egypt, there is no evidence that they had this effect. And, in any event, the Camp David settlement, which was reached in September, made the whole exercise superfluous.

THIS is where matters stood when, immediately after Camp David, the Bureau met in Paris and, in addition to endorsing the Vienna document, is also supposed to have adopted "the resolution . . . which authorized the chairman of the International to hold exploratory talks with the PLO leadership." This, at least, is how the origin of the meeting with Arafat is explained in the joint communiqué which Brandt and Kreisky issued with the PLO leader following their talks in Vienna. In fact, however, no resolution of the sort was adopted at the Paris Bureau meeting.

What actually happened was that a lengthy debate was held on the proposal of the Spanish Socialist Workers party (PSOE) to invite the PLO as an observer to the International's upcoming congress in Vancouver. Peres opposed the proposal, citing the PLO's Palestinian National Covenant which declares the establishment of Israel "fundamentally null and void." "This is simply the sort of resolution," Peres said, "on which the Israel Labor party cannot make any compromise." Most of the parties that spoke on the motion also opposed it, some because they saw it as divisive or premature, others because they objected to the PLO's policy toward Israel and its role in international terrorism.

Kreisky took the position that it was first necessary to determine if Peres was correct in his characterization of the PLO's aim. He proposed, therefore, that the Spanish motion be withdrawn and that Brandt be asked to inform the PLO of the Bureau's discussion and to inquire whether there had been any change in its position as set forth in the Palestinian National Covenant. This would, he stated, give an argument to the moderate faction. At this point, however, Peres intervened and called for a clear rejection of the PLO. It was useless, he said, to inquire if it had changed its position since it had refused to do so on many previous occasions. He found the distinction between extremists and moderates in the PLO artificial and asked why so many people were interested in establishing a dialogue "between me and an organization that wants to kill my country."

In the end, the Spanish proposal was withdrawn and no vote at all was taken on Kreisky's motion. Brandt simply said that there was no need for a Bureau recommendation for the president to "increase his knowledge" about the position of some organization and, if he so chose, to share his knowledge with others on the Bureau. Kreisky, clearly displeased with the manner in which the issue was resolved, observed that he was not "prepared

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to concede that an organization like this should be brought to its knees, so to speak, before new formulas are worked out."

On the basis of nothing more than readiness by Brandt to inform himself about the PLO, Kreisky, acting in the name of the Socialist International, invited Arafat to Vienna for three days of talks and accorded him the kind of treatment ordinarily reserved for an important head of state. Arafat was warmly embraced at the Vienna airport by Kreisky, who was joined in receiving the PLO leader by members of the Austrian cabinet, Arab diplomats, and ambassadors from Communist and other countries supporting the PLO. He was accommodated at the Vienna hotel used for visiting dignitaries and was the guest of honor at a banquet hosted by Kreisky and attended by Brandt. At the conclusion of the weekend talks, Arafat issued a communiqué with Kreisky and Brandt and participated with them in a joint press conference.

In holding these talks with Arafat, Brandt and Kreisky involved themselves in a series of deceptions, first by circumventing the Bureau which had not authorized such talks and had not even authorized Brandt to communicate with the PLO in the name of the Socialist International; then by publicly misrepresenting how the Bureau's discussion had been resolved; and not least, by flouting their own expressed intention to use such a meeting, in the event it was ever held, to pressure the PLO into accepting Israel's existence. Indeed, at the Paris Bureau Kreisky had stated that "I think we have to force, I am not using this term in its full meaning, that we have to cause the PLO to make their position on this question openly known, because I understand that we cannot expect our Israeli comrades to join people in a congress who have as an aim in their program the destruction of Israel." But there is no evidence that such pressure was applied in the talks with Arafat, though there is considerable reason to believe that pressure was applied in the opposite direction. For the only thing that became "publicly known" as a result of the meeting with Arafat was that the Socialist International, not the PLO, had altered its policy toward the Middle East conflict, and had done so in a drastic way.

ANY thought that the PLO might be ready to moderate its policy toward Israel should have been dispelled the moment Arafat arrived in Vienna, flaunting his combat fatigues which he was still wearing after having addressed terrorists at PLO training camps in Bulgaria. In fact, Arafat conceded nothing in the joint communiqué issued with Brandt and Kreisky, while the two Socialist leaders abandoned every one of the four points contained in the Vienna document of the year before. The substance of the first two points—state-to-state negotiations and the normalization of relations—is not to be found anywhere in the communiqué. Instead, it notes Arafat's reference to "the Baghdad summit resolutions which called for a just and permanent peace in the Middle East. . . ." In effect, this constituted a repudiation of points one and two of the Vienna document, since the Baghdad resolutions rejected the Camp David accords and "all the consequences—political, economic, and legal—which derive from them."

While Brandt and Kreisky endorsed UN Resolutions 242 and 338 in the communiqué, they did so in connection with "the implementation of Palestinian national rights" not mentioned anywhere in the two UN resolutions—but without mentioning secure and agreed-upon borders for Israel. (Arafat, of course, did not express support for these resolutions in the communiqué, and in the press conference he promoted two quite different UN resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, one endorsing the PLO's political program and the other granting it permanent observer status at the UN.) Regarding the Palestinian question (point four), Brandt and Kreisky "concurred with Chairman Arafat that the Palestinian issue is the central problem of the Middle East conflict," and they also noted Arafat's description of "the PLO as the symbol and instrument of Palestinian nationalism, and its recognition as the sole legitimate Palestinian representative to the Rabat summit, the nonaligned countries, and the United Nations."

In the communiqué, Brandt and Kreisky also joined with Arafat in expressing "extreme concern" over Israel's "settlement activities in the occupied territories" and over the outbreak of "new military activities," a reference to Israeli air attacks on PLO positions in southern Lebanon. In the joint press conference following the talks, Arafat called these Israeli raids "inhuman" and "terrorist" and decried the fact that there had been "a big outcry regarding 60,000 [*sic*] Vietnamese refugees" while world opinion ignores "the fate of 600,000 Palestinian and Lebanese refugees." But nowhere in the communiqué or in the press conference did either of the two European Socialists so much as mention the campaign of violence against Israeli civilians conducted by PLO terrorists based in southern Lebanon.

At the press conference, Kreisky seemed to accept an additional point of PLO doctrine, which is that the PLO's campaign against Israel is analogous to the European resistance against the Nazis. When asked how Austria could recognize the PLO on the basis of international law, Kreisky replied that a "de facto situation" existed where the PLO was, in his view, the representative of the Palestinian people. He added that he wanted "to say something fundamental" at this point to explain why "in this question I do perhaps a little bit more than is usual." He then referred to the period of the Nazi occupation of Austria when he

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and other Austrians went into exile and spoke "for a country that no longer existed on the map, but whose people existed." He recalled how gratified he was to be received by the Swedish Prime Minister so that he could speak with him about postwar assistance to the Austrian people. "Such a refugee as I once was," he said by way of explaining his personal interest in the PLO, "has special understanding for movements of a similar kind." These remarks could easily be construed to mean that "movements of a similar kind" are in resistance against oppressors of a similar kind, especially since the remarks were made in a joint press conference with Arafat who has repeatedly compared Israel with Nazi Germany; neither Kreisky nor the former West German Chancellor, at any rate, said anything to dissociate himself from such a construction.

FOLLOWING the talks, *Der Spiegel* reported, Brandt informed Bonn that "more clearly than ever, Yasir Arafat had conceded that implementation of the Palestinians' right of self-determination was also possible without the destruction of the state of Israel." Kreisky went a good deal further. He announced that "it would be absolutely ridiculous to think the PLO is out to destroy Israel." When asked what evidence he had for this, he replied: "Arafat told me that there was never on his part any resolution which talks of Israel's destruction. In fact, no Israeli has so far shown me such a resolution. On the other hand, there are clear decisions which are proof of the opposite. The PLO wants to establish its Palestinian state on the territory which will be evacuated by the Israeli troops. This implies the fact that this state will exist side by side with Israel."

These "clear decisions" are noted in the joint communiqué, specifically with reference to "the resolutions of the Palestinian National Council which called for the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state." However, far from substantiating Kreisky's contention that the PLO no longer seeks the destruction of Israel, these resolutions, adopted at meetings of the PNC in June 1974 and March 1977, prove precisely the opposite.

The resolution adopted in June 1974 states that "the PLO will struggle by every means—the foremost of which is armed struggle—to liberate the Palestinian land and to establish the people's national independent and fighting authority on every part of Palestinian land to be liberated. . . ." Other points in the same resolution make it impossible to interpret this statement to mean acceptance by the PLO of Israel's existence if a sovereign Palestinian state is established in territories ceded by Israel. The resolution states that "the PLO will struggle against any plan for the establishment of a Palestinian entity, the price of which is recognition [of Israel], conciliation [with Israel], and secure borders. . . ." The PLO, according to this resolution, will only "consider any *step* toward liberation which is accomplished *as a stage* in the pursuit of its strategy for the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state, as laid down in the decisions of previous National Council meetings" (emphasis added). The idea of a "solution by stages," as the PLO calls it, does not modify the character of the "solution," which is the destruction of the state of Israel. In fact, as Bernard Lewis has pointed out in these pages, the Arabic word used in this context conveniently combines the meaning of solution and dissolution.*

The fifteen-point PNC resolution of March 1977 calls for the "establishment of an independent national state on the national soil" (article 11). But the location of this state is deliberately left ambiguous. The reason for the ambiguity, as Yehoshafat Harkabi has explained, is that inside the PLO, article 11 "may be understood as applying to Palestine in its entirety, as the traditional PLO objective calls for. Externally, it may also be interpreted as referring to a small Palestinian state. Foreign protagonists of the PLO may make use of the second version, as proof of PLO moderation." The ambiguity disappears if this article is read in the context of the rest of the resolution which calls for the restoration of Palestinian national rights "without recognition of or reconciliation with the Zionist entity," and for the escalation of the struggle "to defeat and liquidate the occupation."

IN ALL of the statements issued by Brandt and Kreisky on the Vienna meeting, including individual press interviews, nowhere did they make any mention of the Palestinian National Covenant. This was a striking omission since the fundamental objection to the PLO voiced at the Paris Bureau was that its National Covenant called for the destruction of Israel. It was this objection that Kreisky had addressed when he said that the Socialist International had to "force" the PLO to make its position "openly known" before the question of relations with it could be dealt with any further. Unfortunately, even when Kreisky said this he showed no appreciation of the significance of the Covenant or even familiarity with its contents, since he referred (not without a trace of sarcasm) only to "the famous paragraph" that required clarification by the PLO, as if the objectionable content of the document were limited to a single passage.

In fact, as Peres and others have pointed out many times at meetings of the International, the entire 33-article Covenant—a name which, unlike "charter" or "constitution," is meant to convey the national sanctity of the document—spells out in great detail the PLO position against Israel's

* See "Settling the Arab-Israel Conflict," COMMENTARY, June 1977.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

existence. In addition to declaring the establishment of Israel "fundamentally null and void" (article 19), the Covenant claims, among other things, that Jews are not a people and have no right to statehood (article 20); that warfare against Israel is legal while Israel's self-defense is illegal (article 18); that any solution not involving the total liberation of the country is rejected and that this aim can only be achieved through armed struggle (articles 9 and 21); that only Jews living in Palestine before 1917 will be recognized as citizens (article 6); and that Zionism is a racist, colonialist, Nazi movement that is "organically related to world imperialism" and whose "tool," Israel, is the "jumping-off point for imperialism in the heart of the Arab homeland" (article 22).

When I described the true nature of the Palestinian National Covenant at the Socialist International's round-table discussion on the Middle East held in Vienna in 1978, the American Socialist Michael Harrington commented that instead of focusing simply on the language, "we should look behind the words to see if there is a political evolution." Presumably this attitude reflects the thinking of Brandt and Kreisky as well, for both have shown themselves ready to ignore the words of the PLO and to look only at its alleged political evolution. But their meeting with Arafat showed that there has been no such evolution, at least none that has been publicly disclosed or which can be inferred from the PLO's actions. Nor did this meeting increase the likelihood that an evolution will ever take place. For why should the PLO alter its declared objective of annihilating Israel if respected Western Socialists are prepared to collaborate with it on its own terms, even if this means betraying their Israeli comrades? Why, in fact, should the PLO feel any pressure to change its Covenant when Kreisky, instead of demanding such a change as he had said he would, declares after meeting Arafat that "as long as Israel will not recognize the PLO and the Palestinians, the leaders of the PLO cannot make public an official declaration recognizing Israel"? The uninitiated might well consider that Arafat, not Peres, is the comrade of the Socialists, and that it is Israel, not the PLO, which must repudiate the savage aims set forth in the National Covenant.

At the party leaders' conference following the Yom Kippur War, Golda Meir asked reproachfully if Arab oil and the vast territories and wealth of the Arab states had become "decisive factors in Socialist thinking" about the Israeli-Arab conflict. She took the ignominious silence that greeted her remarks as an admission of guilt. Recently, however, the Socialists have become more forthright in stating their new attitudes, and also more adept at constructing elaborate rationalizations which attempt to obscure the political and moral meaning of their changed orientation. In an interview with *Der Spiegel* following the meeting with Arafat, for example, Kreisky acknowledged that Europe's oil difficulties had much to do with the growing sympathy of European Socialists for the PLO. "This," he said, "not only confirms the correctness of Marx's thesis on societal interrelationships, but also makes it clear that certain existential problems have a sensitizing effect." Socialists not only face these "existential problems," but as the report of Kreisky's fact-finding mission to the Middle East puts it, they also have a "moral obligation" to recognize the PLO and to call upon Israel to do so as well.

Such use of Socialist phraseology cannot obfuscate the plain fact that the policy that is being advocated amounts to an embrace by the Socialist International of a terrorist organization which seeks the destruction of the state of a member party. Nor can the appeal to moral principle make the adoption of this policy by the Socialist International appear consistent with the moral claims of socialism or with the oft-proclaimed principle of Socialist solidarity. All that such diversions do is reveal the extent to which the Socialist International has found it necessary to resort to cant and moral duplicity to justify the organization's new policies.

The need for dissembling and pretense can be traced to several false premises that underlie the Socialist International's present world outlook. One of them is the assumption that the radical parties of the Third World with which it now seeks a close relationship are "Socialist-oriented." The Socialist International has never really defined what it means by this term, though a definition is discernible from the nature of many of the parties with which relationships have been established. "Socialist-oriented" refers to ruling parties in poor countries that perceive themselves to be engaged in a kind of class struggle against the rich countries of the West, a struggle that has euphemistically been called the North-South conflict. Such parties rule despotically, denying political and civil liberties while claiming to give priority to "collective human rights," to borrow Willy Brandt's phrase. They are also intensely nationalistic, using nationalism as both a means of legitimizing their rule and as an instrument of mass mobilization. "Socialist-oriented" also refers to "national-liberation movements" which share this general outlook and which seek to come to power through armed struggle.

The ideology of such parties has been called populist and Marxist-Leninist, and in some important respects it also resembles early Italian Fascism, which similarly emphasized nationalism, collectivism, and conflict between "capitalist" and "proletarian nations."* The important point is

* See my review of A. James Gregor's book, *The Fascist Persuasion in Radical Politics*, COMMENTARY, January 1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that this ideology is not "Socialist-oriented," at least not according to the way socialism has been defined until recently by the Socialist International. The Oslo declaration of 1962, for example, specifically warned against "the dangers of nationalistic excesses, where the welfare of the people is sacrificed to the claims of the state. . . ." This same statement called for economic and technical cooperation between developed and developing nations, with democratic forces in both camps playing a leading role. But nowhere did it entertain the idea that the poor nations as a whole are in the position of exploited proletarians vis-à-vis all classes of the rich nations (including the working classes), an idea which the Socialist International now seems to endorse, though historically it has been associated with the Leninist attack against the complicitous "social imperialists" and "labor aristocrats" of the "world marauder nations."

Most importantly, the Oslo declaration stated that "liberty and democratic self-government are precious rights which must not be surrendered," and it reaffirmed the cherished principle that "the development of the individual personality is the basis for the fruitful development of mankind." In courting the "Socialist-oriented" parties of the Third World, the International has rationalized the surrender of these "precious rights" and has made a mockery of Brandt's pledge at Geneva that in the struggle for human rights "our vision must be unobscured in all directions." This new policy has been justified, particularly with reference to support for the "liberation" movements, by the claim that the International is actually competing with the Communists for influence with such parties and is thus serving the cause of democracy. In this case, the Socialists are deceiving only themselves, as the meeting with Arafat made perfectly clear. For it was not the Socialist International which influenced the PLO, but the PLO which influenced the Socialist International while at the same time strengthening its own political standing in the world and weakening Israel's position. It can be assumed that Moscow was not terribly distressed over the outcome of this meeting. Nor, one thinks, does it feel threatened when Socialists give political and material support to armed "liberation" movements in southern Africa and elsewhere, thereby relieving it of some of the burden of supplying these movements and also further isolating "Western-oriented" groups seeking a nonviolent solution.

THE idea that Socialists can and should try to outbid Moscow for the loyalties of anti-Western elements in the Third World derives from a fundamental and dangerous misconception of the role of socialism as an international movement in today's world. In the report of the Kreisky fact-finding mission to the Middle East, democratic socialism was portrayed as a "third force" which frees movements in the Third World from "the apparently inescapable alternative of having to make a choice either for 'capitalist America' or for 'Communist Russia.'" The idea of a "third force" which lacks an independent capacity for self-defense, not to mention the ability to be a factor of any consequence in world politics, cannot be taken seriously. In an interview in 1973, Willy Brandt categorically dismissed the idea of a neutral Europe as a "force placed between the two world powers," and there is even less reason to believe that European socialism, which is no longer the hegemonic political force in Europe, can play that role today. If the idea has gained some currency, it has nothing to do with socialism's capacity to be a third force, but rather with the drastic decline in American leadership since 1973 and the ensuing emergence in Europe, mostly on the Left, of neutralist attitudes.

In this sense, the new orientation of the Socialist International can be viewed as a symptom of the shifting East-West balance of forces in the world, an indication of growing dangers and not new hopes. But it is more than simply a manifestation of this global problem, since the Socialist International itself has now become a factor, of limited but not negligible importance, which is contributing to the declining political cohesiveness of the West and to the growing intellectual confusion that has accompanied that decline. For the idea of socialism as a third force between capitalism and Communism is not only itself an illusion, but it feeds other illusions, among them the notion that there is no moral distinction to be drawn between the free culture of the "capitalist" world and Communist totalitarianism. This is an idea that Socialists abandoned many years ago, along with the posture of neutralism. That it should now be revived, at this moment of grave uncertainty in East-West relations, will only make it more difficult to achieve a sense of unified purpose within the West concerning the defense of democratic society.

There was a time not very long ago when the democratic-socialist movement was, in the eyes of many, the most determined champion of democracy and the most effective ideological opponent of Communist totalitarianism. One must conclude that this is no longer the case, at least if one judges from the course now being taken by the Socialist International. For instead of being a third force in the world between the poles of capitalism and Communism, the Socialist International represents a movement in crisis, cut off from the ideals and perspectives which once made it a source of hope, and positioned now somewhere between the poles of democracy and totalitarianism but being drawn increasingly into the political and ideological orbit of the latter. Seen by itself, this development does not spell doom for the West. It is really just additional evidence of the decline of democratic conviction in free societies, not excluding our own. But as such, its implications for the future of democratic civilization are ominous indeed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Lawyers' War Against Democracy

Franklin Hunt

EVERY reader who followed the *Bakke* and *Weber* cases must have marveled —and not for the first time—at the power of lawyers and judges to run the country with lawsuits. In *Bakke* and *Weber*, the lawyers and judges laid down rules which will affect our own and our children's educations and careers from now on, but they did not consult us about what they were doing. All we could do was wait nervously until the lawyers told us how they had disposed of our futures. And *Bakke* and *Weber* are not the worst cases of their kind; at least they were started by real plaintiffs with real grievances—not, as is so often the case, by shadowy plaintiffs rounded up by lawyers who want to use them to reform society.

The extraordinary power of lawyers is especially curious because few people (even among the lawyers and judges themselves) have much confidence in them. President Carter thinks their fees are too high and that they overrepresent the rich. Many judges believe most courtroom lawyers are actually incompetent (one judge has suggested that law schools be made to recall defective lawyers the way car makers must recall defective automobiles). It is true that the lawyers who do the most to run our lives for us are by no means incompetent, but neither does superior competence account for their power over us.

That power comes, instead, from their success in manipulating the process of constitutional lawmaking. This process is so far beyond the reach of democratic politics that it is virtually the private property of a small elite of practitioners, judges, and law professors who initiate, decide, and comment on constitutional cases. Lawyers who want the courts to impose policies they know the electorates reject (like abolition of the death penalty and of limitations on abortion) have simply appointed themselves to this elite group. The "vigilante lawyers," to use David Riesman's phrase, have never been bashful about their campaigns for "social reform through litigation." As Archibald Cox explains simply, and sympathetically, because they could not get what they wanted from their legislatures—since, regrettably, ordinary people do not share the "libertarian, humanitarian, and egalitarian impulses" which they, "in the world of the highly educated," sense so strongly—they felt fully justified in relying on the courts. Through them they have tried to operate a kind of government of men (themselves) in opposition to a government of laws made by "resistant" and merely "self-interested or short-sighted majorities."

Today's lawyers' war on democracy is nothing new. Other true believers, altogether similar except that they were conservative rather than liberal, waged it successfully in the past. But while the warfare is old, a new advance guard has launched an escalation in the realm of social policy that surpasses anything we have seen so far. They have mounted an ambitious campaign to get the courts to dictate economic policy directly and for the explicit purpose of redistributing wealth. They would take welfare policy away from the legislatures and the electorates and give it to the courts. They would have the judges prescribe, as a matter of constitutional law, specific requirements for food, housing, employment, medical care (including abortions), and education, and the legislatures and the voters would have no choice but to provide them to everyone.

IT IS worth recalling why the nation forced the Supreme Court to give up its earlier effort to dictate economic and social policy. That effort is symbolized by the famous 1905 case of *Lochner* v. *New York*. In *Lochner*, the majority held that a New York law which limited the working hours of bakery employees to 10 per day and 60 per week was invalid under the due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.* Why the Court should have thought this was so was never obvious and requires some explanation. The due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is very brief, only one part of a single sentence that

FRANKLIN HUNT, here making his first appearance in COMMENTARY, is a practicing lawyer in New York who has contributed articles to a number of legal publications.

* The Fourteenth Amendment is one of the Civil War Amendments which were designed primarily to free the slaves (Thirteenth), insure that blacks were treated the same as whites (Fourteenth), and grant the vote to blacks (Fifteenth).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

also includes the privileges-and-immunities and the equal-protection clauses:

> No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

The due-process clause appears to be intended merely to protect "procedural" rights, such as a right to a fair trial. Well before *Lochner*, however, the Supreme Court, at the urging of conservative legal elites, began to believe that the clause also enacted a great principle protecting "substantive" rights, that is, rights relating to the circumstances and conduct of private life. The clause itself, of course, gave no guidance as to what particular rights "substantive due process" might protect, so the Justices chose, without any hesitation, those that embodied their own laissez-faire social and economic beliefs. In *Lochner*, for example, they held that the New York law deprived both employers and employees of "liberty of contract," that is, the right to make employment contracts for as many hours of work as they wanted.

Lochner, which is just one of many similar cases, is not famous for the majority's decision, however, but for the dissent of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. In an elegant page and a half, Justice Holmes exposed the decision and substantive due process for what they were: a *coup de main* intended to prevent democratic majorities from enacting social and economic policies that conflicted with the doctrines the Justices preferred:

> This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law. . . . The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics. . . . [A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.

The *Lochner* era lasted from the 1880's to 1937. Throughout the period, the Court exhibited an active pro-business and anti-labor bias and was generally hostile to economic and social regulation. The Court's decisions did not, of course, go undisputed. Some legal scholars, including Felix Frankfurter, criticized each decision as it appeared, and in the 30's political opposition to the Court's obstruction of the New Deal produced a constitutional crisis. On "Black Monday," May 27, 1935, the Court invalidated a number of New Deal measures, including the National Industrial Recovery Act, and President Roosevelt retaliated with a threat to increase the size of the Court and "pack" it with new members.

But then Justice Roberts made his famous "switch in time that saved nine," and in 1937, in *West Coast Hotel Co.* v. *Parrish*, the Court (five to four) reversed an earlier decision and upheld a state minimum-wage law. This marked the end of the Supreme Court's enforcement of laissez-faire economics. Thereafter, the Court, with some of its old critics sitting as new members, kept its hands off economic policy.

Now, forty years after West Coast Hotel, substantive due process continues to have a bad name. The Court uses the due-process clause primarily in cases involving the fairness of law-enforcement methods and government procedures (although it has also used it in family-relations and abortion cases). The Court has been careful *not* to use the clause in pursuing the "egalitarian revolution" (the phrase is Philip Kurland's) of the past two decades—undoubtedly because it has wanted to avoid the charge that it has resurrected *Lochner* v. *New York*. Instead, it has relied almost exclusively on the equal-protection clause.

To be sure, over the past generation, critics of the Supreme Court—many of them (such as John Hart Ely, Learned Hand, Philip Kurland, Herbert Wechsler, Henry Hart, and Alexander M. Bickel) sympathetic to some of the Court's work, particularly in protecting and enhancing the legislative representation of underrepresented groups—have accused it and its academic supporters of still playing the old *Lochner* tune while pretending merely to be protecting individual rights under the equal-protection clause. But when it comes to today's proponents of constitutional welfare rights, we do not even have to ask whether they are still playing the old tune. They proudly proclaim that they are, and that their objective is to reestablish substantive due process (or "substantive equal protection," as one of them prefers to call it).

THE proponents of constitutional welfare rights are principally Professors Frank I. Michelman and Laurence H. Tribe of the Harvard Law School and Kenneth L. Karst of UCLA. Many other commentators from elite law schools, including Charles L. Black of Yale, Archibald Cox and Abram Chayes of Harvard, and Arthur Selwyn Miller of George Washington, have over the years celebrated and justified active court

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

intervention in society's affairs. Still others have specifically argued for Supreme Court intervention in certain cases involving wealth discrimination, or have advanced theories to justify legislative policies of income redistribution. But the breakthrough into unashamed substantive due process with court-ordered welfare rights was made by Michelman, Tribe, and Karst, beginning with an article by Michelman in the *Harvard Law Review* in 1969. Their campaign has since continued unabated.

The professors apparently came to their doctrines after the frustration of earlier expectations that the Supreme Court must sooner or later recognize constitutional rights to welfare services (as well as rights to a good many other things they also favored). In an article he wrote with Harold W. Horowitz of UCLA in the optimistic days of the Warren Court, Karst positively reveled in the prospect of the Court's wholesale resort to "substantive equal protection." The authors argued explicitly that the Court did not need to justify such action with any coherent reasoning. It would be enough if it simply concluded that a government action, or toleration of a private action, produced "inequities that are unacceptable in this generation's idealization of America." Everything the Court did would be validated by "tomorrow's history."

But ultimately the professors were disappointed. While the Supreme Court did many things for the poor, it never went beyond invalidating the poll tax, providing indigents with effective resort to the courts in certain proceedings, requiring procedural safeguards for the withdrawal of welfare benefits, and invalidating residency requirements for admission to welfare programs. What was worse, the Court explained even these cases in ways which did not readily suggest a constitutional right to welfare services.

The most serious obstacle current doctrine presents to our professors arises from the principles that determine the responsibility of governments for their own and for private actions. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deny" any person the equal protection of the laws. There are other ways of reading this language, but the traditional one is that the clause is not violated except by some form of "state action." Over the years, the Supreme Court developed ways of finding that what appeared to be merely private action was, in fact, state action. It did this by treating the private activity as a "public function" or by "sifting" the details of private action until it found some kind of state involvement. Thus, the Court held in a leading case that a restaurant's refusal to serve blacks was state action because the restaurant leased its space from a municipal government.

The Court got so adept at finding private actions to be state actions that commentators confidently predicted the state-action requirement would in time become virtually meaningless (despite the obvious requirement in the Amendment for some kind of state denial). In the *Sit-in Cases* of 1964, however, the Justices considered, but did not adopt, what would have been their furthest extension of state action: a holding that the private choice of a restaurant owner to exclude blacks from his restaurant was a state choice excluding blacks solely because a restaurant serves the public and the restaurant owner's choice could only be enforced through the state's trespass laws. Since then, the Court has retreated. For example, in 1976, it reversed a 1968 decision and held that the exclusion of pickets by the owner of a shopping center was not exclusion by the state.

The state-action requirement is an obstacle to a doctrine of constitutional welfare rights because poverty is essentially a consequence of private actions—ordinary, self-seeking economic activities—rather than governmental programs. What is more, the private actions are not, unlike a restaurant owner's exclusion of blacks, intentionally discriminatory, but are merely neutral. For this reason, even the theory rejected in the *Sit-in Cases* would not be enough to support a doctrine of constitutional welfare rights. What is required for such a doctrine is a principle stating that the results of *neutral* private actions (including the actions of the poor themselves), done without any discriminatory intent, should be treated as if they were the *intended* results of government action. This would not only eliminate the state-action requirement, but would establish a new principle of governmental responsibility for non-discriminatory activity. It is a principle the Supreme Court has specifically rejected.

EVEN if the state-action obstacle were overcome, however, our professors would have other problems. Under current doctrine, the Supreme Court will uphold a challenged governmental action, so long as there is a "rational basis" for it, unless such action is based upon a "suspect classification" of persons or groups or invades "fundamental interests." In either of the latter cases, the Court will subject the justification for the action to "strict scrutiny." The foremost suspect classifications are racial ones. Classifications based on alien status, sex, or illegitimacy are less suspect and are given less scrutiny, and some discriminations based upon such classification are permitted that would not be permitted if based upon race. The interests the Court has recognized as fundamental, or otherwise in need of protection by strict scrutiny, are voting rights, access to the courts, marriage, family relations, and abortions. Housing and education are not considered fundamental.

What is crucial for constitutional welfare rights is that the Court has specifically held that classifi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cations based on wealth (or poverty) are not suspect, and that the list of protected fundamental interests will not be expanded. As the list stands now, it does not include any of the welfare rights (even education) that the professors would like to provide. All of these are left to governments and electorates as matters of economic and social policy.

Finally, the use by the professors of the Constitution's equal-protection principle presents them with a philosophical problem. Equal protection implies equality of treatment. What the professors want for the poor, however, is not equal amounts of whatever is provided but extra amounts of certain things. In Michelman's formulation, if the state provides a certain facility, whether for golf, education, or opera, the Constitution should not stop at the requirement that the facility be provided even-handedly to everyone, but should select those specific facilities the poor need most and insure that they get them. What the professors need is a doctrine that, as Michelman says, answers the question, "Why education and not golf?"

OUR professors are more painfully aware than anyone that there has been an "unhappy pause" in their progress. They also know why; they have been halted by a general belief in Justice Holmes's principle, reflected in current doctrine, that the Constitution does not embody particular economic theories. To get under way again, the professors have had to escalate their campaign with frontal attacks on current doctrine, particularly the state-action limitation, and on Justice Holmes's principle. They have attacked the former with a kind of total-state theory, and the latter with the simple claim that Holmes was in error. The result is not merely a reversion to the old *Lochner*, but a resort to a kind of distorted mirror image of *Lochner*; the courts' old right-handed interventions would become left-handed and would not just forbid action the legislatures and electorates wanted to take, but would compel action they did not want to take.

To overcome the state-action obstacle, the professors must argue that the state should be deemed to have intended the consequences of all (even neutral) private activity. They do this with enthusiasm. They think, in fact, that it is self-evident. Tribe believes quite firmly that government must be held to have chosen the entire economic system and all its works, because, after all, government chooses to tolerate the consequences of private activities which it could alter if it wished. Michelman's view is even more universal: private parties (at least as they function in public) are parts of the very structure of the state itself, because whatever they do in society, government could have done. Leaving matters to private parties and private life is merely leaving them to one kind of state agency.

Most people, if they think about it, probably believe that governments are useful to do those things that a majority might agree upon from time to time as being in the common interest, but that otherwise governments have no business doing anything. Our professors think differently. They believe that when the people adopted the Fourteenth Amendment they created a self-starting government machine commissioned to search out and correct any and all defects in their society and their private lives in accordance with the "idealizations" of judges and their commentators. Professor Tribe's idealization is that the courts must require governments to support "human freedom, rightly understood"; Professor Michelman's, that the courts should enforce a theory of justice derived from a "coherent" moral philosophy; Professor Karst's that the courts should insure that everyone enjoys respect and self-respect as "a social fact."

To be fair, our professors are not yet totalitarians. They concede that governments, driven by the courts, cannot cure every defect of society. They also believe that there should be "roles," or "spheres" reserved for private life. And, of course, they believe that the particular governmental intrusions and coercions they insist upon are intended for virtuous purposes: the promotion of "freedom," "justice," and "respect."

But these considerations offer little comfort. The inability of governments to cure every defect of society will afford relief only at the point the courts decide it is impractical to track down the last remaining traces of such defects. The roles our professors would reserve for private life leave little or nothing for *organized* private life, and, in any case, even within their roles people must not be too "self-regarding." And the "freedom," "justice," and "respect" that the professors want to promote are not freedom, justice, and respect as the people on their own may understand them and express them in their laws, but as they are "rightly understood" by the judges and their commentators. The government interventions our professors "rightly" understand to be necessary are already serious enough; we can only guess what interventions others with even purer "idealizations" will want to enforce.

THE three professors make somewhat different attacks on Justice Holmes. Karst and Tribe argue simply that everyone has been wrong all this time in supposing that the Fourteenth Amendment did not enact a particular social and economic theory. Michelman thinks the important question is not whether the Fourteenth Amendment actually enacted any particular theory, but whether he can find one he can persuade the judges to enforce anyway.

While Tribe thinks the Fourteenth Amendment enacted a theory, he does not yet—despite some

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

halting and bizarre efforts to think it through—quite know what it was. He is sure, however, that some day someone will work it out, and it will then be found to include a constitutional right to welfare services. In the meantime, courts must do the only "honest" thing they can, which is to decide cases on the basis of what is good policy. For him, the error of *Lochner* was not that the Supreme Court did not follow Holmes and leave the question of working hours to the New York legislature, but that the Court's view on working hours was wrong and the legislature's was right. Tribe has no patience with democratic quibbles. Courts should not be "wholly insensitive" to them, but on the other hand "it would be wrong to make too much of the point."

Michelman is much less confident than Tribe and Karst. His approach to Justice Holmes is tentative; he does not try to answer him but to evade and out-maneuver him. He avoids the question of what courts ought to do and discusses only what they can be persuaded to do. He looks for a theory of moral philosophy which the courts might be willing to take up and which would support a doctrine of constitutional welfare rights. For this purpose, he evaluates in detail John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice*.

Rawls argues that a just society (one which would be chosen by people in the "original position" of not knowing their ultimate conditions in life or what individual capacities they would have) would be based upon two principles of justice: the "liberty" principle, which would guarantee everyone maximum basic liberties compatible with similar liberties for others, and the "difference principle," which would permit material or other advantages for some only if allowing them improved the condition of those least well-off. Michelman concludes that Rawls's difference principle implies a right in each person to a guaranteed income and that Rawls's theory "as a whole" might also imply the right to guaranteed services. He concedes, however, that in the ideal Rawlsian state, Rawls's own principles would not permit judicial enforcement of such welfare rights, but he argues that in a non-ideal society like our own, judicial enforcement of a right to welfare services would be appropriate.

Michelman then directly faces the problem raised by Holmes's jibe about Herbert Spencer: should constitutional doctrine be based upon Rawls's *A Theory of Justice*, any more than on Spencer's earlier conservative tract? After looking the problem straight in the face, however, he passes on to an easier question: can the courts be *persuaded* to enforce welfare rights on the basis of Rawls's or some similar theory? He concludes that at present they might not, from fear that they could not adequately explain the theory and that legislatures might not obey them. But he believes that courts could use the theory to lay the basis for future enforcement. As the public and legislatures become educated, the courts could, by a series of "tactical judgments" as to how much they could get away with, lead and drive the public and legislatures until, at an appropriate stage, they were able to declare outright the existence of welfare rights as a matter of law.

KARST's argument, finally, is both sophisticated and comprehensive—so comprehensive that constitutional welfare rights are only one part of it. As noted, he, like Tribe, believes the Fourteenth Amendment did, in fact, enact a social and economic theory, but unlike Tribe, he knows what it is: "equal citizenship."

Karst relies heavily on the proposition that Congress, after abolishing slavery with the Thirteenth Amendment, set out to eliminate the nation's racial caste system. Its first effort was the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was specifically aimed at the Black Codes the Southern states had adopted to replace slavery. These Codes deprived blacks of basic legal rights such as access to the courts and the rights to make contracts and to own, convey, and inherit property. The 1866 Act declared everyone born in the United States to be a citizen, and guaranteed to blacks the specific rights which the Black Codes had sought to take away.

In adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress wanted to give constitutional support to the 1866 Act. In doing so, however, Congress did not use the specific language of the Act protecting those legal rights denied by the Black Codes, but instead used general language not limited to blacks or to particular rights. Therefore, Karst argues, the Framers must have intended to adopt a principle of "equal citizenship," not just equal legal rights, a principle "capable of growth" to protect others besides blacks and to guarantee not only legal rights but the enjoyment of whatever social conditions might later come to be thought necessary for "full membership" in society.

This is one of those arguments that, as the law professors say, you can follow all the way up to the "therefore." In fact, the Framers' use of general language, rather than the specific language of the 1866 Act, suggests only that they intended to generalize the method used in the Act and insure that everyone should enjoy equally all legal rights, not just the ones taken away from blacks by the Black Codes. The language in no way suggests that they intended to guarantee anything in addition to legal rights.

This non sequitur, together with his frequent, incantatory repetition of the words "equal citizenship," is all that Karst offers to support his new principle. But even if his principle were, nevertheless, adopted, it would still be necessary to decide what the abstraction "equal citizenship" had "grown" into, and this necessity would make the principle simply another arbitrary exercise in sub-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stantive due process. Karst's own method for determining what equal citizenship has become is simply to announce that "we" all now believe citizenship means that everyone must enjoy respect, including self-respect, not just before the law but as a "social fact." Specifically, everyone must be relieved of the stigma of being a member of an inferior group (being, for example, a black, a woman, or poor) and must be empowered to participate fully in society's affairs (in all its affairs, not just its political affairs). And since these social conditions are what citizenship now entails, it follows that the Fourteenth Amendment requires government to insure that everyone enjoys them, even if it must treat people unequally to do so.

For Karst, if the Supreme Court were to accept his doctrine, some major new interventions would follow. For example, minorities and women could use the doctrine to make courts "erase" the effects of society's past discriminations and attitudes, and governments could use the principle to justify discrimination in favor of minorities and women. As applied to welfare rights, equal citizenship would require governments to provide welfare services to the poor to overcome those deprivations which either impose the stigma of being one of "the disreputable poor" or impair participation in society.

THE proponents of these neo-*Lochner* doctrines are not daunted by the prospect of the courts issuing orders to Congress and state and local legislatures telling them what to do. To our professors this is only a minor mechanical problem. Karst, in fact, is quite offhand about it. As he and Horowitz say, if a direct order is "unbecoming," a court can give a negative order; instead of saying "Do X," it can say "Do not do anything that does not include X."

Michelman also clearly believes that direct court orders to the legislatures are both appropriate and feasible, but with Tribe he thinks that the courts might sometimes worry whether they could "induce compliance on all relevant fronts." Both believe that even if rights to welfare services may not be "perfectly enforceable," courts can accomplish whatever they need to indirectly by manipulating the programs which legislatures have already adopted. They suggest the courts could put "severe strain" on limitations in the programs; invalidate eligibility conditions or classifications even if they are "seemingly plausible"; "impose exacting standards of procedural nicety" for admission or exclusion from the programs; and "create seemingly inflexible requirements of equal expenditure" to insure an adequate minimum for everyone. They believe the courts could even prohibit repeal of welfare programs. With these techniques available, it is hard to imagine what the courts might want to do that they could not do.

Our professors also want the courts to use their powers to dictate in detail both the theory and practice of welfare policy, and particularly the amount of wealth and income to be redistributed. They are not content with—in fact hardly even discuss—merely helping the poor to compete equally in society. They insist that the courts provide everyone some income, and Michelman wants it given as services rather than cash because courts can more easily determine the adequacy of services and because the poor, left to themselves, might squander cash. Furthermore, while Karst and Tribe might in some cases permit a legislature to condition receipt of welfare benefits upon work, Michelman would not. He wants services to be provided without regard to a recipient's "efforts, thrift, or foresight."

Michelman would apparently follow Rawls's difference principle and redistribute income up to the point at which any further redistribution would so destroy incentives for the non-poor that the incomes of everyone, including the poor, would be reduced. Karst would go further. Because the stigma of poverty is "defined socially, not naturally," it depends on relative and not actual deprivation. Therefore, redistribution is necessary even though the poor in the United States are rich by historical standards or by the standards of other cultures. Furthermore, redistribution should not necessarily stop when it reaches the point of reducing the incomes of the poor themselves. It could continue so long as it reduced the incomes of the non-poor even more and thereby lessened relative deprivation. Karst does, however, offer a limit to save us from complete leveling. Because self-respect implies at least some obligation to support oneself, he assures us (in his habitual condescending tone) that "The principle of equal citizenship does not call for the dismantling of the structures of capitalism, such as they remain in the era of the 'welfare-corporate state.' "

WILL the courts ever take up as constitutional law any part of our professors' doctrines? It is still impossible to say. So far they have been largely unreceptive. While academics have been much more sympathetic, a number have also resisted strongly. Some years ago, Ralph Winter of the Yale Law School made a particularly cogent rebuttal of Michelman, and quite recently John Hart Ely of Harvard persuasively attacked the neo-*Lochner* attitudes that have infused numerous Supreme Court decisions and, even more, the minds of the academics ("the ranks of the academy have never missed a beat of the old rhythm").

Far more important, however, than opposition by a minority of legal scholars is opposition to court interventions in general from other quarters of the public. It is true that the history of *Lochner* suggests that public resistance to the courts is only a long-range strategy at best. Nevertheless, increas-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ingly acute criticism from some social and political scientists may turn out to be decisive. The appalling effects of court interventions on social policy have begun to receive detailed analysis from critics like Nathan Glazer, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, David L. Kirp, and especially Donald Horowitz in his book, *The Courts and Social Policy.** They may find allies, surprisingly enough, among judges themselves who may become reluctant to go floundering in the deep waters of social movements they do not understand. Judges are, properly, protective of the prestige of their courts, and may not want them to be exposed before the world as disruptive, confused, and, especially, ineffective.

BUT even if constitutional welfare rights and the total state are held off for the present, their threat will be with us for a long time to come. We should, in fact, be prepared for assaults of all kinds on democracy from new waves of activist lawyers. We may soon face what one legal warrior happily describes as a special "new generation of lawyers." This new generation, "the new professors as well as judges and practitioners," was educated during the "shining moment" of the 1960's and the Warren Court. Because in that period they formed "very basic attitudes, presumptions, and cognitive frameworks in their late teens and early twenties," they will, in due course, be ready to set about "combating injustice," which they are sure "can be routed." It is sobering to think what we may be in for from governments with a duty to correct the defects in society discovered by lawyers with teenage ideas about injustice.

* See also his article, "Are the Courts Going Too Far?," in COMMENTARY, January 1977.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A New Soviet Strategy

Francis Fukuyama

The reason for Russia's interest in the Middle East is solely that of power politics. Considering her announced purpose of Communizing the world, it is easy to understand her hope of dominating the Middle East.

—PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, 1957

The Soviet Union sees its security in spreading Communism. . . . [It] won't be satisfied until the whole world becomes Communist.

—SADDAM HUSSEIN, President of Iraq, 1978

IT HAS been many years now since thoughtful people in the West have lost much sleep over the prospect of world domination by the Communist International (Comintern). This has never been truer than over the past year, when the West has been treated to the spectacle of two major wars between Communist powers, first between Cambodia and Vietnam, and then between Vietnam and the People's Republic of China. One suspects that even officials of the Carter administration, for all their legalistic sanctimony over the use of force and the crossing of international boundaries, felt a certain satisfaction deep down that such events could occur. The two invasions proved to all remaining doubters what many liberals wanted to believe all along: that the spread of Communism throughout the Third World did not in itself represent a threat to American security, and that in any case Moscow had given up on the project long ago in despair over the disloyalty of parties within the movement. The Soviet Union, like the United States, was said to be confused by the nationalism of new nations and disillusioned by the seeming irrelevance of Communism to the aspirations of the Third World. The result, as the New York *Times* informed its readers during the Iranian crisis earlier this year, was that "the Soviet Union is becoming a mostly conservative force in world affairs . . . burdened with the defense of far-flung political and economic interests."

While this view of Soviet Communism in retreat is undoubtedly characteristic of the thinking of the present administration, it may come as something of a surprise to the leaders of the Soviet Union themselves. A series of developments in the past two years indicates that Moscow, far from tiring of its responsibilities as a global power and leader of a universal ideological movement, has entered into a new phase of support for orthodox Marxist-Leninist parties, and that these parties have reciprocated by showing great loyalty to the Soviet Union. Since 1977, three countries in or near a strategically crucial area of the world have fallen under the control of slavishly pro-Soviet governments: Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and South Yemen. A fourth, Iraq, seems to have been the intended victim of a Communist coup which failed only because of the suspiciousness and ruthlessness of its present leaders.

What is remarkable about these four recent cases is that the governments which were targeted by the new Communist groups were all left-wing nationalist regimes of a type very common in the Third World. Professing to be neutralist or nonaligned in the East-West struggle, they inevitably tended to lean toward the Soviet Union and would unfailingly vote with the Soviet bloc at the UN. By no stretch of the imagination could any of these regimes be considered threats to the security of the USSR. On the other hand, each to differing degrees failed to cooperate in Moscow's efforts to expand its influence throughout Africa and the Middle East. The fact that the Soviets were sufficiently dissatisfied to want to replace each of these regimes with a more ideologically compatible and therefore loyal one, suggests that Moscow's objectives are considerably less defensive and more ambitious than is nowadays commonly thought.

Soviet interest in and use of Third World Communist parties is hardly new. During the late 40's and early 50's, when one could still speak meaningfully of a Communist International dominated by Moscow, Soviet strategy relied almost exclusively on local party organizations to accomplish its purposes. Policy debates centered on whether local parties should or should not ally themselves with bourgeois or social-democratic groups, and not whether Communist parties should be used at all. After World War II, Stalin looked upon the leaders of newly independent nations like Nehru of India and Naguib of Egypt as neocolonial puppets, and for the most part wrote off the possibil-

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, a new contributor, is a graduate associate of the National Security Program of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ity of exercising substantial influence through them. As a practical policy, what might be called the "party emphasis" of the late Stalin years was often barren and counterproductive. The universal distrust with which Moscow was viewed was not offset by any remarkable Communist gains.

Moscow's casting aside of local parties in favor of the cultivation of better ties with existing nationalist (but non-Communist) governments coincided with Khrushchev's rise to power in the mid-50's. It was first marked by Soviet support for the Afro-Asian conference of nonaligned nations held in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955, and the arms deal between Czechoslovakia and Nasser's Arab nationalist regime in Egypt later that year. This shift in strategy reflected two considerations. The first was the tremendous optimism Soviet leaders were beginning to feel concerning the potential benefits to be derived from exploiting Third World nationalist resentment against the West for a variety of real or imagined wrongs committed during the period of European colonialism. Khrushchev was the first to point out publicly, at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, that whatever the internal mode of socioeconomic organization or ideology of new nations and national-liberation movements, their anti-imperialism would guarantee a large area of common interests with the Soviet Union in foreign policy. Hopeful articles began to appear in the Soviet press during the late 1950's and early 1960's arguing that the alliance would not be merely a temporary tactical one, but that the "national" revolution in the colonial or neocolonial world would evolve naturally into a "social" revolution which would create a permanent community of interests.

The second consideration leading to the downgrading of Communist parties in Soviet strategy was the proliferation of heterodox Marxist-Leninist ideologies in the early 1960's. The old Communist International derived its "monolithic unity" from the Stalinist monopoly over left-wing ideology and the physical control that Moscow exerted over local parties. Neither of these survived the expansion of the movement after the war. The Yugoslav and Chinese revolutions produced right- and left-wing deviations that in many areas of the developing world were more attractive models than the Stalinist one. The Soviets, moreover, were still too weak militarily to enforce their writ in the factional infighting that soon consumed most major Communist movements in the Third World. It was frequently the case, then, that a vulnerable, dependent nationalist regime would serve Moscow's interests more loyally than an independent Communist one.

ACTUAL Soviet policy toward Third World Communist parties, however, was somewhat more complicated than these shifts would indicate. At the same time that Khrushchev sought to buy the good will of established nationalist leaders with arms transfers and economic aid, he also tried to protect the position of local Communists. But when Nasser in the United Arab Republic and Kassem in Iraq set about suppressing what they regarded as subversive Communist threats to their regimes, Khrushchev found himself caught in a highly embarrassing dilemma. This dilemma remained unresolved until shortly after Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, when the Soviet leadership decided that local Communist parties would be sacrificed where necessary in favor of good relations with existing governments. The first fruits of this new line were evident the following year, when Moscow instructed the Egyptian Communist party to disband—an almost unheard of occurrence—and to join Nasser's Arab Socialist Union as individuals. In other countries, local Communist parties were urged to form united "fronts" with the regimes. Thus during the fifteen years between 1961 and 1975, Communist parties in Africa and the Middle East were for the most part quiescent, and Communist subversion was not a major problem (one exception was the attempted coup by the Sudanese Communists in 1971).

There would be good cause to expect that this "non-party" emphasis of the 1960's was coming under serious review even in the absence of empirical evidence concerning a new trend back to reliance on Communist parties. The first reason has to do with what emerged as the extreme unreliability of most of Moscow's Third World nationalist clients. While there is no doubt that Moscow's decision to cultivate these regimes through arms transfers and economic aid served Soviet purposes in many important ways, it is nevertheless equally clear that Moscow's original expectations about the direction of its clients' political development were disappointed. The first signs of a reappraisal of the policy occurred after a sudden series of setbacks that befell Khrushchev-era allies in the mid-60's, such as the fall of Sukharno in Indonesia, Ben Bella in Algeria, Keita in Mali, and Nkrumah in Ghana. Critical theoretical articles appeared in Soviet journals during the late 1960's and early 1970's questioning whether it had been worth sacrificing loyal Communists for the sake of regimes of such questionable staying power and pointing out that even those regimes which were managing to survive remained retrograde, incompetent, and by no means ready to adopt "scientific socialism."

These doubts could only have been reinforced by another round of reverses which occurred in the early 1970's, primarily in the Middle East, where an overwhelming share of Soviet military and economic resources earmarked for the Third World had been invested. The outstanding failure was Egypt, a country in which almost $4 billion in military assistance donated over more than twenty years failed to prevent Sadat's defection to the American camp in 1974; this was followed by can-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cellation of Soviet port privileges and abrogation of the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty in 1976. Moscow's control over arms supplies proved to be a remarkably ineffective tool for influencing Egyptian policy: neither increased arms aid (in the spring and summer of 1973) nor an arms embargo (from late 1974 on) could induce Sadat to abandon, in the first case, what Moscow regarded as an adventurist course and, in the second, a capitulationist one.

So too with other radical Soviet clients whose nationalism has proven a substantial obstacle to Moscow's military penetration of Africa and the Middle East. Syria, for all the intransigent anti-imperialist rhetoric of its Ba'athist government, flaunted its independence in 1976 by sending an armored column into Lebanon in direct contravention of Soviet wishes on the eve of a visit to Damascus by Soviet Premier Kosygin. As in the Egyptian case, Soviet control over the arms pipeline failed to prevent Damascus from crushing the Palestinian-Lebanese Left when it saw fit. The Syrians also openly dissented from Soviet policy in the Horn of Africa and substantially increased their trade with the West. Algeria, Libya, Iraq, and India have all refused to grant the Soviets military facilities, and in November 1977 Somalia closed down the naval base in Berbera in retaliation for Soviet support of Ethiopia.

Another reason to expect renewed Soviet interest in international Communism is that Moscow has for all practical purposes won its rivalry with Peking for hegemony over the movement. This is above all due to Moscow's superior ability to supply parties loyal to it with military and political support. The example of Cuba is quite instructive. On a purely ideological level, Cuba's Guevarist doctrines were closer in many ways to Maoism than to Soviet-style Marxism, and all during the 1960's Castro attempted to stake out a course in foreign and domestic policy quite independent of Moscow. But severe economic difficulties eventually forced Havana into line. By 1970-71 Cuban criticism of Soviet foreign policy had ended and the DGI, or Cuban intelligence service, was reorganized and in effect taken over by the KGB. Extensive Cuban cooperation with the Russians in Africa was one of the consequences of this development. Non-ruling Communist parties, mindful of this example, must understand that whatever the attractions of Maoism, only the Soviet Union can supply them with the weapons and aid necessary for survival should they come to power. The pro-Peking offshoots of the Communist movements left over from the 1960's are at best marginal contenders for power.

Indeed, China's problem may run even deeper, particularly after its invasion of Vietnam. Apart from China's inability to overcome its relative military and economic weakness, its ideological position has been steadily eroding for over a decade. China's global anti-Soviet campaign has increasingly led to open support for right-wing regimes like Pakistan or Iran under the Shah—not to speak of the United States—in a way that is bound to hurt its credibility with leftists in the Third World. Maoism as a domestic system may also lose much of its appeal if Deng Xiaoping succeeds in his apparent efforts to make Chinese Communism yet more revisionist than the arch-revisionist Russians themselves. Soviet-style Communism may not be any more attractive than it was in the mid-60's, but it is coming to be seen as the only realistic alternative within the movement.

A final reason to expect Moscow to show greater interest in Third World Communism lies in its increasing ability to project military power around the world. Western analysts have tended to think in terms of Moscow's ability to assist established national governments fighting conventional wars, but Soviet power can also be used to support local parties locked in internal power struggles. The first instance of this was the 1975-76 Soviet-Cuban intervention on behalf of Agostinho Neto's MPLA in Angola. The MPLA was a Marxist-Leninist group into which the original Angolan Communist party had been incorporated; the direct use of Cuban combat troops was instrumental in helping the MPLA defeat the Western- and Chinese-backed UNITA and FNLA nationalist groups.

II

GIVEN all these considerations, it should not surprise us to learn that the Soviet Union has ceased holding back local Communist bids for power, and now has hopes of securing influence in the Third World in a more reliable and long-term way by installing regimes tied to it by bonds of ideological loyalty. Recent events in Afghanistan, South Yemen, Iraq, and Ethiopia indicate that a major shift in Soviet strategy has in fact occurred.

Among the cases representing the new trend in Soviet policy, Afghanistan has been very much in the news as a result of the blatant Communist putsch there and the violent Muslim reaction it engendered.* While the Afghan revolution does not promise to be a Soviet success, it is nonetheless highly significant for what it reveals about Moscow's intentions. Prior to the April 1978 coup that overthrew the leftist government of Mohammed Daud, this landlocked country lying on the USSR's southern border had hardly been a threat to the Soviet Union or unfriendly to Soviet interests in southern Asia. Spurned by Washington in the early 1950's, Afghanistan negotiated an arms agreement with Moscow in 1956 and has been exclusively supplied with Russian equipment ever since. Afghanistan served Moscow's purposes in many ways. Like other "nations" in the region, its political frontiers did not coincide with existing ethnic divisions, and the country's predominantly

* I am indebted to Professor Hannah Negaran for much of the contents of this section.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pushtun leadership refused to recognize the validity of the border with Pakistan that left many of their kinsmen in the latter country's North West Frontier Province. The Soviets found this irredentist movement, as well as a secondary one concerning the Baluchis in Pakistan and Iran, a potential source of instability for two American CENTO allies. Under the most optimistic scenario, pressure from Afghanistan and India would lead to the breakup of Pakistan along ethnic lines, paving the way for a pro-Soviet client state in Baluchistan and direct Soviet naval access to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.

For all of Daud's leftist and pro-Soviet inclinations, however, Afghanistan was not Outer Mongolia: its self-proclaimed nonalignment had a real if limited meaning. This was most evident in the three or four years preceding the coup, when Daud abandoned his strident irredentism and moved toward a degree of rapprochement with his neighbors, Iran and Pakistan. Daud signed various economic agreements with the Shah, and officially dropped Afghanistan's claims on Pakistan's North West Frontier Province in recognition of the mutually destructive nature of the border fighting that persisted as late as 1976. What the Afghan Prime Minister sought was genuine nonalignment, and to this end he was actively encouraged by such charter members of the Third World neutralist movement as India and Yugoslavia. What Daud did could not possibly be construed as a threat to Soviet security or a move into the American sphere; rather, he created inconveniences for Soviet policy by dropping the Pushtun and Baluchi issues and ending Afghanistan's role as an instrument for the expansion of Soviet influence into South Asia and the Persian Gulf.

The two Afghan Communist parties, Percham and Khalq, came to power in two days of heavy fighting on April 27-28, 1978, during which Daud and several members of his family were killed. The Soviets loudly denied any role in the takeover. Appropriately enough, this story was believed only by American officials and academic experts who for the past two decades have built their careers on debunking the "myth" that Moscow has any influence or control at all over the world Communist movement. Yet a great deal of circumstantial evidence has convinced those close to the scene that the takeover was encouraged—if not actually planned in a tactical sense—by Moscow. The Soviets recognized the new regime immediately, and proceeded to flood the country with trade missions and technical advisers. The new Premier, Nur Mohammed Taraki, quickly reopened the Pushtun and Baluchi issues, reversing the conciliatory course begun by Daud. All contacts with pro-Western countries were broken off; in their place came a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union signed by the new Afghanistan in November 1978. Altogether, a Communist Afghanistan has insured a regime in Kabul that would not be subject to fits of national self-assertion and independence.

THE Communist takeover of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) in June 1978 differed from the one in Afghanistan in that the leaders of the new government had occupied high positions in the old one. It was in many ways less a coup than an internal power struggle given decisive assistance from the outside by the Soviet Union and its allies, followed by an extensive purge of the losing faction. Once again, a pro-Soviet regime was replaced by one yet more pro-Soviet, and ideological orthodoxy proved to be a central theme in determining the nature of Moscow's involvement.

South Yemen was of course an avowedly Marxist-Leninist state before the coup. In 1969, it made a decisive break with the fashionable currents of Arab nationalism by stressing the internationalist character of its ideology. The practical impact of this doctrine was evident in the fact that South Yemen, alone among Arab states, supported Marxist but Christian Ethiopia against its Muslim opponents in Somalia and Eritrea.* The port of Aden became a major logistics and staging base for the Soviet and Cuban intervention on Ethiopia's behalf in late 1977, at a time when such radical Soviet clients as Syria and Iraq were actively participating in the war on the side of Somalia.

The threat that South Yemen might develop into something other than a docile instrument of Moscow's African policies came in the person of the Republic's President, Selim Rubai Ali, who undertook several hesitant measures to give some reality to South Yemen's professions of being "nonaligned." He was opposed to, though unable to stop, South Yemen's role in supporting Ethiopia. He attempted to end his country's isolation from the rest of the Arab world by initiating some cautious contacts with Saudi Arabia and the other monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. In 1976 and 1977, he succeeded in winning from his conservative neighbors a small amount of foreign aid to lessen the almost total dependence of his country's desperately poor economy on the Soviet bloc. Rubai Ali maintained some ties with Communist China and did not join in Moscow's ritualistic denunciations of Chinese policy. As in the case of Mohammed Daud, his policies were disagreeable but not seriously threatening to Soviet interests; at most they represented a potential pole of opposition to the resolutely pro-Soviet and pro-Cuban line of other leaders within South Yemen's ruling party.

Rubai Ali and two of his followers were executed on June 26, 1978, in a bizarre sequence of events that began with the assassination of North

* Libya also aided Ethiopia, but only in the interest of pursuing Colonel Qaddafi's personal vendetta against Jaafar Numeiry in the Sudan.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yemen's President, Ahmad Hussein Ghashmi, by a bomb-carrying diplomat from South Yemen. At the time of his execution, there were over 5,500 Soviet, Cuban, and East German advisers and troops in the country, and more were brought back from Ethiopia to help suppress units loyal to the President. The East Germans had been busy refurbishing South Yemen's police apparatus, and it is hard to believe that they did not know about the plans to assassinate Rubai Ali beforehand.* Indeed, they may have been active participants and instigators of the conspiracy, which after all was nothing more than a purge of right-wing deviationists so common in Communist countries. Rubai Ali was succeeded as President by the former Premier, Abd al-Fattah Ismail, a man whose career was shaped in struggles against the Nasserite or Arab-nationalist wing of the party. His speeches and statements at party conferences show him to be a resolute Stalinist, incongruous as this may seem in the context of *qat*-chewing Yemeni culture. It is amusing to note how Western correspondents have taken South Yemen's protestations of national independence at face value, as if the regime's first priority were to distance itself from Moscow. The truth of the matter is that South Yemen's new leadership has elevated loyalty to the international socialist movement headed by the Soviet Union to a matter of principle.

THE THIRD case is that of Iraq, where serious evidence exists to suggest that the Iraqi Communist party (ICP) was preparing to stage a coup against the Ba'ath government in the spring of 1978. Although this abortive takeover attempt has received relatively little attention in the West, it is the most revealing of the significance and direction of the new trend in Soviet foreign policy.

Iraq is not a relative backwater like Afghanistan or South Yemen. With substantial armed forces that are now, after the decline of Iran, indisputably the most powerful in the Persian Gulf, with its geographical centrality to both the Arab-Israeli and Persian Gulf theaters, and, above all, with the enormous oil reserves that make it the fourth largest OPEC oil producer, Iraq bids fair to becoming *the* predominant state in the Arab world. Indeed, one can argue that with the isolation of Egypt in the wake of the recent peace treaty with Israel, Iraq has already emerged as the central arbiter of Arab affairs. For these reasons alone any Soviet machinations to install a Communist regime in Baghdad should be of vital interest to the West.

There have, of course, been other Soviet-sponsored coups against strategically important regimes in the Third World that failed. In April 1978, for example, President Siad Barre of Somalia uncovered a conspiracy within the armed forces led by pro-Soviet officers who were unhappy with Barre's expulsion of the Russian military from that country during the war with Ethiopia. It is not surprising that the Soviets should have urged their sympathizers to act, in view of the fact that Barre had expelled Somalia's Soviet advisers the previous October in retaliation for Moscow's aid to Ethiopia, and was busily propagandizing against the Soviet presence in Africa.

But it is much more surprising that Moscow should have sponsored a coup against Iraq, since Baghdad has long been regarded as Moscow's most loyal ally in the Middle East. The ruling Ba'ath party espouses a radical anti-imperialist doctrine that is often more intransigent and extreme than that of the Soviet Union itself. Iraq has served Soviet interests repeatedly—by nationalizing Western oil companies and acting as a price hawk within OPEC; by purchasing Soviet arms with hard currencies; by supporting various radical subversive movements around the Persian Gulf; and by giving Syria direct military assistance in the 1973 war with Israel.

Nonetheless, the Soviets had certain reasons for being dissatisfied with Baghdad after 1975, among them the latter's growing trade with the West and its rapprochement with the Shah of Iran. The Iraqi Communist party in March 1978 published an open attack on the Ba'ath regime for its deviations from the Soviet line that was very similar to a statement made by the Khalq/Percham United Front shortly before the Afghan coup a month later. This audacious challenge may have been the opening salvo in the ICP's bid for power. In any event, it indicated the Communists' high level of self-confidence vis-à-vis the Ba'athists. Unfortunately for themselves and for Moscow, they miscalculated: in May the government began an extensive purge of Communists in the army, which was still going on more than a year later. The Ba'ath was quite explicit in its accusations against the Soviet Union; party strongman Saddam Hussein became a veritable fount of anti-Communist invective during a period when mutual Iraqi and Soviet unhappiness over the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty would otherwise have dictated a high degree of cooperation and an outward show of solidarity. If a group as favorably disposed to the Soviet Union as the Iraqi Ba'ath claims that Moscow was plotting against it, it hardly behooves outside Western observers to disagree.

* It is significant that Moscow seems to be attempting to assert its hegemony over "fraternal" Communist parties through the reimposition of direct police controls. The African operations of the East German intelligence service (MFS) are now second in size only to the KGB. The MFS has helped reorganize the police apparatus of Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, the Sudan, and South Yemen. This "help" is double-edged: while it increases the existing government's control over its own population, it also serves as a source of intelligence and infiltration of agents directly responsible to Moscow. In the event of a power struggle, MFS control over the police could be used as a direct instrument of physical coercion.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ETHIOPIA, the final case, differs from the first three in that there is no evidence to suggest that Moscow played a role in putting the Communist regime there into power in the first place. While the Soviets apparently did support Major Mengistu Haile Mariam during the power struggle that ended in a successful coup on February 3, 1977, that choice was not dictated by ideological considerations. Mengistu is in many respects a second-rate Communist. A parvenu military officer who, like Castro, declared his adherence to Marxism-Leninism only after he had come to power, Mengistu did not represent a civilian party organization. His early opponents all claimed to be Marxist-Leninists and in some respects would have been more ideologically acceptable partners from a Soviet standpoint.

Where ideology did seem to play a significant role was in Moscow's decision to back Ethiopia against Somalia and the Eritrean national-liberation movement in mid- to late 1977. This move was highly risky for several reasons. It amounted to a sellout of both Somalia and the Eritreans, who had previously been Soviet clients. In the case of Somalia, Moscow was in danger of losing a concrete and strategically important naval facility in Berbera in return for the vague possibility of a future replacement along the Eritrean coast when and if the central Ethiopian government reestablished its control there. By betraying the Eritreans, Moscow alienated its radical Arab clients and gave the Saudis an opening for increased influence in the Horn. Quite apart from these external conflicts, it was not at all clear that Mengistu would survive within Ethiopia. The governing Derg faced simultaneous separatist movements undertaken by several different ethnic groups, as well as insurgency campaigns mounted by dissident factions on both the Left and Right.

There were some practical factors working in favor of support for Ethiopia: it was a much larger and ultimately more influential country than Somalia (provided it held together), and it had the backing of the non-Arab members of the Organization for African Unity. But ideological considerations obviously played a fairly important role in the final Soviet decision. While President Mohammed Siad Barre has claimed since 1969 that Somalia was a Marxist state, his dedication to the Soviet Union was overshadowed by a commitment to greater Somali nationalism and to Islam. The task of uniting the Somalis of the Ogaden desert, Djibouti, and Kenya was written into the Somali constitution and presented something of an obstacle to long-term cooperation with the Soviet Union. Just as Arab nationalism made the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'ath parties unpredictable clients, so Somali nationalism threatened to draw the Soviet Union into conflicts in which it had no inherent interest. In the words of a *Pravda* commentator, the Somali invasion of the Ogaden proved "the pernicious consequences of the renunciation of revolutionary internationalist principles and the lapsing into nationalism." Mengistu and the Derg, by contrast, did not regard themselves primarily as Ethiopian nationalists, in part because there is no such thing as an Ethiopian national identity. However imperfect their Marxism, they at least promised to be more reliable allies. As one Soviet diplomat explained, "we feel the Ethiopian revolution is more genuine."*

THE aftereffects of the takeovers make it clear why the Russians wanted to put their own people in power. Third World nationalism, while serving as a vehicle for Soviet expansionism, also places limits on the Soviets' ability to manipulate local politics because it is at its base quite xenophobic. Ba'athist Iraq had never permitted the Soviet navy to construct a base in Umm Qasr at the head of the Persian Gulf, whereas Communist South Yemen has allowed itself to be transformed into a virtual logistics facility for Soviet-Cuban activities against its fellow Muslims. It took two massive defeats at the hands of Israel, in 1967 and 1970, to induce Nasser to invite large numbers of Soviet advisers into Egypt; the new Marxist-Leninist regimes, by contrast, have accepted Soviet, Cuban, and East German military and technical experts from the outset.

The problem for the West is not simply that Communist gains in these apparently remote countries threaten specific Western interests, but that they have the potential to become cumulative and self-reinforcing. The Soviets are in the process of constructing what amounts to a multinational military infrastructure which can be used as a base of operations for further expansion. The symbiosis between Ethiopia and South Yemen is a perfect example of what Avigdor Haselkorn has called the growing "Soviet collective security system."† South Yemen proved indispensable as a conduit for Soviet and Cuban assistance to Ethiopia, with the ultimate result that a Marxist-Leninist government consolidated its rule in Addis Ababa. Conversely, when Rubai Ali threatened to draw South Yemen out of the system the following year by restricting Soviet access to Aden, Cuban troops stationed in Ethiopia were brought back and used to purge him and his followers. The two Marxist governments functioned far more effectively together than either would have alone. The Soviets, who have directed the construction of this system from the center, are thereby relieved of the risky possibility of intervening with their own forces. Not only do the Soviets and their Cuban allies enjoy an extraordinary freedom of maneuver within this system, they acquire new and more reliable proxy forces as well: witness the role of South Yemen in menacing

* Quoted in Marina and David Ottaway, *Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution* (Africana Publishing Company, 1978), p. 170.

† *The Evolution of Soviet Security Strategy: 1965-1975* (Crane and Russak, 1978).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Saudi Arabia in the spring of 1979, or recent Afghan threats against Pakistan and Iran.

III

It is too early to say how successful the Soviets will be in this round of the conflict. To some extent they have already overplayed their hand: the Iraqis and Somalis have been seriously alienated, and Taraki's days seem numbered in Afghanistan. But Americans would do well to remember that these results have come about only because there were others—an incongruous collection of Pakistanis, Saudis, Chinese, and Iranians—who were willing to bear the burden of containing Soviet Communism. In the future, they may not have the ability, or more likely the willingness, to act on our behalf without greater support and recognition. What we have seen in the past two years is a foretaste of what the international arena will be like in the face of further American retreat: not a more diverse and independent world, but one increasingly accessible to Soviet influence and military power.

The first step is to recognize that a problem even exists. Over the past two decades there has occurred in this country what might be called a slow process of self-Finlandization, whereby our expectations as to what constitutes normal or acceptable Soviet behavior in the world have steadily risen, while our view of our own sphere of legitimate action has continuously shrunk. This tendency was evident in a recent article in the Washington *Post* by Selig Harrison, one of the few resident American experts on Afghanistan and South Asia. Harrison pleaded for the United States to stay out of any involvement in Afghanistan on the grounds that the Shah of Iran and not Moscow was ultimately responsible for the coup against Daud. He did not even try to prove that the Soviets weren't actively involved; instead he argued that they had a *right* to install a Communist regime in Kabul in response to certain intolerable provocations by an American ally, the Shah. These provocations included economic aid, trade, cultural exchange, and help from the Savak to suppress the Afghan Communists. In other words, the Soviets may legitimately demand that Third World nations cease to maintain normal relations with pro-American neighbors and forbid them to take measures to protect themselves from Communist subversion.

That such arguments can be made, and taken seriously—indeed, that there has been so little outcry against the sudden mushrooming of Communist regimes around the periphery of the Western world's oil supply—indicate how far the process of self-Finlandization has gone. To some extent the new Soviet strategy is the result of the inherent weakness of Soviet influence and appeal. The West, therefore, has only itself to blame for whatever vitality and success the new Communist International has shown.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Women as Conservative Rabbis?

Ruth R. Wisse

THE current controversy over the admission of women to the rabbinate of the Conservative movement is one of the few local and "internal" issues to stir the temperate world of American Judaism in recent years. Prompted by no crisis in the polity at large, responding to no call for aid from any threatened brother community, oblivious in this instance to the moods and needs of the state of Israel, affiliated American Jews have addressed themselves to the question of whether women should serve as rabbis with a degree of energy and interest that has been uncharacteristic of indigenous Jewish affairs. The quality of the debate and the arguments advanced by both sides tell us something of the direction of middle-American Judaism when nothing but its own present and future is at stake.

Though the status of women is a matter of equally intense concern to modern Orthodox and Reform Jews, the present debate centers on the Conservative movement and on its main institutions—the Rabbinical Assembly, which is the organization of Conservative rabbis; the United Synagogue of America, which is the association of Conservative synagogues; and the Jewish Theological Seminary, the rabbinical and educational center of the Conservative movement. The centrist position of Conservatism has helped make it numerically the most prominent branch of American Judaism, with a larger number of members and affiliated congregations than either Reform or Orthodoxy in all its manifestations can claim. But of the three, it is also the most vulnerable and exposed. Reform, which does not acknowledge the binding authority of *Halakhah*, Jewish religious law, has long been free to make whatever adjustments the modern age demanded. Orthodoxy, which remains bound by Jewish law in its traditional rabbinic interpretation, is consistent in its resistance to innovation. In its simultaneous dedication to both tradition and adaptation, Conservatism alone must always choose between weakening the religious way of life it was founded to "conserve" and sacrificing its immediate relevance to contemporary American society. By choice and by necessity, Conservatism remains the proving ground of American Judaism, reflecting its patterns of change and its degree of stability.

During the past few years, since the popularization of the women's movement, and the ordination of the first female rabbi by the Reform movement in 1972, there has been growing pressure within Conservatism for the extension of women's religious rights to include rabbinic ordination. In October 1977, at the request of the Rabbinical Assembly, a commission was appointed "For the Study of the Ordination of Women as Rabbis." Composed of fourteen representatives, the commission heard testimony from all segments of its constituency, and after long deliberation recommended, by a vote of 11 to 3, that women be trained as rabbis by the Conservative movement and that their admission to the designated program of instruction be arranged "as quickly as possible." Looking beyond the preparatory stages to the actual employment of these women in local congregations, the commission also urged that the community be educated concerning issues raised in the report "so as to insure as smooth and as harmonious an adjustment to the new policy as possible."

The report was duly submitted to the annual convention of the Rabbinical Assembly in January 1979, with the anticipation of overwhelming endorsement, the more so as the Assembly was meeting this year not in New York but in Los Angeles, where the liberal wing could be expected to form a majority. Yet there was considerable opposition to the recommendations on the part of younger rabbis as well as known traditionalists among the older members. If put to a vote, a strong resolution of endorsement might have met with defeat. Rather than risk an embarrassment on an issue of such declared urgency, the Assembly left the decision to the faculty of the Seminary where candidates for ordination must be trained and certified. There, for the moment, the matter rests.

The current challenge to rabbinic Judaism is a variation on a major modern theme. The emphasis on male responsibility in traditional Judaism has been under attack since the first incursions of modernity, and all the modern Jewish ideological

RUTH R. WISSE teaches Yiddish literature at McGill University and is the author of *The Schlemiel as Modern Hero* and *A Shtetl and Other Yiddish Novellas* and co-editor of *The Best of Sholom Aleichem* (New Republic Books).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

movements, whether secular or religious, have proclaimed and variously encouraged the equal participation of women. In Reform Judaism, where men and women are equally obligated—or as critics point out, equally free from obligation—women have always been theoretical candidates for ordination. In the Jewish Socialist Bund and several branches of Zionism, reaction against the traditional role division was so absolute that free love was originally encouraged as an alternative to marriage and the same kind of work was demanded of members of either sex. What distinguishes the current debate from its predecessors is the desire to reinterpret radically the role of women within the legitimate context of tradition.

To this end, the commission report underlines, literally underlines, its intentions of remaining true to the authority of Jewish law despite the force of its recommendations for change. Previous changes in the status of women, and the mixed seating of men and women during religious services, already constitute the most serious deviation of Conservative Judaism from Orthodox practice. The commission report now contends that its recommendation of ordination for women is but the logical extension of earlier, acceptable modifications and no threat to the core of the tradition to which it remains committed.

The report, a 27-page document to which is appended a brief minority dissenting opinion, presents the case for ordination in unequivocally positive terms. It points out that at public meetings the "overwhelming majority" of those who testified strongly favored the ordination of women. On the question of "general feminist issues" there was unanimity among members of the commission, and no dispute whatsoever within the community at large. Even the structure of the report manifests its support, placing the burden of persuasion not on the proponents of women's ordination to show why the rabbinic tradition should be altered, but on the rabbinic tradition to show why it should not be modified according to generally accepted notions of improvement. The only real problem, the one to which the report devotes sustained attention, is the compatibility of this proposed innovation with the "requirements of *Halakhah* as [they] had been theretofore observed and developed by the Conservative movement." Most of the report is therefore an attempt to show how the proposed changes are justified within a continuum of legal development in a movement still devoted to the same traditional "core."

The report first explains the general circumstances under which development of the law is considered acceptable. Distinguishing between that part of Jewish law which is *d'oraita*, biblically ordained, and that which is *d'rabbanan*, rabbinically developed, the Conservative movement from its inception declared itself bound by the first, but free to develop the second as "the conditions of the Jewish community change." Because classical Judaism recognizes no such distinction and considers the two areas inseparable, the Conservative movement introduces changes even in this second domain only under special conditions: the development must be gradual and not abrupt; it must be exegetically rooted in traditional methodologies; it must be initiated from within the "community of the committed and the informed" and must be ratified by that community before it can gain legitimacy. Anticipating the difficulties of drawing fine lines of demarcation, the report warns that the existence of inevitable "gray areas" of ambiguity dare not be taken as an excuse to thwart all efforts at change.

SATISFIED that the general conditions for development have been met in this particular instance, the report enumerates some of the distinguishing criteria of men and women in Judaism, but shows why each in turn is irrelevant or unconvincing when applied to the question of women as rabbis. It notes that according to some sources women may be ineligible to hold any office of communal responsibility in the Jewish community; that women are exempted from the *obligation* to study Torah though they may voluntarily assume that obligation; that women are generally exempted from positive time-dependent commandments, including those relating to public worship, and may therefore be legally unable to discharge the obligations of another person who cannot claim exemption; that women are ineligible as witnesses in judicial proceedings, "including the execution of documents determining personal and familial status"; and that women are, by virtue of the foregoing, traditionally considered to be ineligible as judges. These points are examined, but none is considered applicable or persuasive in the matter under consideration.

The report's arguments against these criteria may be summarized as follows:

1. The role of the contemporary rabbi is not one which is established by the classical tradition, and is consequently subsumed under no existing category of Jewish law. Even rabbinic ordination by the Jewish Theological Seminary more closely resembles the granting of an academic degree than the traditional conferring of rabbinic authority through *semikhah*.

2. The Conservative movement has over the years already taken a strong stand in favor of obligating women to study Torah, and in fact, many of the prospective female rabbis are graduates of the movement's educational programs. The report makes much of the "ethical" plight of parents who, having given their children of both sexes an identical Jewish education, are unable to explain the "sudden differentiation" to their daughters.

3. Although the status of women in certain areas is still a controversial matter, this should not affect

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the rabbinic functions a woman can comfortably fulfill. *Halakhic* matters in Conservatism are normally referred to the Rabbinical Assembly's Committee on Jewish Law and Standards, which can issue either a consensus or a split decision; a minority opinion with at least three adherents becomes a legitimate option for individual congregations and rabbis, allowing considerable diversity of practice within the movement as a whole. During the past twenty-five years, majority opinions have given women the right to be counted as part of the prayer quorum and to be called up to the Torah reading. A minority opinion permitted women to serve as witnesses. Nevertheless, despite the disagreement that persists, the commission report argues that none of these functions is actually "essential" to the function of a rabbi:

> The simple fact is this: since the modern rabbinate, as noted above, is not defined or circumscribed by *halakhic* strictures, there can be no direct *halakhic* objection to the conferral of the title "Rabbi" upon a woman, together with all the rights and responsibilities to perform the functions *essentially* connected to the office. In connection with this, the commission noted that it is a commonplace to ordain *kohanim* [descendants of the biblical priesthood], even though officiating at a funeral, which can pose *halakhic* problems for a *kohen*, is popularly viewed as a rabbinic function.

In addition to the legal arguments, the report also advances some ethical considerations, deriving from the idea that the history of Jewish law "exhibits a strong tendency to approach ever more closely an ideal ethical state. . . ." Since each person should have "equal opportunity to pursue a chosen career on a footing equivalent to that of everyone else," it would be wrong to deny such an opportunity to a young Jewish woman, given the lack of a direct legal argument against it.

One additional point that has been emphasized by supporters of women's ordination in the report and elsewhere is that the movement cannot afford the cost of refusing to take advantage of the leadership pool that young women now represent. Even as their ordination is being proposed, women rabbis are looked to as an essential revitalizing force, as potentially 50 per cent of the "spiritual leaders" of the future, as the great source of untapped energy yet dormant in American Jewry.

THE MINORITY opinion, opposing the ordination of women, raises several points of unequal weight:

1. Citing the wide diversity of practice in Conservative congregations, including some which neither count women as part of the prayer quorum nor invite them to lead public service, the minority argues that it is unreasonable to expect that women will not "at some point infringe on these *halakhic* restrictions in the performance of their rabbinical duties."

2. The unity of the Conservative movement is threatened by the ordination of rabbis whose religious authority in certain areas would be questioned by others of their colleagues.

3. This would mark the first time that the Seminary actually entered the arena of "*halakhic* decision-making." Until now the procedures of the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards have permitted dissident minorities within the movement the option of remaining part of it. A decision to train women for ordination, taken by the movement as a whole, would force out those who disagreed with this interpretation of the law.

4. If, as it seems, American Jewish youth is turning these days "toward traditional values, and to an authentic *halakhic* life style [*sic*]" does the Conservative movement not stand to alienate more committed Jews than it may attract by this decision? In its eager response to one social phenomenon, is the movement not ignoring the emergence of another?

FOR the outside onlooker, who may be concerned not only with the substantive matter of women's ordination but with the cultural posture of the community it represents, the commission report is a fairly revealing contemporary document. There is no doubt that in declaring so forcefully in favor of this issue, the majority report feels it has acted with uncommon boldness, affirming what one of the movement's leaders has called "our determination to respond to modernity, to resist fossilization." The commission report has been hailed as proof of the "life-affirming adaptability of the Jewish tradition" and of the creative vitality of the Conservative movement. Certainly within the institutional framework of the Conservative movement, the democratic procedures observed by the commission, the social timeliness of the question, and the declaration on the side of change must indeed feel bracing and fresh. But there is enough in the report to suggest quite the opposite conclusion. In the kinds of issues it raises and fails to mention, in the manner and the assumptions of its argument, the commission report offers more evidence of defensiveness and indirection than of sober, confident optimism.

By all admissions, the immediate catalyst for the current debate on female rabbis was the modern feminist movement which has inspired a reconsideration of women's roles in all the major religious denominations and in all the branches of American Judaism. Although it naturally invokes this vast social movement as the ideological premise for the discussion, the commission report alludes to it with all the delicacy of a wooing lover. Referring always to "general feminist is-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sues" and "general feminist debates," the report appears to define feminism as the ability and right of women to pursue careers of their choice outside the home, an ideal, as it used to be said of motherhood, that can be readily upheld by all. But of conflicting trends and choices within modern feminism that would have a critical bearing on the question of the ordination of women in the same capacity as men, there is no mention or even acknowledgment. Does feminism oppose all distinctions between male and female roles as a euphemistic device for keeping women in allegedly subject positions, or does feminism insist on equal rights and opportunities for women as women? Does "general feminism" believe that biology influences ontology, or does it regard social conditioning as the only determinant of sexual roles? If "general feminism" is thought to favor social androgyny, then it seems about as compatible with traditional Judaism as Delilah was with Samson. If it assumes, on the other hand, that the biological differences between men and women must find expression in certain social forms, then the stated arguments for the feminization of the rabbinate are not as straightforward as the commission report assumes.

The unexamined premises of the discussion suggest that the commission tried to stir the waters no more than was necessary, preferring broad references to the spirit of the times to an examination of potential areas of social conflict. But it is in itself noteworthy, and symptomatic of the report's stance, that Judaism should be asked to conform to the accepted general ideas of the moment without subjecting those ideas to the same measure of scrutiny as the civilizing structure they seek to modify. The commission report might have been a more sinewy and realistic document if it had undertaken to mark what it felt to be the boundaries of accommodation between "traditional Judaism" and contemporary feminism as well as the many areas of *halakhic* adaptability.

While the status of women is its primary concern, the report necessarily devotes some attention to the target of innovation, the Conservative rabbinate. Advancing the argument of "equal opportunity," the report defines the rabbinate not as a religious vocation but as a normal profession "with a wide variety of functions including teaching, preaching, counseling, officiating at religious ceremonies, representing the Jewish community, etc." In fact, the task of squaring the ordination of women with *halakhic* directives that seem to contravene it is facilitated by the contention that the rabbinic role is no longer that of the established classical tradition. Women are not to be admitted to the great lineage of the rabbinate upon which Judaism has stood in its Diaspora history, but to a somewhat indeterminate and evidently reduced role whose functions they may serve at least as well as men.

It is understandable that once having decided to press for the admission of women to the rabbinate, the commission should recommend that it be done with all fervor. But it is puzzling to note, in a movement committed to gradual rather than abrupt transition, that while their status as public prayer leaders and even members of a prayer quorum is still in question, and their acceptability as witnesses even more so, women should be encouraged to hold the highest position of religious authority on the argument that these particular duties are not "essential" to the rabbinic role. The image of the rabbi projected by this kind of backdoor defense is hardly ennobling.

No one doubts the gap between the rabbinic ideal and the reality of the contemporary congregational leader who all too often has to court his parishioners like an auditioning actor, follow their impulses like an opinion pollster, and offer direction with all the authority of a horse in harness. It may well be that American rabbis are no longer the authoritative judges in Jewish life, but play only a custodial role in local institutions and communities. What emerges from the commission report, however, is an embrace of the status quo that buries not only the past but even the future in the limitations of the present.

The vision of an exemplary rabbinate, as the sociologist Charles Liebman persuasively contends, must precede the institutional reality. The commission report, which, in effect, welcomes women into the rabbinate by conceding its limitations and the secularization of its functions, offers up the present as its vision and the current job description as its sufficient ideal. A religion so supremely pragmatic is not very likely to inspire. And to settle for women of little synagogues because one no longer aspires to men of the Great Synagogue may be to deprive Judaism of more than one is granting its women.

IN HIS pioneering study of Conservative Judaism, Marshall Sklare pointed out many years ago that the single most disruptive strain to Jewish traditionalism in America was the position it accorded women. Female subordination constituted not merely "an important violation of Western norms," but a strong organizational threat. Since men were no longer showing the same degree of religious interest they once had, the void created by their absence could only be filled by women, "the logical group which can bridge the gap." The modification of the norms of Judaism to encourage the fuller participation of women has given Conservative Judaism some of its strength and aligned it more closely with democratic American expectations.

The arguments for the ordination of women mark a stage further in this development. As the women's movement has emphasized the aspirations of women outside the home and drawn attention to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

those professions from which women are still customarily excluded, the declining interest of the most qualified males in a rabbinical career has made the admission of female applicants an immediately attractive institutional prospect. This convergence of interests helps explain the commission report's otherwise odd emphasis on the *immediacy* of implementation, a dedication to change that seems more closely attuned to the tempo of North American culture than to the pace of the religious community it is meant to represent. The argument for the admission of women, however welcome it may be to those who want to be rabbis and to those who believe it is right, also offers a glimpse of real institutional insecurity as the leadership hastens to catch up with part of its constituency whom it "cannot afford" to lose.

It is, indeed, hard to keep pace. Though the Conservative movement has yet to take an authoritative stand on this issue, a Conservative congregation in Pennsylvania has already appointed a woman rabbi who the congregation expects "will put new life in our temple by appealing to the newer and younger element." A leading spokesman of the Conservative movement, who commented six years ago on the development of American Jewry with the observation that "most problems are the result of solutions; pursuing a goal or ambition is often more satisfying than a realized dream," is quoted as having hailed this appointment as a "historical breakthrough and simply fantastic," and as a hopeful trend for other congregations to follow.

Nevertheless, with all this fervor, some difficulties remain which the Conservative movement cannot altogether ignore, though it apparently hesitates to confront them. At the very end of the report, before the appended signatures, is a single sentence with the air, but hardly the significance, of an afterthought: "In making these recommendations, the commission is making no recommendations in regard to traditional practices relating to testimony, and no implications concerning such practices should be drawn on the basis of this report."

This expression of the conservative impulse of Conservative Judaism suggests that despite its recommendation of a radical departure from accepted Jewish practice, based on far-reaching reinterpretations of Jewish law, the commission does not intend to force the hand of its law committee which has not yet ruled that *halakhic* law can accept women as witnesses. The context of the report makes it clear that there is no readiness to defend such a regulation, nor any eagerness to explain it. It is simply there, an unfortunate anachronism that Conservatism is stuck with as long as it remains bound by the inviolability of the revealed law in some form of its classical interpretation.

Supporters of the commission report argue that if such negative encroachments on "equality" between men and women cannot altogether be removed, at least their effect should be minimized and confined to the narrowest possible sphere. The report itself, as has been shown, uses the analogy of the *kohanim*, who according to Jewish law may not officiate at funerals yet are permitted to serve as rabbis though they cannot undertake this common rabbinic function. Women, according to this logic, should not be barred from certain functions within the rabbinate just because they cannot fulfill all.

The analogy is ingenious but also ingenuous. The original proscription against *kohanim* coming into any contact with the dead was in no way meant to limit their priestly role, but rather to define the absolute ideal of its purity. The law was hardly intended to prevent priests from serving as religious authorities.

The injunctions governing the testimony of women, on the other hand, are clearly meant to discourage not only their assumption of authoritative leadership, but even their *participation* in certain judicial and religious areas that were not considered their primary domain. To have women serve in the highest judicial and religious office while the law in whose name they serve bars them from one of its basic civil and religious functions seems an obivous transgression of the spirit of the law with, at best, only token observance of the letter.

RABBINIC Judaism interpreted biblical law in accordance with its understanding of the obligations binding on males and females, and the social ideal it considered most fitting for each sex. A modern student of the problem points out that "the talmudic sages made not a single attempt to formulate a general principle governing the status of women," and today's interpreters can find legal precedents for liberalization in a variety of sometimes contradictory pronouncements. But Jewish law undeniably expects different things of men and women, and though its expectations are endlessly reinterpreted, they cannot be wholly eliminated without calling into question, as the Reform movement did, the binding nature of the law itself.

The restricted religious role Orthodox women occupy in Judaism may not satisfy modern notions of equality; even among Orthodox women they have recently been subject to vigorous reexamination. But within the internal logic of Judaism they were part of the noble and potentially sublime purpose of perfecting the Jews and humankind. Judaism's ability to create an alternative model of virility, one which depended on intellectual and spiritual prowess rather than political and physical might, helped to compensate for the great social dependency of the Jews without undue sacrifice of masculine self-confidence and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

biological zest. A group that cares as much for its collective survival as for the individual self-realization of its members, and that must transmit its communal values without benefit of national territory or political machinery, may still find in the *halakhic* system a decipherable and defensible system of social priorities. Yet the changes recommended by the commission report, which call upon women to assume social and religious leadership while apologetically acknowledging their restrictedness in fundamental areas, leave the impression of a meaningless body of tradition whose forms are only adhered to when there is not a shrewd enough argument to break them down. That Judaism may still have something residually relevant to say on the question of sexual roles is never alluded to by the commission members of either the majority or the minority persuasion.

Women rabbis, if and when they are ordained in the Conservative movement, would still be faced with the need to interpret a law that is felt to have no obvious intrinsic value in this important area of human affairs. And both they and the Conservative movement as a whole may then find it increasingly difficult, when the distinctions between women and men have no known consequence or meaning, to maintain Judaism's unyielding differentiations between wool and linen, between milk and meat, between Sabbath and week, between Israel and the Nations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Elizabeth Hardwick and Mary McCarthy

Pearl K. Bell

More than thirty years ago, Elizabeth Hardwick and Mary McCarthy began their literary careers with precocious works of fiction (*The Ghostly Lover* and *The Company She Keeps*). Both of them went on to become literary and cultural critics of considerable authority. But in the novels and stories they continued to write (Miss McCarthy has of course been the more prolific novelist), their fierce analytic intelligence often seemed less an asset than a meddlesome intrusion. Their highly developed skills at critical generalization diminished their imaginative freedom; they preferred commentary to the disorder of human experience, and their characters were personifications of the writers' fervent—in Miss McCarthy's case, belligerent—opinions about politics, society, culture, and woman's estate. Their fiction displayed such perfect command of an intellectual "position" that the well-heeled bohemians of Miss McCarthy's *A Charmed Life* and the academic voyeurs of Miss Hardwick's *The Simple Truth* seemed encased in preconception.

Now each of them has again produced a novel, testing her strengths against more complex structures—more complex because the novel form has been declared exhausted, and the political world has lost its simpler faiths—and one has the opportunity to judge whether their large critical gifts have worked for or against their imaginative vitality.

Though Miss Hardwick calls *Sleepless Nights** a novel, it has very little in common with other novels, and in no way conforms to Mary McCarthy's famous definition: "A prose book of a certain thickness that tells a story of real life." At first reading, *Sleepless Nights* appears to be a haphazard assemblage of fragmentary portraits, anecdotes, aphorisms, meditative generalizations, wayward bits and pieces of "transformed and even distorted memory," and it is extremely puzzling. Its elegantly wrought randomness and calculated air of improvisation yield almost no clues to the author's intentions. Though the spectral narrator is named Elizabeth, and she speaks of many incidents and places and people drawn from the life of the novelist—growing up in Kentucky, going north to study at Columbia, living on Marlborough Street in Boston and on West 67th Street in New York, being married and then no longer being married—Miss Hardwick has denied that the book is autobiography and says that much of it is made up. It is certainly not a progressive account of one woman's life, since it moves in erratic hopscotch jumps over some fifty years of time and space.

If it is neither memoir nor conventional fiction, what is it? Six years ago, Miss Hardwick published an "opening of a novel in progress," entitled "Writing a Novel." Throughout this earlier version of the first chapter of her present book, Miss Hardwick takes the reader into her confidence, spelling out the problems posed by various characters she may or may not eventually include in the novel she is both writing and writing about, wondering what to remember—"which part of the true story should I tell?"—and, even more urgently, how to remember it. At the end of the chapter she is still plagued by nervous uncertainty about the most fundamental decisions she will have to make: "Now, my novel begins. No, now I begin my novel—and yet I cannot decide whether to call myself I or she."

Though many sentences and whole paragraphs of that *Ur*-opening have survived in *Sleepless Nights*, Miss Hardwick has now jettisoned every reference that identifies the narrator as a writer who is working on a novel. The teacherly theoretical apparatus—the deliberate fumbling, the agonized vacillation between invention and autobiography—has been thrown out. Miss Hardwick no longer documents the ordeal of writing a novel, but has flown straight to the experience of consciousness and memory that is the act of writing itself. What she is up to in *Sleepless Nights*, then, is not to describe the experience of writing a novel (as she did in the didactic excerpt of 1973) but to exemplify it.

Near the beginning she captures the novelist's incurable literariness:

> Tickets, migrations, worries, property, debts, changes of name and changes back once more: these came about from reading many books. So, from Kentucky to New York to Boston, to Maine, to Europe, carried along on a river of paragraphs and chapters . . . all consumed in a sedentary sleeplessness. Is that sufficient—never mind that it is the truth. It certainly hasn't the drama of: I saw the old white-bearded frigate master on the dock and signed up for the journey.

Of course the disembodied voice of "Elizabeth" speaks of much more than paragraphs and chapters, and the figures that command her attention are often shabby and bleak, as her mind summons up the shape and mood of the past in memories of an overworked mother burdened with too many children and a drunken husband; of the scabrous theatrical underworld of drifters and losers in midtown hotels of the 40's; of foolish lovers and the narrator's vanished husband; of Billie Holiday and shopping-bag ladies and cleaning

PEARL K. BELL *is our regular fiction critic.*

* Random House, 151 pp., $8.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

women and failed intellectual dandies; of the "depressed spirits living in a conquered territory" in the furnished rooms of Morningside Heights.

Each shard of memory looms up with dazzling lucidity—Billie Holiday's "oily eyelids" and "violent perfume," her "splendid head, archaic, as if washed up from the Aegean"—and the meditative asides can be sharp as a claw. Yet in the end, Miss Hardwick's attempt to enact the mysterious fashion in which the mind of the writer functions in the process of writing is by its very nature self-defeating. You may discard causality and linear connection and motives and point of view—all the "givens" of the realistic novel—but you will still require something to bind the shreds of dissociated consciousness into a whole, however tenuous it appears to be.

Miss Hardwick has depended almost entirely on *style* as her principle of unity—beautiful words about ugly, desperate, boring people. Yet the disparity between the burnished language and the mean, disreputable lives robs those lives of a necessary brute veracity. As a result, the tone is one of cool detachment from the human degradation and wreckage being remembered. Miss Hardwick is not blind to this incongruity: "Yet why is it that we cannot keep the note of irony, the jangle of carelessness at a distance? Sentences in which I have tried for a light tone—many of these have to do with events, upheavals, destructions that caused me to weep like a child." Unfortunately, her awareness does not mitigate the chill.

This is the danger that threatens any novelist fired by an abstract idea of "the new"—it overwhelms passion, rage, and pity, demanding such an obsessive attention to performance that nothing else seems to matter. Much as one may admire the intellectual boldness in *Sleepless Nights,* Miss Hardwick has staked too much on the idea itself, and forfeited much in the telling.

IN SHARP contrast to Elizabeth Hardwick's fascination with subjective experience, Mary McCarthy's *Cannibals and Missionaries,** her first novel in eight years, is a sort of thriller about terrorism and hijacking—albeit a thriller with high intellectual gloss. What the story lacks (at least until the genuinely spectacular denouement) in manipulative tricks of suspense, it makes up for in a wealth of information—some of that wealth no figure of speech.

In her famous essay, "The Fact in Fiction," Miss McCarthy argued that "the distinctive mark of the novel is its concern with the actual world, the world of fact, of the verifiable, of figures, even, and statistics." By this touchstone, *Cannibals and Missionaries* is a novel with a vengeance. (Whether it is also the political novel she seems at times to have had in mind is another matter.) The book is as densely packed with fastidiously researched data—about everything from varieties of helicopter landing-gear to the brush strokes of Vermeer—as a computer print-out. Unlike the tedious accounting of clothes, furniture, luggage, cooking, and contraceptives in *The Group,* which sometimes seemed less a work of fiction than a household inventory, much of the factual plenty in her new novel is pertinent and amusing. But it is dispensed with too zealous a hand, and there is just too much of it.

The excitement begins with the hijacking of an Air France 747, bound for Teheran from Paris, by a band of terrorists (Dutch, German, Arab, and a lone Tupamaro). Unexpectedly, the plane is an embarrassment of riches for the hijackers, for it is carrying, in economy class, a committee of prominent American and European liberals planning to investigate torture in the Shah's prisons (the time is the early winter of 1975), and, in first class, a group of wealthy American art collectors who have signed up for a tour of Iranian museums and archeological sites. The plane is diverted to Amsterdam, and after extorting a mammoth helicopter from the Dutch government and NATO, the revolutionary guerrillas hole up with their hostages in an isolated farmhouse in northern Holland.

When Jeroen, the Dutch leader of the hijackers, learns that the collectors own among them a Vermeer, eight Cézannes, an El Greco, a Titian, and much more on that order, he demands that the paintings be shipped to the hideout in exchange for the millionaires' freedom. As the tedious and uncomfortable days stretch into weeks, the carefully crated masterpieces are dropped by helicopter, one by one, near the farmhouse, like manna from heaven. And Jeroen becomes possessed by his Promethean vision, "the sheer beauty of the coup . . .":

> Once the house contained irreplaceable masterpieces, any notion of taking it by storm would have to be abandoned by the imperialists unless they wished to pass for "barbarians" before the eyes of the entire civilized world. At that point, the commando could dictate its own terms and at its own good leisure. . . .

But as the long-drawn-out business of ransoming the rich hostages for their paintings drags on, Jeroen begins to suspect that his magnificent scheme may not work. Even before all the collectors have been sprung, he announces his additional demands, one of which is that Holland get out of NATO and break relations with Israel. The Dutch Prime Minister makes it clear that on this point he will not budge, no matter what treasure-trove of art and liberalism is at stake; political principle always overrides culture.

During the stalemate, the fact-finding missionaries experience some expected changes of heart toward their captors. They find themselves pitying the terrorists and romanticizing them as "warriors, born to a short life." As the fatuous "Bolshie" rector of a fashionable Episcopal church in Gracie Square puts it, they should not be "overcritical" of the revolutionary thugs, for "they want to change the system of which we're all a part. . . . And I can't say that I blame them, though I may question their methods." Only the dwindling troupe of collectors is unmoved by this access of even-handedness; they loathe the kidnappers and resent the theft of their masterpieces. They are contemptuous of people who are so willing to bend over backward that they see the world upside-down.

* Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 369 pp., $10.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Miss McCarthy operates the complicated machinery of her plot skillfully, but one wonders what has become of her once bright clear voice and unsleeping indignation, the scourge of hypocrites here, intellectual poseurs there, and fools everywhere. *That* Mary McCarthy is not entirely absent from this talky "thriller," but her witty and aggressive self-confidence is not what it used to be. Her satiric lance has a dull edge, and her thrusts are neither well-aimed nor damaging. Indeed, she seems surprisingly out of touch with the prototypes of her character, who appear out of sync with the present-day realities they are meant to represent. For example, one liberal is allegedly the president of a "good New England women's college," but this chattering goose, with her busy earrings and artful makeup, sounds like a provincial teacher of high-school French; she is inconceivable as the president of Wellesley or Smith. (These days the women heading "good New England women's colleges" are sober-minded Ph.D.'s with a dedicated talent for fund-raising, administration, and power.) The art-loving plutocrats are in the main anachronisms who belong not to the America of 1975 but to *New Yorker* cartoons of the 40's. As for the "New Left" journalist traveling with the liberals, she is beautiful, intelligent, sensitive, and erudite, and during her captivity she fills a journal with arresting comments on art, life, and love (so she will have something to read the next day). This intriguing woman, one would guess, far from resembling any New Left journalist of the moment, is a hindsight and somewhat gilded version of the young Mary McCarthy.

WHAT is especially strange about the novel is the superficial attention Miss McCarthy pays to the political and moral aspects of terrorism—an opportunity she would not have missed in the old days—and the excessive space and energy she devotes to the paintings and the fine points of collecting. She has chosen a political topic but failed to write a political novel, perhaps because she is not completely sure where her sympathies lie. On the one hand, she holds that terrorism is violence which can lead to horrible consequences for the innocent and the guilty alike. On the other hand, she seems to admire the brazen ingenuity of the guerrilla leader, for whom terrorism has a certain aesthetic grandeur, "art for art's sake in the political realm" (he was once an art student). Though she mocks the open-minded, empty-headed Episcopal minister, in a way—and of course much less naively—she agrees with him about "changing the system." In *Cannibals and Missionaries*—the title comes from an old puzzle: how to ferry three cannibals and three missionaries across a river, in a boat for two, without having cannibals outnumber missionaries at any stage—political ideas are subordinated to pedagogical gamesmanship. The serious intent of the book—and I don't doubt that she started out with one—remains cloudy.

ELIZABETH HARDWICK's critical sensibility is the source of a venturesome effort to work out a new aesthetic idea, and as a result her novel is hobbled by the abstract severity of that idea. Contrarily, *Cannibals and Missionaries* suffers from its author's failure to decide what she wants the story to mean. Can it be that Mary McCarthy, surely for the first time in her life, has been unable to make up her mind?

Movies

Coppola's Folly

Richard Grenier

T. S. ELIOT, in the very first of his *Selected Essays*, wrote: "The difference between art and the event is always absolute." One might have thought that the author of *Apocalypse Now*—who has taken "The Waste Land" and its notes as his bedside book, who has drawn the whole concept of his plot from the epigraph of "The Hollow Men" ("Mistah Kurtz—he dead"), and whose own "Colonel Kurtz" quotes Eliot with singular portentousness at the film's climax—would have given this proposition some consideration. He has not. Eliot also wrote: "The emotion of art is impersonal," and "The progress of an artist is . . . a continual extinction of personality." Francis Coppola has evidently not considered these propositions either.

Unable to resist the impulse to address and instruct the spectators of his movie, Coppola writes in a special introduction to the press booklet distributed to critics at advance screenings:

> The process of making the film became very much like the story of the film. I found that many of the ideas and images with

RICHARD GRENIER, *a critic and novelist, writes widely on the movies. His article, "John Wayne's Image," appeared in our September issue.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which I was working as a film director began to coincide with the realities of my own life, and that I, like Captain Willard, was moving up a river in a faraway jungle, looking for answers and hoping for some kind of catharsis.

In support of this contention, Coppola offers episodes (with pictures) from the making of the movie. On May 19, 1976, Typhoon Olga hits Subic Bay in the Philippines, destroying over a million dollars worth of sets and equipment and forcing evacuation of cast and crew to Manila. In July, after costly delays, new sets are built on high ground because of the rainy season now under way. In March 1977, actor Martin Sheen (Willard) is hospitalized as a result of heat exhaustion.

We also know from the journal published by Coppola's wife, Eleanor,* that Francis was "going through the most intense struggle to write his way to the end of the script and understand himself on the way"; that he "could end up being wiped out financially and owe millions"; that "like Kurtz now, he felt the exhilaration of power in the face of losing everything" ($18 million dollars to be exact); that Sheen had not had heat prostration but a heart attack; that Coppola had "a sort of nervous breakdown"; that he "has said that he is the Willard character [after being Kurtz for a time], and when Marty [Sheen] was close to death Francis [Coppola] collapsed, too. He said he [Coppola] was as near to death as he has ever experienced. He said he could see reality receding down a dark tunnel and he was totally scared that he wouldn't get back." We also learn that Coppola's marriage disintegrated under the strain of making the film, that he left his wife for another woman, but that the marriage was finally saved.

For all his apparent attachment to T.S. Eliot, then, Coppola is clearly one of the most self-absorbed, self-dramatizing artists since the high tide of the Romantic movement. And in *Apocalypse Now* he has produced the most eagerly awaited movie since *Gone With the Wind*. Hailed again and again while still being shot as the "Film of the Decade," it also—and quite without precedent—shared the top prize at the last Cannes Film Festival while still only a "Work in Progress." After a special preview of this same Work in Progress last spring in Los Angeles, spectators were besought to help Coppola find the right ending for the film (four separate endings, all shot, being then still under consideration). News magazines devoted special stories to both the preview and, later, to the still unsolved problem of the film's conclusion. Finally, on the eve of the film's opening, in an exquisite agony of indecision, still unable to separate himself from his work, Coppola made the startling announcement that it would be released with not one but two endings, one for the 70mm. version (calling for special equipment), another for the 35mm. version (with wider distribution).

In my experience, movies, before release, have often had two endings, five endings, no endings. After release and their normal theatrical runs, they have been altered for the simpler-minded audiences of television. "R" rated films, after a first go-round, have been sanitized on re-release for the "PG" market. But I have never known of a motion picture to be released in first run with two different endings. If for this alone, *Apocalypse Now* has made cinema history.

Now the movie. There are no titles or credits. The opening image is of a palm-tree jungle, fronds stirring gently in the breeze. After some minutes a faint *whit-whit-whit* is heard, so tentative it might be birds. It fades away, then recurs, stronger now: the sound of military helicopters. Two aircraft flit dimly across the camera field and disappear, then two more. Without our ever having had a clear view of the helicopters, we see the jungle suddenly burst into flame, and upside down, superimposed on the left side of the screen, appears the face of Captain Willard (Martin Sheen), his blue eyes luminous.

As at many points in the movie, the superimposed images hold the screen for a long time, altering only very slowly. All this is beautifully photographed and composed. The images come in a slow succession of dissolves. An old-fashioned tropical-style ceiling fan rotating overhead in an unknown room. The palm-tree jungle again. The flames of napalm. Willard's eyes. Helicopters dimly flitting past. Now the face right side up. Willard reclining. A bottle of Martell Cordon Bleu on the bedside table of a hotel room. Beside the bottle a service 45 automatic. The overhead fan rotating. With Willard's face upside down once again, we begin to hear a "voice over," Willard's voice telling of his past. He did an earlier tour of duty in Vietnam as an airborne officer on assignment with the CIA, then returned home to find that war had made him incapable of resuming his earlier life, and is now back in Vietnam, awaiting another special assignment.

In the first fully dramatized scene, we see Willard in his hotel room, drinking, neurotically agitated. He smashes a mirror with his bare fist, cutting his hand. Blood flows. He wipes it on his face. In the next scene, shot with great ponderousness (Coppola has called his movie a "film opera"), Willard receives his mission from General Corman (G.D. Spradlin) and aide Lukas (Harrison Ford). A Special Forces Colonel named Kurtz, in command of a Montagnard unit harassing Vietcong and North Vietnamese in the back country, appears to be waging a private war. Formerly a model officer, he has gone "out of control," answers to no authority, seems in fact to have gone mad. The decision has been made to "terminate Kurtz with extreme prejudice." Willard has his assignment: he is to proceed upriver in a navy patrol boat into Cambodia and assassinate Kurtz.

Most of the movie concentrates on the story of Willard's progress upstream. His first military encounter is with elements of the army's crack First Air Cavalry Division commanded by Colonel Kilgore (Robert Duvall), who mounts a spectacular attack on a point in the river held by "Charlie." The sound of the helicopters drowns

* *Notes*, Simon & Schuster, 288 pp., $9.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

out half the dialogue, but one has the impression that Kilgore—of an extraordinary callousness regarding suffering and death inflicted on "gooks"—has chosen this particular point to attack because it is an excellent place to indulge his passion for surfing. The prime victims of this American lightning assault are shown to be children in a schoolyard, innocent tots at play. "I love the smell of napalm in the morning," says Kilgore after the attack. "It smells like victory." Willard, rather sane now for a man who was smashing his bare hands into mirrors not long before, says to himself: "If that's the way Kilgore fought the war, I wondered what they had against Kurtz. It couldn't be just insanity and murder. There was enough of that to go around." And again: "Charging a man with murder in this place is like handing out speeding tickets at the Indy 500."

The next episode is Willard's attendance at a surrealistic riverside USO show, with scantily clad ladies forced to evacuate in their helicopters when U.S. soldiers storm the stage. Farther upstream, the patrol boat stops a sampan to search for weapons. One of the navy crewmen has an attack of nerves and machineguns the sampan hysterically, men, women, and children. There is only one survivor, a woman, wounded. Willard (succumbing to the pitilessness he was just condemning?) finishes her off.

The next military post they reach is an American-held bridge which is blown up by the VC every night, rebuilt by U.S. troops every day. There seems to be no commanding officer. All the while, as they continue upstream, Willard is reading over Kurtz's file, how he graduated third in his class at West Point, wrote a master's dissertation at Harvard on the Philippine insurrection, as a young field officer seemed destined for the army's highest commands—and now this. The patrol boat is attacked from the shore by Communist forces and one of the four crew members is killed by gunfire. It is next attacked by a savage tribe, and a second crew member is killed, this time by a spear through the chest.

We now enter the kingdom ruled over by Colonel Kurtz. An armada of awesome, painted primitives in boats. A set reminiscent of Angkor Wat. A horde of tribesmen armed with both spears and automatic weapons. Heads on stakes. We now also come upon the film's most brilliant character: a half-crazed, spaced-out, hippie combat photographer electrifyingly played (in a film in which the acting is otherwise undistinguished) by Dennis Hopper. "Wait till you meet Kurtz," he cries with a manic intensity that brings the film alive with a jolt. "The man's clear in his mind! But his soul is mad! . . ."

Willard is then taken directly to Kurtz in his temple, but when we finally meet the mad colonel he still remains very mysterious, shot in some of the deepest shadow effects since the death of the *tenebrosist* painter Georges de la Tour. Kurtz has by his bedside (titles ostentatiously visible): Goethe, the Bible, Sir James Frazer's *The Golden Bough*, Jessie K. Weston's *From Ritual to Romance*. When Kurtz speaks—later, but still largely in the shadows—he quotes some of the most familiar lines from Eliot's "The Hollow Men": "We are the hollow men/ We are the stuffed men. . . ." When he converses in unmetered prose, he talks of "the stench of lies" and says, "Horror and mortal terror are your friends." He tells what seems to be a turning-point story. One day his men inoculated all the children in a village against polio. Hours later, when the men were called back to the village, they found the enemy had hacked off all the little inoculated arms. Kurtz did not recoil but was inspired by this example: "If I had ten divisions of those men, able to use their primordial instinct to kill without feeling, without passion, without judgment . . . ," he says. The idea of atonement is not absent, however. "You have a right to kill me," Kurtz tells Willard, "but no right to judge me." Willard begins to feel that Kurtz is yearning for death, thinks he would rather "go out standing up, like a soldier" than as "some broken, wasted, rag-ass renegade."

When, finally, Willard kills Kurtz, the tribesmen sink to their knees in homage to their new chief and god, and for a moment it seems that Willard may replace the man he has just assassinated. But he pushes aside this mad temptation, makes his way through the tribesmen to his boat, and with his one remaining crewman, creeps eerily out onto the river and begins his return voyage to "the world," civilization.

This is the end of the film in the 70mm. version. The other ending, to be released in the 35mm. version, has Willard call in an air strike after assassinating Kurtz, consuming—as by the flames of hell itself—Kurtz's camp, his tribe, and all wickedness associated therewith. Coppola, I am told, refers to this version as the "Mom-and-apple-pie" ending.

WHAT is one to make of this ambitious, grandiose work, still incomplete in many ways, produced in such a state of romantic *angst* by its author, whose stated goals were nothing less than to exorcise the demon of Vietnam and to investigate the "moral issues behind all wars"?

The first thing to say is that the film is sumptuously shot and photographed, which, coupled with its evident seriousness and fearless disregard of the usual "commercial values," was probably enough to carry with it many of the country's leading film critics. But to say that a film is sumptuously directed is not to say it is well directed, that its directorial style is appropriate to its story. Of course, in Francis Coppola, author of *The Godfather*, we are dealing with a director of extraordinary gifts in the realistic cinema. In the symbolic, expressionistic cinema, which is where *Apocalypse Now* belongs, his gifts are less impressive. In its intellectual substance, *Apocalypse Now* suggests the work of a twenty-year-old film-school student, who, brought up on the conventional realism and pseudo-realism of Hollywood and TV, has just breathlessly discovered modernism. Although not twenty years old but nearing forty, Coppola piled into T.S. Eliot and *The Golden Bough* as if he were the first person who had ever read them, and this gives his film

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Our public philosophers speak out



A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY READER

Edited by Richard J. Bishirjian

A political scientist presents the collected wisdom of noted public philosophers such as *Eric Voegelin, Willmoore Kendall,* Irving Kristol, Robert Nisbet, Michael Novak, and Gerhart Niemeyer.

$9.95 at bookstores, or write directly to:

Arlington House

165 HUGUENOT STREET
NEW ROCHELLE, N.Y. 10801

"Absolutely fascinating."
—JANE GOODALL

The Biology of Peace and War: Men, Animals, and Aggression by Irenaus Eibl-Eibesfeldt

"An internationally eminent colleague of Konrad Lorenz inquires deeply into the key questions concerning 'human nature' as they relate to peace and war...[builds] on newly emerging evidence that as well as being warmakers we have equally been ready to 'ritualize' our aggressions...to enjoy peace...A PIONEERING STUDY."
—Publishers Weekly

THE VIKING PRESS Dept. ATE-C
625 Madison Avenue, New York 10022

Please send me _____ copies of THE BIOLOGY OF PEACE AND WAR @ $15.00. I enclose $_____ total. (Include sales tax where applicable plus $1.00 per copy to cover postage and handling.)

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State____ Zip _____

an unmistakably sophomoric, not to say semi-educated, quality.

That Coppola should not be sophisticated in literary matters is less surprising, however, than that he should, apparently, know so little of the history of his own art, the cinema. His wife has described him sitting at a new editing machine, running the film's opening sequence, "dissolving" images from three video screens and projecting them simultaneously onto one main monitor. "It was amazing. Three layers of image. It was spatial. Francis says it changes the whole editing ball game. . . . I got a rush, standing there, contemplating the possibilities." But although working with video equipment no doubt greatly speeds up editing mechanics, the ability to show simultaneous superimposed images was one of the very first things the cinema discovered it could do that the stage could not. In the form of "lap dissolves" (or simply "dissolves"), with one image gradually replacing another on the screen to indicate a shift in time or place between two sequences, it was universal in filmmaking until the late 50's. Then, when Stanley Kubrick, in *Paths of Glory*, shot a whole movie without a single dissolve, with one straight cut after another hammering the audience throughout the entire film, a shock wave went through the international film world, and for two decades now motion pictures have been in the Age of the Straight Cut. Now Coppola has rediscovered the technique of superimposed images, the old lap dissolve. Motion pictures are as subject to cyclical fashions as any art, and no doubt it was bound to happen sooner or later. But it is hardly breaking new ground.

FORM aside, what about the way this majestic film deals with the "moral issues behind all wars"? What does it tell us about war? First of all, we must remember that long before *The Godfather*, Coppola won an Academy Award for co-authoring the screenplay of *Patton*—made and released well before the Tet offensive of 1968. I confess I have my suspicions about a man who, while his country is engaged in a war which maintains a minimal level of acceptability, writes a work showing a renowned military commander in a heroic light but, when the winds of public opinion shift, decides to investigate the moral issues behind "all" wars. I think, for all his chest beating, that this man is simply a chameleon, changing his color with the times.

In any event, I don't see that *Apocalypse Now* deals at all with the moral issues behind wars. Those issues are most commonly of two sorts: (1) the fundamental pacifist question, put forth at such length by Tolstoy: is any military victory in any war worth its cost in blood?; (2) more specifically: is the particular war (in this case Vietnam) worth its price? By the simple fact that *Apocalypse Now* shows Americans in Vietnam engaged in actions of callous or perverted cruelty, and their adversaries doing nothing wicked at all (although Kurtz does tell his "inoculated arms" story), the film forfeits any claim to illuminating either of the moral questions involved. All it does is range itself in the camp of those who opposed the American role in Vietnam but who had—and have—no comment to make about the Communist side (to which, as the victor, Tolstoy's question is more properly addressed than to the Americans).

To the extent that *Apocalypse Now* has anything at all to say about war, it is in the tradition of Goya's astonishing series of etchings, *Los Desastres de la Guerra*: the simple depiction of the horrors of war. (I wonder if it is irrelevant to mention that the brutal hangings and executions by firing squad portrayed by Goya were being carried out against his fellow Spaniards by apostles of a New Order: the French under Napoleon. Coppola has chosen to show only the horrors perpetrated against others by his fellow Americans.) But to whom is this message that war is horrible addressed? Not, surely, to the American public at large which is hardly in a mood to glorify and glamorize war. One has the feeling that in making *Apocalypse Now*, Francis Coppola, co-author of *Patton*, was engaged in a pitiable exercise in self-instruction.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is perhaps worth noting that in the Soviet Union—where Coppola presented his film to great acclaim at the Moscow Film Festival—the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* had little difficulty in reaching an interpretation. "The meaning of the movie is quite clear. The war in Vietnam was an immoral criminal adventure of the militarists in Washington." The film's main protagonists, it wrote, are "officers from the army and intelligence service of America. From start to finish they are killers, maniacs: they sadistically torture, execute, and hang defenseless peasants, women, and old people." The article affirmed with assurance that the Pentagon and the Hollywood "bosses" had tried to prevent the film from being made.*

The scenario of *Apocalypse Now*, of course, is drawn from Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*, and, it must be said, follows the story line of the novel rather more carefully than is usually the case when great novels are "adapted" for the screen. There are changes: Captain Willard (as the character based on Conrad's Marlow is called) is sent to kill Kurtz (as the character is called both in the novel and the film), whereas Marlow hears about him for the first time while on his way upstream (and certainly doesn't murder him); Willard is a war psychopath to begin with—which rather limits the distance he has to fall—whereas Marlow is quite civilized.

But a surprising amount of significant detail has been retained. Kurtz had been destined for the top before this madness came upon him. Willard is fascinated, yearns to meet him. The voyage is hazardous. The black helmsman is killed with a spear. Gradually Willard becomes aware of the terrible thought (Conrad's words), "The mind of man is capable of anything." There are the heads on stakes, the "unspeakable rites," the celebrated lines: "The horror! The horror!" In Willard's mind, as in Marlow's, there grows a dark complicity and finally even an identification with Kurtz.

Interestingly, the film's most vibrant character, the war-groupie photographer played by Dennis Hopper (he is given no name), is drawn almost *in toto* from the novel, where the corresponding character also plays a key role. In

* These are presumably the same bosses who, according to the Soviet press, are so intent on blacklisting Jane Fonda. Yet when the California State Senate failed to confirm Miss Fonda's appointment to a political post on the California Arts Council and her friends ran a full-page advertisement in the Los Angeles *Times* angrily denouncing the Senate vote as a "resurrection of the specter of McCarthyism," leading executives from five of the six major Hollywood studios appended their names to the advertisement. For her role in the yet-to-be released *The Electric Horseman*, Miss Fonda has just been paid $1.5 million by Columbia Pictures.

WHY HITLER WASN'T KILLED

Hitler's Personal Security
by Peter Hoffman
$15.00, photographs & maps

There were at least 30 assassination attempts against Hitler, and this book reveals how tantalizingly close some of them came to succeeding. "Historian Hoffmann . . . has researched the security efforts made on Hitler's behalf with precision. He concludes that Hitler's behavior in matters of his own security confirmed in detail [his] general tendency of risk-taking to the point of being self-defeating and self-destructive." *—Der Spiegel*

available at your bookstore or directly from

The MIT Press
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Conrad he is a half-mad young Russian adventurer (also given no name) who has fallen under Kurtz's spell, and it is through him—encountered before Kurtz—that we learn whatever we are to learn of Kurtz's abominations. The historical transposition is implausibly successful. Line after line of Hopper's ecstatic rantings come virtually unchanged from the mouth of the bizarrely dressed, agitated young Russian: "You don't talk with that man—you listen to him. . . . He enlarged my mind. . . . He has enlarged my mind. . . . He made me see things—things. . . . He could be very terrible. . . . He wanted to shoot me, too, one day. . . . You can't judge Mr. Kurtz as you would an ordinary man. No, no, No!" From the young Russian, crazed with the glamor of adventure, to the combat groupie, "high" on the war, the language hardly needed to be changed at all.

An unavoidable problem in evaluating *Apocalypse Now* is the appropriateness of Conrad's tale as a vehicle for a demonstration of the horrors of war. *Heart of Darkness*, after all, is the study of a gradual reversion to savagery, But war is organized cruelty from the start. There is no way around it. In war it doesn't take years in the "bush" or months of slow travel on a jungle steamer to strip off the veneer of civilization. In combat it is gone in minutes. But it is when we come into the presence of Kurtz himself, inhabited now—thanks to Coppola's erudition—by the spirits of T.S. Eliot, Sir James Frazer, and Jessie K. Weston (not to mention Marlon Brando), that the film runs into real trouble.

I have already described the scenes. Kurtz in deep shadow for the most part. The Frazer and Weston volumes at his bedside. Kurtz intoning quotations from T.S. Eliot. Some dark rumblings about the right to kill, the right to judge. Painted on the temple wall outside, the giant words "APOCALYPSE NOW." Willard's killing of Kurtz. The savage tribe kneeling in homage to the new god-king. Willard hesitating: is he to replace Kurtz? Then his departure for civilization.

Now anyone with even a cursory knowledge of modern poetry knows that the epigraph of Eliot's "The Hollow Men" ("Mistah Kurtz—he dead") comes from *Heart of Darkness*, and that the notes to Eliot's "The Waste Land" (which Eliot complained "have had almost greater popularity than the poem itself") pay tribute to Frazer's *The Golden Bough* and Weston's *From Ritual to Romance*. Although Coppola can hardly have flattered himself that he was seeing dazzlingly fresh new correlations then, he no doubt thought himself on safe ground in assuming that the various works, symbolically at least, told a common story, and that a coherent work of art could be created by wrapping them all up together. But the fact that Eliot successfully integrated a fragment of Conrad into his own work, which he simultaneously acknowledged to be "profoundly influenced" by the opus of Frazer, does not mean that the whole of *The Golden Bough* can be dumped right into the climactic scene of *Heart of Darkness*.

One of Frazer's cherished beliefs was that societies in early stages of psychic development had "divine kings" on whose vitality the well-being of the society, and of nature, was thought to depend. When this god-king's powers began to fail him, he had to be slain and replaced with a more vigorous successor, to insure the healthy survival of the society and the continuing round of nature's miracles. There was no notion of wrongdoing, or guilt, or punishment in this. It was a ritual, according to Frazer, dedicated entirely to survival, hope, life. *Heart of Darkness*, in direct contrast, is about the opposite process—a reversion to barbarism, a terrifying night journey from civilization into savagery and evil.

Those who know little of the


On the Making of Americans
Essays in Honor of David Riesman
Gans, Glazer, Gusfield, and Jencks, Editors
The common theme in this book, as in Riesman's own writings, is what is happening to Americans and American culture. The authors address topical issues in, for example, education, mass culture and individualism, family and community, economics and liberty.
$25.00
Assuring the Confidentiality of Social Research Data
Robert F. Boruch and Joe S. Cecil
This is a practical guide to the gathering, preserving, and utilizing of social research data without compromising the privacy of the individuals under study. The authors describe three classes of techniques -- procedural, statistical, and legal -- and suggest changes in law and research practice.
$18.00
University of Pennsylvania Press
3933 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
(215) 243-6261

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

making of motion pictures might be surprised to hear that Coppola and his crew set off into the jungles of the Philippines on what was to become a $31-million movie without a finished script, already in a dither of uncertainty about the ending. Coppola apparently first thought he would find the ending, in torment, "within himself," or that it would somehow emerge from the very process of making the movie. He next thought, enraptured, that the ending might emerge from Marlon Brando's improvisations. But when Coppola wrote scenes based on these improvisations, Brando didn't like them. He refused to act them, wouldn't come to the set. Possibly the worst prima donna in the cinema today, Brando was finally coaxed into working again (photographer Vittorio Storaro had made some "strange light and smoke"). He improvised again. They shot it. Coppola rewrote it. Brando improvised, Coppola rewrote. They shot. They improvised, rewrote, shot, improvised, rewrote, shot. Thus was finally filmed a crucial, climactic scene for the "Film of the Decade."

But which exalted personage was to determine the ending of this movie? Conrad? Frazer? Eliot? Jessie Weston? Marlon Brando? Mom? Film-makers are often accused of not being sufficiently respectful of their sources, but Coppola was all too respectful. The trouble was that his august sources wouldn't agree. The problem was never really solved. Conrad won on points, as it were. But Frazer finished strong as well. Far, far too strong for purposes of clarity and coherence.

IN SUM, *Apocalypse Now* is a film that went colossally wrong, from the egotism of its director, his juvenile megalomania, the callowness of his ideas, and the weakness of his intellectual equipment. At the center of a failed dramatic work is sometimes a simple fallacy (sometimes a flaw in the author's character) which, once it announces itself, corrupts the entire undertaking. I am tempted to think that in the case of *Apocalypse Now* it is Coppola's notion that his practical and artistic problems in merely making a movie were the full equivalent of the voyage into terror and darkness experienced by men who kill and are killed in war. In his most shaming statement about his film, Coppola said he wanted to make the audience aware of the Vietnam war's "sensuousness." I can only say that this sensuousness must be deliciously apparent to a movie director far from the deadly blast of incoming artillery fire, sitting cozily in front of his new editing machine, finding ever more beautiful images to dissolve.

The headline-making exposé of a nation's indifference to the Holocaust.

In a book that is stirring international debate, Bernard Wasserstein argues that pro-Arab prejudices and preoccupation with their own war effort led British officials to virtually ignore the plight of Europe's Jews in World War II. Drawing on documents that include British papers not previously available to historians, he shows, for example, how British generals undermined Churchill's plans for a Jewish fighting force, why plans to bomb Auschwitz were cancelled, and where the first British shots of the war were fired: against an unarmed refugee boat bound for Palestine. $17.95

BRITAIN AND THE JEWS OF EUROPE 1939-1945
Bernard Wasserstein

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016

SINCE 1478

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books in Review

New Political Thinkers

THE NEOCONSERVATIVES: THE MEN WHO ARE CHANGING AMERICA'S POLITICS. By PETER STEINFELS. *Simon & Schuster. 335 pp. $11.95.*

Reviewed by
JAMES A. NUECHTERLEIN

FOR over forty years now, America's liberals and conservatives have spent most of their time arguing, in one way or another, about the New Deal. That conflict lingers on at the level of partisan politics, but it has long since lost whatever interest it once held as a framework for analyzing political thought. Few intellectuals any longer care to debate the welfare state. We do seem finally in recent years to have begun to move beyond the old categories and many of the old controversies; since the 1960's, indeed, the fault lines of American politics have been considerably rearranged.

It is this rearrangement that Seymour Martin Lipset and Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. had in mind when they remarked some time ago that "it is far less meaningful to ask of an American intellectual today 'Are you liberal or conservative?' than to ask 'Are you COMMENTARY or *New York Review of Books*?'" COMMENTARY or *New York Review*, neoconservative or New Left; that division in the American intellectual community provides the context for Peter Steinfels's study of the neoconservative movement.

The Neoconservatives is an easily misread book. A number of reviewers, none of them sympathetic to neoconservatism, have misleadingly portrayed it as a balanced and dispassionate analysis of the movement. It is no such thing. If it is not quite a polemic, neither is it at all disinterested. Steinfels does, it is true, give neoconservatism something of its due. The movement has provided, he concedes, the "serious and intelligent conservatism" America has lacked until now. Moreover, Steinfels acknowledges that the leading neoconservatives are perceptive and literate social critics who, while producing "telling critiques" and "provocative analyses" of liberal and radical thought, have confronted questions of fundamental significance to American political culture. Since modern American conservatism has generally been depicted as the province of the mean-spirited, the emotionally deprived, and the not-quite-bright, these are noteworthy concessions.

But Steinfels does not like any of the answers neoconservatism provides for the questions it raises. He finds it, on balance, "cramped, less than we are capable of, a withering of America's possibilities"; should it prevail, it threatens to attenuate and diminish the promise of American democracy." Throughout his discussion, Steinfels makes an endless series of debater's points at his subjects' expense, and it is his regular practice, upon granting an argument, either to snatch it back immediately with counterargument or to qualify it into meaninglessness. Steinfels presents the case in favor of neoconservatism but he lingers on the one against it, and the dominant tone of the book is one of subtle derogation. Steinfels's line of argument endlessly meanders, circles, and doubles back on itself, but it invariably finds its way to the conclusion that, sadly, neoconservatism will not quite do. Overall, the book's analysis is not so much inaccurate —though it does get certain things wrong and distorts some others—as it is jaundiced.

Steinfels rightly locates neoconservatism's origins in the revisionist liberalism of the 1950's, which attempted to add depth and rigor to the prevailing sentimental orthodoxies of the American Left. The end-of-ideology liberals rejected radicalism and populism; their animating instincts were anti-totalitarian and anti-utopian. They felt comfortable with pluralism, neo-orthodoxy, incrementalism, and consensus; were skeptical of mass movements and of moralism. Their characteristic style of social analysis discarded the old progressive dualisms (the interests vs. the people, the oppressors vs. the oppressed) in favor of new categories which, they thought, better suggested the complexities of the historical process: ambiguity, irony, paradox, tragedy. History was to be borne with, not overmastered. (Still today, neoconservatives distinguish themselves fundamentally from their opponents on the Left by their understanding that life is not open-ended.)

It was the events of the later 60's, of course, that turned revisionist liberals into neoconservatives. Understanding what happened in that period is essential to understanding neoconservatism, yet Steinfels's treatment is so cursory and so ill-informed as to leave any reader who was not there entirely blank as to what the movement was all about. He minimizes the force and impact of New Left radicalism and writes as if it had virtually no influence on the broader liberal community. One gets no sense from his account of the febrile radical sensibility that pervaded the New Politics nearly as much as it did the New Left. If most liberals largely ignored the Marxist assumptions of those farther leftward, they broadly shared the mood of moral outrage —and compounded it with heavy doses of guilt. Anyone who doubts this or has forgotten it (many liberals appear to have been rendered amnesiac on the subject) might refresh his memory by browsing through almost any liberal newspaper, journal, or other media outlet of the time.

As concern on the Left over racial injustice and the war in Vietnam expanded into ever more generalized and strident attacks on the inequalities of liberal capitalism, the corruption of middle-class culture, and the sickness of American

JAMES A. NUECHTERLEIN *teaches history at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario. His article, "Watergate: Toward a Revisionist View," appeared in our August issue.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hero of the Six Day War. Architect of Entebbe. Ambassador to the United States. And first native-born Prime Minister of Israel.

As much as any single individual, General Yitzhak Rabin has participated in, shaped and personally fought for Israel's peace and survival. Now, his candid, timely memoirs reveal fascinating details of major military, political and personal strategies: the storming of Entebbe, dramatic negotiations with Nixon and Kissinger, his "indisposition" during the 1967 war, the power struggle among top Israeli leaders from Ben-Gurion and Eshkol to Moshe Dayan and Golda Meir, the Begin-Sadat Peace Treaty....With great insight and integrity, Rabin offers a thorough understanding of the important events that have shaped his life and the history of Israel and the world.

"Fluently written...forthright and pragmatic ...one of the most candid and informative memoirs to date." —*Publishers Weekly*

"A vital element in Israel's history and saga." —*Senator Jacob K. Javits*

"An indispensable commentary by a foremost 'mover and shaker'...Rabin emerges as a warm, witty, perceptive warrior-statesman." —*Abram L. Sachar, Chancellor of Brandeis University*



Illustrated with 16 pages of photographs and maps
$12.95

Little, Brown

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

society itself, the men who would become neoconservatives (and who were themselves overwhelmingly pro-civil rights and anti-war) watched in dismay as those they had considered fellow liberals either capitulated to radicalism or, short of that, showed themselves incapable of defending the values and institutions of liberal democracy against the radical onslaught. Neoconservatism was born of the effort of a minority of liberal intellectuals actively to resist the arguments of those who found American society irredeemably corrupt and in need of radical moral or institutional reconstruction.

What started as a defense of traditional liberalism, however, soon began to move in unexpected directions. It became clear on reflection that when liberals caved in to radicals, the problem was not simply a failure of will. Liberals found it difficult to defend themselves against those farther to the Left because, in fact, they shared so many assumptions with their critics. For if, as liberals had generally assumed, human nature was either benign or infinitely malleable, if inequalities among people were essentially environmental in origin, and if institutions and situations were readily susceptible to the application of rationality and good will, what then, other than insufficient concern and effort, could account for the persistence of America's problems? So it was that contemplation of the collapse of liberal morale led the old liberals/new conservatives to a reconsideration of liberal thought. In that reconsideration, they came to recognize that the underpinnings of their political beliefs were more vulnerable to Burkean reservations than they had earlier understood. If, within the categories of New Deal politics, they might still consider themselves liberals, they found themselves more open than before to conservative intimations concerning the limits of social policy and of the political enterprise.

Steinfels analyzes neoconservative attitudes both in general categories and through detailed discussion of three leading neoconservative thinkers: Irving Kristol, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Daniel Bell. The chapter on Kristol is shallow and dismissive, that on Moynihan not much better. Things improve considerably in the section on Bell—it is, in fact, the best chapter in the book—in no small part because, of all the major figures identified with the movement, Bell most vigorously resists the neoconservative label. Steinfels in general writes most sympathetically of those neoconservatives who have strayed least far from orthodox liberal assumptions; liberalism, from his perspective, may legitimately be questioned from within, but there clearly is no salvation outside the Church.

How, in fact, does neoconservatism differ from liberalism (as presently defined) on the issues? Neoconservatives still favor the welfare state, but reject redistributive schemes imposed through government planning. They oppose or remain skeptical of such recent liberal causes as affirmative action (when defined as quotas), busing, open admissions, community control, environmental purism, no-growth economics, prisoners' rights, and women's lib. They have no use for the counterculture. They favor the cultivation of excellence and the maintenance of meritocracy. Unlike today's liberals, they are actively sympathetic to traditional family values, traditional religious concerns, the work ethic, equal opportunity (whether or not it results in equal outcomes), and a vision of America as a middle-class society. They repect the free market and its disciplines, but do not make a fetish of them. In foreign relations, neoconservatives are unreservedly anti-Communist—not just non-Communist—though they disagree among themselves on that policy's application in specific circumstances (détente and SALT II, for example). They do not at all share the Fulbright-McGovern tendency to instinctive distrust of American intentions and actions abroad, and


Through the charming device of a "biography" ...an analysis of many of the major thinkers of the Western world...
ELISEO VIVAS
TWO ROADS TO IGNORANCE
A Quest Biography
Eliseo Vivas – distinguished philosopher, teacher, literary critic, and thinker—relates the search by his alter ego, Alonso Quijano, for a philosophy to live by as well as one to think well by. In part intellectual autobiography, in part spiritual history of the post-1918 Western world, this account of one man's search for truth bears witness to the humility of deeply lived experience. $15.00
SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY PRESS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they fear, in the wake of Vietnam, a loss of willingness to defend, by whatever means necessary, legitimate national interests. They are pro-Israel virtually to a man. Third World rhetoric concerning Western guilt and neocolonialist oppression leaves them cold; they subscribe to the Moynihan school of diplomacy. The concept of the national interest seems to them a necessary and valid guide to foreign affairs, not a cause for apology.

Steinfels concedes an element of validity in most neoconservative criticisms of the contemporary Left, but finds them partial, exaggerated, and excessively negative. Neoconservatives, he suggests, are insufficiently critical of the "establishment" and of capitalist institutions and values, and unduly preoccupied with the faults and dangers of the "new class" and the "adversary culture." Alarmed to the point of panic over the "imminent collapse" of the social fabric, Steinfels's neoconservatives appear obsessed with largely phantasmal threats on the Left while ignoring the clear and present evils of the "corporate elites" on the Right who dominate American society. Steinfels argues that because neoconservatives emphasize stability over social justice, they could wind up as little more than sophisticated apologists for an oligarchic status quo. (Like so many on the American Left, Steinfels doesn't like capitalism at all, but, in the apparent absence of plausible alternatives, finds it difficult to come out and say so directly.)

IT IS essential to Steinfels's argument to show that the neoconservative "counterintellectuals" have vastly exaggerated the degree to which America's intellectual community constitutes an adversarial culture of "dissent and opposition" to prevailing American norms and values. Much of his case, however, rests on a tendentious misreading of the work Ladd and Lipset have done on the politics of American college professors. Steinfels cites a number of findings by Ladd and Lipset which would seem to indicate that professors are only modestly more liberal than the general population and that they comprise, at most, a "very loyal opposition."

That view holds up, however, only so long as one identifies *all* college professors as intellectuals in the normally accepted sense. When, in fact, we identify those faculty members who write or speak regularly on political and cultural issues—and whom we generally have in mind when we think of academic intellectuals—we are speaking overwhelmingly of professors in the humanities and social sciences, not those who teach natural science, education, medicine, law, business, fine arts, engineering, home economics, or agriculture. And Ladd and Lipset show conclusively that social scientists and humanists hold political views substantially to the Left of either professors or the general community. This is not to say that they are radicals in the sense of advocating

LibertyPress
LibertyClassics



Reflections on History

By Jacob Burckhardt

Jacob Burckhardt, the nineteenth-century Swiss historian and humanist, was a friend of liberty and a skeptic of power. He foresaw the coming of collectivism, and Nietzsche found in Burckhardt an historian who "was not dominated by the general whims and dared to see things realistically." First translated into English in 1943, *Reflections on History* was previously published in the United States under the title *Force and Freedom*. With an introduction by Gottfried Dietze. "No one predicted the modern totalitarian state more accurately"—Reinhold Niebuhr in *The Nation*. "A guided tour through the history of civilization"—*Saturday Review of Literature*. Hardcover $9.00, Softcover $4.00.

We pay postage, but require prepayment, on orders from individuals. Please allow four to six weeks for delivery. To order this book, or for a copy of our catalog, write:
LibertyPress/LibertyClassics
7440 North Shadeland, Dept. 571
Indianapolis, Indiana 46250

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wholesale recasting of American institutions—most liberal academics lack the courage of their considerable rhetorical radicalism—but there can be little doubt that they are significantly out of step with the attitudes and values of their fellow Americans. One thinks, in this regard, of the bicentennial events of 1976, which neoconservatives, along with most Americans, wanted to use essentially to affirm the American experience, but which most liberal intellectuals, resistant to any suggestion of an "American celebration," preferred to mark with solemn secular jeremiads on the nation's failure to live up fully to its ideals.

One aspect of neoconservatism with which Steinfels is sympathetic is its concern with moral and religious values, which he wishes that the Left would take more seriously than it normally does. But Steinfels, a liberal Catholic (he is executive editor of *Commonweal*), argues that neoconservatives tend to use religion as a prop for the existing order rather than as the critical and transforming agent it might be. This view, of course, fits in with the characteristic belief of liberal theology that religion must serve either to support or to undermine the political order. The neoconservative view of the matter, however, is quite different: it insists that serious religion judges and transcends *all* political perspectives. This understanding of the relationship between religion and politics is conservative only in that it rests on an anti-utopian imperative—on the assumption that man's fundamental problem of alienation will not be solved by shifting his socioeconomic institutions a few degrees to the Left. Walter Rauschenbusch, the Social Gospel theologian, used to argue that capitalism was "essential atheism" and that America had to establish some form of Christian socialism; from the neoconservative perspective, that is precisely the sort of conflation of proximate and ultimate values which religion ought to eschew.

STEINFELS avoids precise predictions concerning neoconservatism's future, but he leaves the general impression that it is likely to prosper, a prospect which fills him with some uneasiness. He may have less to worry about than he thinks.

On the one hand, neoconservatism has already made a difference. It has managed the not inconsiderable feat of establishing a body of respectable conservative thought in America. The Left might not like the direction journals like COMMENTARY and the *Public Interest* have taken, but it finds itself forced, however reluctantly, to pay them serious attention. Neoconservatism has, in fact, put liberals essentially on the intellectual defensive, as Steinfels in effect concedes. Perhaps not since the 1920's has American liberalism existed in such disarray and confusion as it presently does.

It would still seem, however, that neoconservatism has a long way to go before becoming the dominating influence that liberals dread and non-liberals anticipate. Within the intellectual community, for example, the political spectrum still tends to begin in the center and move leftward; liberals under pressure find it more natural to move leftward to radicalism than rightward to conservatism, however defined. This instinctive suspicion of conservatism can be seen even among neoconservatives themselves, most of whom find the neoconservative label uncomfortable and would prefer some other appellation, such as "neoliberal."

Conservatism in America is indeed resurgent, but that resurgence owes less, it would seem, to neoconservatism than to a revitalization of that older tradition of laissez-faire individualism that has for so long dominated the American Right. Political conservatives in America prefer Ronald Reagan to Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and they are more likely to take their theoretical bearings from William F. Buckley in *National Review* than from any of the contributors to COMMENTARY. Even Irving Kristol, who is perhaps the closest of any major neoconser-


For them, Ellis Island was no Plymouth Rock
In their own words, grandparents and great-grandparents tell what it was like for them to come to America as immigrants. Their vividly told stories make a superb book of living history:
ISLAND of HOPE, ISLAND of TEARS
Recorded and written by
DAVID M. BROWNSTONE
IRENE M. FRANCK
DOUGLASS L. BROWNSTONE
Documented with fifty-two contemporary photographs. $11.95
Rawson, Wade

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vative to the traditional American Right, identifies himself with a "conservative welfare state," and it is difficult to imagine most American conservatives living in peace with a welfare state of any provenance whatsoever.

It may well be the fate of neoconservatism, in other words, to find itself forever too far Left for conservatives and too far Right for liberals. As with substance, so also, if in different measure, with spirit. America's Left and Right might agree not at all on policy, but they share a common approach to politics as an arena for heroic endeavor. The moral urgency and sense of mission embodied in George McGovern's 1972 presidential campaign served as a mirror image of the spirit of the Barry Goldwater movement of 1964. Neoconservatives, by contrast, remain suspicious of the crusading spirit and resist moralistic rhetoric and emotional appeals. In so doing, they may again find themselves going against the American grain. Things could change, but Americans have characteristically found the heroic mode of politics—whether of Left or Right—more congenial than one rooted in a sense of limits.

It would indeed be ironic if neoconservatism, an intellectual movement devoted to the defense of the American system of democratic capitalism, found itself excluded from major influence in society on the grounds that, both in doctrine and in temper, it was somehow un-American.

After the Holocaust

SURVIVING AND OTHER ESSAYS. By BRUNO BETTELHEIM. *Knopf. 432 pp. $15.00.*

Reviewed by DAVID BIALE

Few followers of Freud have had as wide a range of concerns as Bruno Bettelheim. Out of his pathbreaking work with autistic children, he has produced a host of influential books and articles. He has also written penetrating works on the psychological role of fairy tales and on the children of the kibbutz. And as a result of his personal experiences in Dachau and Buchenwald, he was among the first to analyze the psychological impact of the concentration camps.

It would be hard to imagine a collection of essays reflecting these diverse interests and others as anything but maddeningly eclectic. Yet Bettelheim has largely succeeded in this volume in integrating the diverse products of his career. Although the essays differ widely in quality and importance and occasionally suffer from a wooden style, they are held together by some common themes peculiar to Bettelheim's biography and philosophy.

As the title, *Surviving*, suggests, Bettelheim's main concern is with

DAVID BIALE, *a new contributor, is the director of the Jewish Studies Program at Binghamton and the author of* Gershom Scholem: Kabbalah and Counter-History *(Harvard).*

LibertyPress
LibertyClassics



The Evolution of Civilizations
An Introduction to Historical Analysis

By Carroll Quigley

A comprehensive and perceptive look at the factors behind the rise and fall of civilizations. Quigley examines the application of scientific method to the social sciences, then establishes his historical hypotheses. He identifies seven stages of historical change for all civilizations—mixture, gestation, expansion, age of conflict, universal empire, decay, and invasion—and tests his hypotheses with a detailed analysis of five major civilizations: the Mesopotamian, the Canaanite, the Minoan, the classical, and the Western. "He has reached sounder ground than has Arnold J. Toynbee"—*Christian Science Monitor.* "Studies of this nature, rare in American historiography, should be welcomed"—*American Historical Review.* Hardcover $9.00, Paperback $4.00.

We pay postage, but require prepayment, on orders from individuals. Please allow four to six weeks for delivery. To order this book, or for a copy of our catalog, write:
LibertyPress/LibertyClassics
7440 North Shadeland, Dept. 572
Indianapolis, Indiana 46250

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the consequences of surviving the concentration camps. In "Trauma and Reintegration," an essay written specially for this volume, he notes that all survivors are plagued by the question, "Why was I saved when so many others died?," and they must consequently deal with enormous guilt and feelings of special responsibility as well as with the task of reintegrating their shattered personalities. Bettelheim discerns three strategies which survivors typically adopt. Some are so traumatized by their experience that they never succeed in reintegrating and remain as helpless in the outside world as they were made to feel in the camps. Others evade the feelings of guilt and deny that their camp experience had any significant impact; they try to take up life as it was before. Bettelheim considers this strategy of denial untenable not only for survivors, but for civilization as a whole after the Holocaust. The third group attempts to salvage something positive by directly confronting their horrifying experience. They try to refashion their lives as a conscious and continual response to the question, "Why me?"

This book represents Bettelheim's own attempt to follow the third strategy of confrontation with his personal experience. He writes: "By promoting the personality integration of others, one may try to promote also one's own: and by serving the living one may come to feel that one has met one's obligation to the dead. . . ." Read in this light, the essays collected here suggest the intimate connection between Bettelheim's personal struggle with his traumatic past and his professional and public concerns. It quickly becomes clear, for example, why the essay on autistic children, "Schizophrenia as a Reaction to Extreme Situations," follows a group of pieces on the concentration camps. As a result of his experience, Bettelheim has been able to detect a similarity in the impact of extreme trauma upon concentration-camp inmates and upon children, despite their utterly different sources. Moreover, the way he has found to deal with his own past has been to help these traumatized children achieve the reintegration and autonomy that camp survivors also seek.

In a more general sense, the thread which holds these essays together is Bettelheim's firm if unstated belief in the relevance of psychological self-awareness and understanding in solving social and historical problems, a belief which, as a follower of Freud, he links to an emphasis on morality based on the renunciation of instinct. Thus, in his writings on education ("Education and the Reality Principle," "The Decision to Fail," and "Summerhill"), Bettelheim stresses that "all education is based on a middle-class morality that finds its psychoanalytic equivalent in a powerfully developed reality principle. . . . This morality is not learned on a rational basis, but mainly through . . . anxiety instilled by the parents and by the example of parental behavior."

NOWHERE is Bettelheim's debt to Freudian morality clearer than in his essay, "Surviving," from which the book takes its title. Published originally in 1976, the essay is a scathing polemic against Lina Wertmuller's film, *Seven Beauties*, and Terence Des Pres's book, *The Survivor*. Bettelheim utterly rejects the attempt by both the film and the book to draw lessons for everyday life from the world of the concentration camps. Wertmuller sees the camps as an allegory of capitalist society in which only the amoral survive while the idealistic perish. Des Pres, influenced by a superficial reading of sociobiology, finds a model of a higher morality in the alleged behavior of the survivors, a vestige, he claims, of a mythical pre-cultural ethic inherent in man's genes. Des Pres argues that the lesson of the camps is that we must "live beyond the compulsions of culture" and "by the body's crude claims."

Bettelheim is an appropriate

Justice and Reverse Discrimination



ALAN H. GOLDMAN

"His proposals for preferential treatment differ significantly from affirmative action programs now in vogue. The book makes a valuable contribution to the discussion of an important social issue." – *Library Journal*

Alan Goldman's book comes as a timely discussion of one of the thorniest and most passionately debated moral questions to have arisen in this country in years: the justice (or injustice) of reverse discrimination in job hiring, school admissions, and training program policies. In a sustained effort to bring philosophical clarity to this stormy debate, the author considers both sides of the issue in the context of a fair and balanced treatment. He argues that, ultimately, an appeal to justice has priority over strictly utilitarian or legal claims. Cloth, $16.50. Paper, $3.95

From the Publishers of *Philosophy & Public Affairs*

Princeton University Press

Princeton, New Jersey 08540

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

critic of these ideas, for Des Pres constructs his theory largely against his distorted reading of Bettelheim's early writings, particularly "Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations," included in this volume. As against Wertmuller and Des Pres, Bettelheim insists that insofar as any strategy could be said to have led to survival, it was the preservation of some vestige of conventional morality and culture. The lesson of the camps, if there is any, is that "survival guilt" cannot be denied in favor of the "crude claims of the body," for that guilt is the foundation on which survivors must try to reconstruct their personalities and on which all civilization rests.

Bettelheim also emphasizes the central role played by chance (liberation by the Allies) against those, like Des Pres, who think that survivors learned some heroic virtues. But this downplaying of the behavior of camp inmates is contradicted by much of Bettelhem's own earlier writings. In "Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations," published in 1943 shortly after his own liberation from Buchenwald and arrival in the United States, he argued that the degree of disintegration of a prisoner's personality and his consequent ability to survive depended largely on his personality integration before his imprisonment. In "The Ignored Lesson of Anne Frank" (1960) and "Unconscious Contributions to One's Undoing" (written for this volume), he goes further and asserts that the victims often contributed to their own deaths by denying the desperate reality of their situations and attempting to continue life as if nothing had changed. He argues that "well-integrated and autonomous" people (words he uses with tiresome frequency) would have resisted the Nazis by any means possible, including by breaking up their families (as the Frank family failed to do) and even by attacking the SS with butcher knives. Such resistance, he believes with Hannah Arendt, "would have noticeably hindered the functioning of the police state" and might have changed the Nazis' attitude toward their victims.

"The most forceful Arendt appraisal to date"*

On her conception of politics

On the essence of totalitarianism

On her critique of Marx

On the nature of violence

On her concepts of freedom, thinking, and judging

HANNAH ARENDT:
The Recovery of the Public World

EDITED BY MELVYN HILL

"Controversial up to the time of her death in 1975, Hannah Arendt now begins to emerge —in this valuable book of thirteen essays by American, English, and Canadian writers— as a breakthrough figure among thinkers who have confronted the causes and consequences of modern alienation and political collapse."
—*Publishers Weekly**

"Provides readers with a chance to assess and judge her thought and career..The transcripts of a conference in which Arendt participated are particularly revealing of her characteristic political attitudes."—*Library Journal*

$14.95

ST. MARTIN'S PRESS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Israel Shenker

Wizards of language defined and examined in

Harmless Drudges

9.95 at your bookseller or from the publisher

Barnhart Books BB
BOX 250
BRONXVILLE, NEW YORK • 10708

ACCOUNTING FOR GENOCIDE

Victims and Survivors of the Holocaust
Helen Fein



"An extraordinary piece of work...With the publication of this book, Helen Fein goes to the head of the ranks with Hannah Arendt and Raul Hilberg as the most important scholars of the Holocaust."—SIDNEY H. ARONSON, *Brooklyn College, City University of New York*

"A pathbreaking work in Holocaust studies. It combines a new height of methodological sophistication with a rare depth of moral passion and analysis which makes for enormous intellectual and ethical impact...This book is a must read."—IRVING GREENBERG, *Director, National Jewish Conference Center*

$15.95 at all bookstores

THE FREE PRESS
A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co, Inc.
100D Brown Street
Riverside, New Jersey 08370

One need not go beyond Bettelheim's own writings to see how untenable is this accusation of passivity against the victims of the Holocaust. No one disputes that the victims offered little resistance or that they denied the reality of the extermination camps. But the question is whether any other strategies were really possible. Bettelheim showed already in 1943 how the Gestapo devised effective tactics in the camps to destroy the autonomy of all prisoners. These tactics were extended to the Nazi rule of occupied Europe, thus assuring the total passivity of the intended victims. One cannot have it both ways: if Bettelheim's account of the paralyzing impact of totalitarianism on individual psychology is correct, then he cannot hold that the Jews could have put up an effective resistance. His whole discussion is further compromised by his own behavior: although politically active in Vienna in 1938, he did not "confront reality" and flee the Nazis. Nor did he greet the Gestapo with a butcher knife, but instead allowed himself to be trapped by the system.

It is perhaps too much to expect that a trauma as profound and extensive as the Holocaust could produce an entirely consistent theory. Indeed, the tensions and contradictions in Bettelheim's thought are compelling evidence that his own struggle with the past continues unabated. This is itself instructive in a time when the Holocaust has become fertile ground for anyone with a facile theory. Bettelheim's example shows that the exploitation of the Holocaust as a vehicle of ideology is but one more form of avoidance and denial.

Campaign Biography

SENATOR. By ELIZABETH DREW. *Simon & Schuster. 191 pp. $8.95.*

Reviewed by JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR.

THE campaign biography is a familiar variety of literature in this country. It usually lacks literary pretensions, and does not customarily appear, prior to publication, in magazines of general circulation with large and influential readerships. Elizabeth Drew's *Senator,* a panegyric on the Honorable John C. Culver (D., Iowa), is an extraordinary specimen of the genre, for Mrs. Drew is several cuts above the hacks usually employed to compose such works, and her book originally appeared in the *New Yorker.*

Why Culver? He is in some ways a fairly typical member of the upper house, if there is such a thing, but he seems to me intrinsically much less interesting than, say, Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D., N.Y.) or S.I. Hayakawa (R., Cal.), both of whom, right or wrong, are far more than garden-variety politicians. His principal qualification for apotheosis in America's glossiest periodical is, so far as I can see, that he is a protypical Left-Liberal. (Indeed, I admit, without much embarrassment, that I never heard of Senator Culver until Mrs. Drew unveiled her portrait.) He qualifies on almost every count. He thinks the Great Society programs failed because we didn't spend enough money on them. He seems still to believe that what the Third World needs to cure its ills is more dollars from this "isolated island of affluence." He was one of five Senators who voted against a prohibition of American aid to Cambodia, Vietnam, Uganda, and Cuba. (If he has any views on what is going on in Indochina, Mrs. Drew doesn't mention them.) His explanation, presumably for the benefit of voters who can see no reason why their tax money should be given to such dirty little despotisms (as distinct from their wretched victims), is that "it's another example of denying the President flexibility in international matters. . . ." I detect a certain disingenuousness in this one, for I doubt that the Senator favors an "imperial Presidency," except possibly for Edward M. Kennedy. He seems quite willing to have Congress make major decisions in the closely related area of defense. He led the fights against large nuclear aircraft carriers and the B-1 bomber. He "followed his instincts" by blocking the construc-

JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR. *is Richard Ely Professor of Law at the Yale Law School.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion of a naval base on Diego Garcia atoll in the Indian Ocean, where the Russian Fleet has lately been very active. He opposes a draft.

I do not mean that Culver is wrong on all these debatable issues, but his anti-Pentagon attitude is too consistent to be wholly the result of objective consideration of the merits of each case. "It seems to me," he says, "that the propensity for hawkishness is in direct proportion to how remote a person is from any military experience." The plain implication of this observation is that Culver, who is, Mrs. Drew tells us, proud of his 39 months in the Marine Corps, is opposed to "international confrontations and large-scale increases in expenditures for arms" because he knows the horrors of war from personal experience. There are in fact many combat veterans and a few authentic heroes in Congress—e.g., Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D., Hawaii) who is not, as it happens, opposed to defense spending. But a check of Culver's *Who's Who* entry shows that he is not one of them. His Marine service did not begin until after his graduation from Harvard in 1954, about a year after the end of hostilities in Korea, and ended in 1957 or 1958. By the time serious fighting erupted in Vietnam, he was snugly ensconced in the House of Representatives.

STILL more important, Culver is one of the doughtiest housecarls of Edward M. Kennedy, the Porphyrogenitus. He began his political career in 1962, while he was still in Harvard Law School, by helping his college classmate's first run for the Senate, and thereafter served as his legislative assistant. Busts of John and Robert Kennedy stand on the mantel in Culver's office, and the near presence of Ted is felt throughout the book. The intimacy between the two men is constantly stressed. A couple of pointless pages are devoted, for example, to their prowess in a softball game between Kennedy's staff and those of Culver and his Iowa colleague, Dick Clark.

Mrs. Drew describes Culver in terms which would require qualification if she were writing about Abraham Lincoln. We are told flatly and in so many words that he is brainy, careful, considerate, courageous, honest, humorous, principled, shrewd, skillful, tenacious, thorough, and thoughtful, and if a copy of the Boy Scout Handbook had been available, another dozen adjectives would probably have been added (trustworthy, loyal, etc.). I was taught long ago in English composition that it is better to develop a character through his actions than by using strings of adjectives. But Mrs. Drew's occasional illustrations of the astounding virtues she attributes to her hero are less than convincing. We are frequently told, for example, that his humor is superlative, that

Around the world today . . .

DISASTER ASSISTANCE
Appraisal, Reform and New Approaches
Edited by LYNN H. STEPHENS and STEPHEN J. GREEN

A UNA-USA Book. "In a decade all-too-likely to be punctuated with disaster, whether earthquakes in Latin America, famines in Africa, or nuclear meltdowns in the U.S., this book performs a signal service by reminding us that future-consciousness is a survival skill. Its central message ought to be nailed to every door: Expect the Unexpected!"—Alvin Toffler, author of *Future Shock.* 337 pages, $20.00

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Edited by PAULA R. NEWBERG

A UNA-USA Book. A major issue in American foreign policy, human rights is discussed fully in its theoretical and practical dimensions here. The philosophical and political background of contemporary human rights questions and the moral responsibility of multinational corporations are two of the concerns examined by eleven distinguished contributors. 256 pages, $22.50

ARMS AND POLITICS, 1956-1978
Arms Control in a Changing Political Context
By ROBIN RANGER

The first single-author work to survey the whole field of arms control in theory and practice. Dr. Ranger analyzes different concepts of arms control, the individual groups and organizations holding these views, and the success and failures of these ideas in the world of politics, international and domestic. 280 pages, $19.95 (Distributed in the U.S. for Macmillan of Canada)

ARMS TRANSFERS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
Edited by ANDREW J. PIERRE

The pros and cons of arms transfers—political, military and economic—and the policy dilemmas arising from this ubiquitous aspect of contemporary international affairs are scrutinized in this symposium by public figures and experts. As a comprehensive dissection of the policy issues, this book is a lasting contribution to the debate on arms sales. 352 pages, $22.50

JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES
Challenges and Opportunities
Edited by WILLIAM J. BARNDS

A Council on Foreign Relations Book. The erosion of America's economic competitiveness and of its military supremacy in the Western Pacific is creating bilateral economic conflict at the same time that Japan's confidence in America as its military protector is declining. The authors identify the causes of the growing difficulties facing the two countries and propose ways to cope with current and future strains in their relationship. 256 pages, $15.00 cloth, $6.95 paper

UNITING THE DEMOCRACIES
Institutions of the Emerging Atlantic-Pacific System
By JAMES R. HUNTLEY

Since World War II, the West has forged a series of alliances and economic pacts unprecedented in scope and impact. Mr. Huntley examines the workings of such bodies as NATO, the Common Market, OECD and the Council of Europe and shows how they form a surprisingly integrated whole: the "extended Atlantic System." 416 pages, $20.00

At bookstores, or direct from **New York University Press** • Washington Square, New York, N.Y. 10003

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it dominates convivial sessions with his friends, that "one is swept along by the force as well as the substance." But I can recall but one example of his mirthmaking. Ted Kennedy comes in for lunch. "Culver. . . , trying to look very serious, says, 'I was hoping I could have lunch with you, Ted, but I'm busy.' [Fair, but not uproarious.]

"Kennedy laughs, and says to Culver, 'You still stiff from the [softball] game?'

"Culver answers, 'I was never stiff.'

"Kennedy laughs again."

I didn't.

SOMETIMES, perhaps unjustly, one suspects Mrs. Drew of doctoring the transcript a bit. She often quotes at some length the Senator's expositions of his political philosophy, apparently tape-recorded. One of them includes a 47-word extract from Edmund Burke, including three dots to show that a part has been omitted. Somehow it seems unlikely that the Senator delivered the sermon just that way.

Mrs. Drew's adulation does not totally spoil her prose. She writes fluent and correct *New Yorker*ese. It is a literate, rather bland, style, intended to clothe its message, which is often highly propagandistic (as in this case), in the appearance of moderation and reasonableness. Its chief drawback is that it grows tedious after a while.

And despite her worshipful tone (oddly reminiscent of Parson Weems on George Washington), she has managed to produce a moderately interesting account of ten days of the daily grind of a moderately important politician. It may well do him some good. The *New Yorker* has long since abandoned its old motto, "not for the old lady from Dubuque," and some Iowa voters may believe what the book has to say. Senator Culver is up for reelection next year, and if the fate of his equally liberal colleague, Dick Clark, in 1978 is any guide, he can use a good campaign biography. But I wonder what A.J. Liebling, who wrote for the *New Yorker* in the days when reporters shunned ideology like poison ivy, and never developed crushes on practicing politicians, would have thought if he had lived to see such a thing published in its pages.

Blake as Marxist

WILLIAM BLAKE. By JACK LINDSAY. *Braziller. 334 pp. $15.00.*

Reviewed by MILTON KLONSKY

DERIDED in his own time as a religious crank teetering on madness; rejected by critics and connoisseurs of art as a bungler, incapable of drawing the human figure correctly; virtually ignored as a poet, so that he was forced to engrave and publish his own works, the poet-painter William Blake has since become one of the most influential figures of the Romantic era. What's more, he has managed to escape the usual categories imposed by the custodians of culture, and seems to speak to us directly, with an almost contemporary voice. The way we regard him, therefore, reflects our own concerns and our own values.

The author of this biography views Blake as a kind of proto-Marxist who "drove beyond the Hegelian idealist element into the sort of realizations that we find in the young Marx," but "had no conception as to how the final revolution he desired was to come about except by some spontaneous uprising of all peoples" and "no notion of the positive forces at work in the industrial system." Born too soon to have been enlightened by the Marxist dispensation, Blake is relegated by the author to an ideological limbo somewhat like the one in which Dante placed such virtuous pagans as Virgil and Ovid, who lived before the advent of Christianity.

Admirers of Blake will find it hard to recognize his characteristic

MILTON KLONSKY *is the author of* William Blake: The Seer and His Visions *and of the forthcoming* Blake's Dante *(Crown/Harmony).*

Einstein, Freud, Mahler, Kafka...

There were hundreds like them—Jewish cultural giants who were trapped and terrorized by the Holocaust.

These are their stories:

Of Einstein—who was branded a menace to "Aryan physics" ...Of Alfred Doeblin—who fled to a new faith...Of Lasker-Schüler—modern Germany's greatest lyric poet who died penniless in Jerusalem.

Prophets Without Honour is filled with unforgettable accounts of the few who escaped and the many who did not. The collective biography of a generation of genius, it is an exciting "intellectual adventure."*

*Lucy Dawidowicz

"Grunfeld has put the whole awful, somehow ennobling story together with a quiet passion and a wealth of unexpected details."
—ALFRED KAZIN

A Jewish Publication Society Selection
$15.00

PROPHETS WITHOUT HONOUR

A Background to Freud, Kafka, Einstein and Their World

BY FREDERIC V. GRUNFELD

Holt, Rinehart & Winston

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

features in this portrait. In order to shrive Blake of any taint of mysticism and the occult, Mr. Lindsay explains away his visionary art and poetry as an attempt "to secularize millenary religion." Blake used "the religious idiom," as Mr. Lindsay calls it, because "there was no other idiom in his day that could affirm human unity with the fullness and depth that he required." Peeling away this musty old "idiom" from Blake's prophetic books, and probing beneath their mythological and symbolical apparatus, he discovers in *Milton*, for instance, what he calls a "great truth," namely, "that wishful thinking was not enough and one must understand the phase of history in which one lived." It takes some doing to reduce so superbly imaginative a poem as *Milton* to so pious a platitude.

Jerusalem, on the other hand, elicits less certainty, perhaps because it is too vast and polyhedral a work to be summed up quite so one-sidedly. Mr. Lindsay finds that since it "frowns on all forms of social and political struggle, there is thus a general unity in the work, but at the cost of a certain grim flatness and lack of dramatic structure." Why the absence of "social and political struggle" should entail a "general unity," he does not explain, nor why this in turn is negated by a "lack of dramatic structure"; but a couple of pages later the dialectical fusion of opposites results in confusion twice confounded when he informs us that the prophetic books, *Jerusalem* included, are "not only an unparalleled poetic universe of forms, images, symbols, but also a penetration into the processes of history which holds an ever-deepening meaning for all of us." One cannot but wonder how Blake, who was himself something of an alchemist, might have reacted to this attempt to transmute his lifelong mysticism into fool's-gold Marxism.

Mr. Lindsay, however, continues undaunted. "As no poet before or since," he declares, Blake "was a total revolutionary," yet it is this very totality that he fails to recognize. Blake was an early and enthusiastic supporter of such political causes as the American and French revolutions, the abolition of slavery, the emancipation of women from marital and sexual bondage. But as his vision deepened and expanded, he came to believe that social and political oppression had their counterpart in a cosmic tyranny which he identified with the malevolent demiurge of gnostic theosophy; and, at the same time, that this tyranny was focused to a burning point within the psyche of each individual as religious shame and guilt. Politics for Blake was not enough. The redemption of Everyman (or Albion, as Blake called him, corresponding to the *adam kadmon* of the Kabbalah) must therefore encompass all three.

When Blake asks rhetorically in *Jerusalem*, "Are not religion & politics the same thing?" he does not, as Mr. Lindsay supposes, mean to reduce the former to the latter, in

Announcing publication

THE MESSIAH TEXTS

Jewish Legends of Three Thousand Years

By Raphael Patai. A collection of ancient and modern works of magical insight and timeless grandeur central to an understanding of the Messianic dream of Judaism. Delightful folk tales, apocalyptic fantasies, parables of prophetic power spanning three millennia in a major new work by the noted anthropologist and biblical scholar Raphael Patai. *536 pages, $17.95. Also available as an Avon paperback original.*

Edited by Karl H. Van D'Elden. Sixteen contemporary West German poets discuss politics and literature, the burden of history, and the effects of today's political values and their own commitments on their work. *252 pages, $16.95*

West German Poets on Society and Politics

Now in a WSU Press edition

MARXISM AND ART

ESSAYS CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY

Edited with Historical and Critical Commentary by Maynard Solomon. "The best anthology on the subject in English which I know."—Herbert Marcuse. "A masterful job."—Carl Oglesby. "An important contribution to Marxist studies. It reveals a rich tradition, full of controversy."—Sheila Delany, *West Coast Review. 684 pages, paperbound, $7.95, clothbound, $16.95*

WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS
The Leonard N. Simons Building
5959 Woodward Avenue
Detroit, Michigan 48202

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the manner of Marxist analysis, but to proclaim that the prophetic tradition was as alive in his time (and in himself) as it had been in the days of Isaiah and Jeremiah and Ezekiel. For this he was stigmatized by his contemporaries as something of a religious lunatic. Marx, too, no doubt, would have joined them in pointing a revolving forefinger at the head of the cockney prophet who believed the material world to be not only "evil" but a "delusion," and asserted that "every Natural Effect has a Spiritual Cause." Yet Blake did so say and so believe. Only his biographer refuses to take him at his word, but, desiring to have it both ways, rejects Blake's spiritualist metaphysics while accepting his libertarian politics.

THROUGHOUT this biography, Mr. Lindsay turns a narrow censorious eye on Blake's character, similar to the ideological squint with which he examines his ideas, charging him with "timidity" and "quietism" and "a rooted fear of political action." But what "action" that could have been, other than the symbolic action of a poet and artist who never ceased his "Mental Fight" against injustice, Mr. Lindsay does not tell us. The portrait of Blake that emerges is of a pecksniffian, quarrelsome, spiteful, envious, thoroughly unpleasant personality, ungrateful to friends and benefactors (Mr. Lindsay makes much of his violent falling out with his patron William Hayley) and resentful to the point of paranoia against anyone who might have offended him. Blake was "torn," he concludes, "between a ferocious animosity to those he considered his enemies, and his efforts to school himself into a creed of universal forgiveness."

The artist Samuel Palmer, who came to know Blake intimately during his last years, recalled him with reverence long afterward as "a man without a mask," one of the rare few who lived according to the Socratic precept that the inner and outer man be the same. As Mr. Lindsay sees him, however, the mask worn by Blake was the semblance of not wearing one.

For an author who claims in his foreword that Blake has been for him a "vitally formative influence," this is surely a harsh and unsympathetic arraignment. In fact, that "creed of universal forgiveness" which Mr. Lindsay mentions slightingly in passing was the dominant theme of Blake's last and perhaps greatest work as an artist, the illustrations of the *Divine Comedy*. He there envisioned Dante's imaginary *Inferno* as derived from the psychological abyss in the mind of Everyman, or any man, and also foreshadowed its realization in the totalitarian hells of our own century. "What is now proved," Blake wrote, "was once only imagined." Even the most devout Marxist must acknowledge the truth of that.

Revisionist Revision

HOW THE SOVIET UNION IS GOVERNED. By JERRY F. HOUGH and MERLE FAINSOD. *Harvard University Press. 679 pp. $17.50.*

Reviewed by RICHARD PIPES

WHEN Ibsen brought out *A Doll's House* a hundred years ago, its denouement proved too strong for conventional tastes, and so a number of theaters in Europe and the United States began to stage the play with a "happy ending." In one of these versions, called *Breaking a Butterfly* and subtitled "Founded on Ibsen's *Norah*," the heroine declared herself in the final scene a "poor weak foolish girl" undeserving of her husband and stayed home, presumably to improve herself.

There is something of the same quality about Jerry F. Hough's book, which may be said to be "founded" on the late Merle Fainsod's *How Russia Is Ruled*, of which it is billed as a second revised edition, in the sense that it has roughly the same plot and cast of characters but in all essential respects departs from its prototype. Where the reader of Fainsod's work emerged with a sense of tragedy, the reader of Hough's "revision" is left with a feeling of soothing optimism and general well-being.

Merle Fainsod began his academic career at Harvard in the 1930's as a specialist on international socialism. During a year which he spent in the Soviet Union as an exchange scholar he acquired a reading knowledge of Russian. To judge by an article he wrote for the *Encyclopedia of the Social Studies* (under the entry "Soviet"), he then took a rather benign view of the Soviet system, believing it to be evolving toward a synthesis of freedom and planning which some day would result in the realization of the social and political ideals of Communism ("the withering away of the state").

After the war, Fainsod became Harvard's leading expert on Soviet affairs. He taught a popular course on Soviet government, noted for its polished lectures, and guided numerous graduate students, some of whom today hold influential posts at universities and in government. Not the least of his contributions to Soviet studies in this country was to have helped found and direct the Russian Research Center at Harvard.

In 1953, Fainsod published in the Russian Research Center series a book destined to become his *chef d'oeuvre, How Russia Is Ruled*. The range of research, the clarity of exposition, and the judicious quality of the conclusions at once established this volume as the standard work in its field. In 1964, Fainsod brought out a revised edition which incorporated material that had come to light in the decade following Stalin's death, and altered the analysis wherever it was necessary to allow for the changes that had occurred since the 20th Party Congress.

In both instances, the timing of publication turned out to have been unlucky: the first edition appeared months after Stalin's death, just as the Stalinist system, to which it was principally devoted, was about to undergo major reforms; the appearance of the revised edition coincided with Khrushchev's ouster. Fainsod joked resignedly that the appearance of the second revision on which he was at work would surely spell the

RICHARD PIPES is *Frank B. Baird, Jr. Professor of History at Harvard. Mr. Pipes's most recent book is* Russia Under the Old Regime.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

demise of Brezhnev's rule. Alas, he was not destined to test that prognosis because he died suddenly in 1973, before he had time to complete the new edition. The standing of *How Russia Is Ruled,* however, remained so high, and it continued to be used so widely in college courses, that Harvard University Press decided to proceed with a second revision anyway. The task was entrusted to one of Fainsod's students, Jerry F. Hough, a professor of Soviet politics at Duke.

To the scholar, the verb "to revise" denotes certain fairly well-defined procedures, most of them connected with updating. Revising a scholarly work means, first and foremost, supplementing the evidence on which it rests with information that has emerged since previous publication, and, where this becomes necessary, adjusting the conclusions. In the case of a work concerned with current events, it also means bringing the narrative forward, to the present. A scholar who revises his own publication enjoys, of course, full freedom to alter his approach, methodology, and conclusions. If, however, he is revising someone else's work, he will be careful, first, clearly to set off his own contributions from those of the original author, and, second, not to tamper with the author's methodology or principal findings. If he should decide that he cannot, in good conscience, go along either with the methodology or with the principal findings of the work he has been asked to revise, he will resign the assignment and, if so moved, write his own book instead.

How the Soviet Union Is Governed, unfortunately, meets none of these criteria. Hough has not produced "an extensively revised and enlarged edition" of Fainsod's *How Russia Is Ruled,* as the title page proclaims; his is, for all practical purposes, a new book which incorporates large chunks of Fainsod (often suitably "cleansed") but which in all essential respects departs from him, and, indeed, takes a diametrically opposed view of the subject. I have no doubt that Harvard University Press had the legal right to bring out *How Russia Is Ruled* with a happy ending: a clause in its standard contract authorizes the Press to carry out revisions of books on its list with someone else's assistance if the author is unwilling or unable to do so. Whether it had the moral right to butcher the original in this manner is another question. The fact that the volume no longer carries the imprint of the Russian Research Center indicates what the book's original sponsor thought of the matter.

FAINSOD, who quickly rid himself of his early optimism about the evolution of the Soviet system, joined after the war that school of political scientists who operated with the concept of "totalitarianism." He worked on the premise that the elite ruling (rather than "governing") the Soviet Union had as its principal objective full control over every facet of organized life, and that in the pursuit of this objective it had to rely heavily on the political police with its mass terror. "Ultimately," he wrote, "the totalitarian dictatorship must depend on terror to safeguard its monopoly of power." The heart of *How Russia Is Ruled* was a detailed analysis of the development and structure of the apparatus of control employed by the Soviet Communist party, with heavy stress on the political police.

Now it so happens that Hough does not find the "totalitarian" model useful: he regards it as self-contradictory, oversimplified, and suffering from a variety of other shortcomings. He prefers to view the Soviet political system as a synthesis of authoritarian impulses on the one hand, and "interest articulation" combined with "input of demands" on the other. Or, to say it in different words, as a system which comes nowhere close to attaining its totalitarian objective and whose leaders, like it or not, must allow a considerable measure of popular participation in the political process.

It must be conceded that Fainsod and other proponents of the "totalitarian" approach tended to see the system too much in terms of what it professed to be rather than in terms of what it actually was: this was the legacy of a time when the Soviet Union had to be studied

Non-resident Bachelor, Master and Doctoral degrees for the accomplished individual are offered by Columbia Pacific University

Columbia Pacific University has been authorized by the State of California to grant non-resident Bachelor, Master and Doctoral degrees in numerous fields, including Business, Psychology, Engineering and Health. Classroom study at campuses, just north of San Francisco, is optional.

Degrees are earned through a combination of full academic credit for life and work experience, and completion of an independent study project in the student's area of special interest. The time involved is normally six to 12 months. The cost is under $2,000.

Columbia Pacific University is attracting accomplished individuals, members of the business and professional community desiring to design their own projects, and receive academic acknowledgement for their personal achievements. May I send you our catalog?

R. L. Crews, M.D., President
Columbia Pacific University
150 Shoreline, Suite 42
Mill Valley, California 94941
(415) 332-7832

ENROLL MORE STUDENTS
UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE
INSTITUTE
ACADEMY
SCHOOL

Education America, with offices in major U.S. cities and overseas, can recommend many foreign students of all ages and levels to your institution. If you are interested in increasing your enrollment with qualified students please write us for more details and include your brochure.

EDUCATION AMERICA, INC.
One Penn Plaza, Suite #4526
(45th Floor) New York, N.Y. 10001
Tel: (212) 736-9323
Cable: EDUAMERICA Telex: 668851 EDUAMRC

A GIFT TO TREASURE

ORDER FOR CHANUKAH - JONAH IN THE WHALE

Hand-engraved on plexiglas-5¾"x2½"x1½". $90 ppd. (KS/MO residents add $3.71 tax.) Limited Edition.

Send Check or Money Order to

Unique Judaica, Limited
601 W. 67th St.
Kansas City, Mo. 64113
Write for our free catalogue.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

almost exclusively from printed Soviet sources. In this respect, it is of some merit to correct the older view with information that has come to light recently on the more complex nature of Communist decision-making. But Hough carries the corrections much too far, being bent on demonstrating that the Soviet system is not qualitatively but only quantitatively different from our own. Soviet shortcomings, he tells us, are not much worse than those evident in Western political institutions, and a great deal of Soviet politics is simply misconstrued: thus, for example, Soviet law really functions as law should, and the KGB not only represses, it also educates the citizenry.

Hough has not only subverted Fainsod's fundamental theses, he has also felt free to purge those parts of the original which he chose to incorporate of such information as does not fit his own conception of the Soviet Union. For example, Fainsod quoted figures that showed what an appalling toll Stalin's Terror had taken of Communist officials. Hough omits them (even though they come from official Soviet sources) and provides instead an innocuous but also meaningless statistic on the general decline of party membership in that era. Fainsod provided a lengthy historical account of forced-labor camps under Lenin; Hough (writing, incidentally, after the appearance of *The Gulag Archipelago,* to which he manages to avoid any reference) ignores the subject. Fainsod had 65 separate page references in his index to Soviet forced-labor camps; in Hough's index this entry does not even appear. Nor is there in Hough's volume any mention of Felix Dzerzhinsky, Lenin's Himmler, who figures repeatedly in Fainsod's narrative.

NOBODY quarrels with Hough's right to hold eccentric views, even if they clash with what virtually all Russian dissenters, in and out of the USSR, tell us about the Soviet system. The question is whether a scholar holding them ought to have undertaken to tamper with a well-established manual which rests on diametrically different propositions, and mislead the reader that he is merely "revising," i.e., presumably updating, it. One of the consequences of this whole procedure is that Fainsod, the author, becomes, as it were, a third party to his own book—a scholar with whom Hough debates and whom he even lists in the index as a person with his own, independent opinions. Thus: "Fainsod, Merle: on Stalin's consolidation of power . . . on Khrushchev . . . on postwar period." All that is lacking is an index entry for "Fainsod, Merle: on Hough, Jerry, F.," for it would have highlighted the surrealism of the entire undertaking.

Since it has been my experience that writers of critical reviews are suspected by some readers of acting out of personal motives, let me hasten to add that Hough treats my own work very generously and incorporates some of my findings into the historical section of his book. For this I am, of course, grateful. If, nevertheless, I find myself most unhappy about his product it is first because he has given us a very unrealistic, sugar-coated view of the Soviet Union, and secondly because he has chosen to do so by abusing his position as editor of an established scholarly work to advance his own, very different theories. At least Ibsen could protest travesties of his plays: in this case, the author is no longer alive to voice his dismay.

We mourn the death of

Sydney M. Kaye

1900-1979

Beloved friend of COMMENTARY
and long-time member of the Publication Committee

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

U.S. Government Report:

Box or menthol:

Ten packs of Carlton

have less tar than one pack of...

	Tar mg./cig.	Nicotine mg./cig.
Kent	12	0.9
Kool Milds	14	0.9
Marlboro Lights	12	0.8
Merit	8	0.6
Merit Menthol	8	0.6

	Tar mg./cig.	Nicotine mg./cig.
Parliament Lights	9	0.6
Salem Lights	10	0.8
Vantage	11	0.8
Vantage Menthol	11	0.8
Winston Lights	13	0.9

Carlton is lowest.

Less than 1 mg. tar, 0.1 mg. nic.

Of all brands, lowest...Carlton Box: less than 0.5 mg. tar and 0.05 mg. nicotine av. per cigarette, FTC Report May '78.

Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health.

Box: Less than 0.5 mg. "tar", 0.05 mg. nicotine; Soft Pack and Menthol: 1 mg. "tar", 0.1 mg. nicotine av. per cigarette, FTC Report May '78.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Some people set their sights higher than others.

Seagram's V.O.

The symbol of imported luxury. Bottled in Canada.

Enjoy our quality in moderation.

Canadian whisky. A blend of Canada's finest whiskies. 6 years old. 86.8 Proof. Seagram Distillers Co., N.Y.C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED